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THE
A M E R I C A N
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ART. I.—CHRISTIAN MIRACLES AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE.

By Rev. J. Q. BITTINGER, Yarmouth, Me.

THE controversy between Christianity and scepticism, has its origin not in any superficial or temporary causes, such as may be peculiar to one age rather than to another, but in the necessary antagonism between the two. Circumstances may furnish the occasion for concentrating the attack upon Christianity, because scepticism, animated by an ever active spirit, seizes upon any supposed advantage, but these are accidents which find their sustaining power in the intrinsic hostility between truth and error. It may, therefore, at different times and from special motives assume different forms, whilst its spirit remains the same, and thus scepticism presents some singular contrasts in its development and history.

No thoughtful observer can fail to see the direction in which scepticism for the present is moving. For a long period it was confined to purely rational grounds, and boasted that the development of mind, and the advancement of philosophic thinking must either reject out-right the doctrinal statements of Scripture as opposed to reason and to the consciousness of man, or must tone these down to the demands of reason; therefore, as an obvious inference from this, the supernatural events of the Bible in attestation of the doctrinal statements, are unworthy of credence. The objection reduced to its simplest form is: Miracles must be rejected, because they stand in connection with irrational statements. It would be a sufficient reply to this position to say, that the doctrinal statements of

the Scriptures are not hostile to the pure *intuitions* of reason, though they may be so to the *reasoning* of men in consequence of the disturbance which sin introduces into human speculation.

The objection to Christianity, however, has taken a different form. Scepticism would accept the doctrinal statements of Scripture as truthful and in harmony with the laws and the demands of the soul, but from their adaptation to the spiritual nature of man, is drawn the inference that the miraculous events with which they are connected are mere fabrications of the imagination; that what commands an assent by its intrinsic truthfulness and its adaptation to our deepest spiritual aspirations, needs not the help of miracles to recommend it. The tacit assumption here is, that these doctrines are developed out of the human mind, and the inference, then, would be that the scriptural narrative, so far as it pretends to the miraculous, must be rejected as a needless appendage. It might not be impertinent to inquire of those who hold to this view, why some of the best* minds reject the essential doctrines of the Bible.

But the tendency now is to set aside the supernatural in religion on scientific grounds without regard to the question, whether the doctrines of the Bible are in harmony with reason or not. Miracles are a violation of the uniform and invariable order of nature, acting through universal and inflexible law, and therefore whatever implies a contradiction or suspension of this uniformity, must be rejected for scientific reasons. The investigations of physical science, it is said, preclude the possibility of miracles; there is no room for them; nature indicates no provision for such events. On the contrary she sternly denies them a home within her domain. The advocates of this attack upon Christianity boast a higher philosophic culture, and a more scientific analysis. These are claimed as unfriendly to the miraculous in the Christian religion, and whatever is now incapable of solution on scientific grounds, is either rejected as mythical or fictitious, or it is confidently pretended will be solved, since the progress of the past in this direction is prophetic of the future.†

Scientific scepticism, then, rejects the scriptural narrative and miracles as unworthy of credibility. Can it still hold on

* Minds of the very highest order intellectually have found serious difficulties in accepting Christianity. It would be a natural supposition that if Christianity had been developed out of the human mind, or were something which ever could have been so developed, the best minds would with unanimity group around it as its friends and defenders. But is every great intellect a champion of Christianity?

† Recent Inquiries in Theology, etc., p. 122-3, Am. Ed.

to the doctrines of Christianity? or does the rejection of the one of necessity lead to that of the other? It may be claimed, indeed the claim is put forth, that the Christian revelation stands independent of miracles, and therefore, that these may be denied without affecting its doctrines.* But, as has well been remarked, miracles are not merely *external accessories* of Christianity, but constitutive of it;† and, therefore, if denied, we must submit to the denial of Christianity itself. For we are not concerned with any *possible* means by which the truths of revelation might have been introduced to the attention of man, but with the *actual* means by which the Bible declares they were made known. Christ, therefore, stands before us as doing works of a miraculous character, and claims for these a divine power, and appeals to them as proofs of a divine mission. "If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works, that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in Him." (John x. 37, 38.) "That ye may know that the Son of Man hath power upon earth to forgive sins, (then saith he to the sick of the palsy,) arise, take up thy bed and go unto thine house." (Matt. ix. 6.) Thus also Christ's apostles wrought similar works, and declared that they did so in his name. "By the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, whom ye crucified, whom God raised from the dead, even by him doth this man stand here before you whole." (Acts iv. 10.) If now neither Christ nor his apostles did these works by divine power, though claiming that they were so done, and if they were wrought by human skill, whilst it was pretended they were divine works, what must the inference be as to their truthfulness in other matters? If they imposed upon men in respect of the works which they did, how can they be regarded trustworthy in respect of the doctrines which they taught? For are not the miracles of Christ and his apostles so inwrought with the Christian religion, so "constitutive an element of revelation," that to deny these is in truth to deny the teachings of the Bible? How, for example, can we reject the fact of Christ's resurrection, without also rejecting the doctrines which grow out of that fact, and must stand or fall with it? "If Christ be not raised, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain." (1 Cor. xv. 17, etc.) Then

* Recent Inquiries, etc., p. 106.

† See Mansel's Essay on Miracles in "Aids to Faith," pp. 9-12, where the substance of this paragraph is more fully stated, and where in foot-notes he quotes from Rothe in "Studien a Kritiken," 1858, p. 23—"Miracles and Prophecies are not *adjuncts appended from without* to a revelation in itself independent of them, but *constitutive elements* of the revelation itself."

Christ was not the person he claimed to be. (Matt. xvi. 21 ; xvii. 22, 23.) Then the apostles are "false witnesses of God," and their testimony, therefore, can have no authority. And thus by suffering the moral character of the teachers to be impaired, if the miraculous events of the Bible be derived from the doctrines with which they stand connected, we virtually deal the death-blow to the things taught and witnessed.

The essential truth of miracles, then, as evidences of a supernatural revelation, must not be abated by the advocates of Christianity ; for it is the *fact* of such truth, of which scientific scepticism is not unmindful, that prompts the bold attack upon Christianity, by denying the *possibility* of miracles,—such a possibility as cannot be established on scientific principles. As events in a sphere of existence, where all physical phenomena are thought to be traceable by invariable laws to natural causes, they are incapable of such demonstrations as that on which we accept any fact purely natural, such as the motion of the planets, the results of chemical combination, or the phenomena of electricity. Miracles are to be denied, because no scientific proof can be adduced in their favor ; because they contradict the results of physical research as deduced from the uniformity of nature and the inflexibility of natural law.* It is plain, then, if miracles are to be rejected, because they are not susceptible of proof, such as we have in favor of events in nature, the whole question must be yielded ; for no one holds that miracles occur in accordance with such an exact and uniform law as that by which the physical world unfolds itself, so that they may be reduced to a scientific basis. But would such an admission—that miracles are not traceable to natural causes, and therefore are not susceptible of proof as phenomena of nature are,—justify the inference that they are causeless, as if any one held to such a thing ? † Do we not in the physical world accept multitudes of facts without being able to assign their causes, or to trace the particular law by which they are governed ? Why ? Because, as Butler says, having found that the cause of nature in some respects and to a certain degree is in accordance with general laws, we may infer the same of the rest. ‡ It is, therefore, not neces-

* Recent Inquiries, etc. "The particular case of miracles is one specially bearing on purely *physical* contemplations, and on which no general moral principles, no common rules of evidence, or logical technicalities, can enable us to form a correct judgment," p. 150, c. 119. "The essential question of miracles stands quite apart from any consideration of *testimony*," p. 159.

† Yet Mr. Baden Powell in "Recent Inquiries," &c., affirms that "miracles in the old theological sense," are "isolated, unrelated, and *uncaused*" events, p. 160.

‡ Analogy, Pt. 2, c. 4.

sary to the credibility of a physical fact that the exact cause should be known. How, then, can we know whether the cause of a particular event be natural or supernatural? But if no natural cause can be assigned, as is the case of miracles, does it, therefore, follow that the event is causeless? On the contrary the advocates of Christian miracles claim for them a special divine interposition: a cause as grand and impressive as that which created the world *de nihilo*; and therefore he denies the pertinency of the reasoning which objects to the credibility of miraculous events, because no natural antecedents can be traced.

Now the objection so far from being valid, furnishes an argument in favor of their credibility, viz., because they are *not* natural events, therefore, they demand an antecedent outside of physical causation; and hence the evidence for their proof cannot in the nature of things be such as we have and demand for ordinary phenomena in the material world. They have not, and no one claims for them a scientific basis, simply because they are not within the sphere of nature.

The objection to the possibility of miracles takes a two-fold form: either as founded on the results of scientific investigations, or as founded on the general experience of men. As regards the first, a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature as developed under the test of science, and according to which no provision is made for anything so incredible as a supernatural event. In the other case, a miracle is a violation of our experience as respects the uniformity of these laws. When, therefore, Christ and his apostles declared their works to be miracles, they either acted the part of imposters—which is not the ground of objection to miracles at the present time—or they employed a superior knowledge of the laws of nature, so as to produce effects which have a semblance of the supernatural, but which under the ordeal of a truer and broader scientific investigation will deploy into light, and be admitted as natural results from natural causes.* Thus, for example, by an inhabitant of the tropics, who had no knowledge of the laws of congelation, the conversion of a fluid into a solid, might be thought a supernatural phenomenon, but the advance of scientific knowledge in his case would soon convert this seemingly miraculous fact into a result of natural law. In like manner meteoric phenomena or any unusual event in the natural world, because their causes have not yet been discovered, or their laws traced by which they occur, might be

* Recent Inquiries, p. 123.

viewed as falling within the sphere of the supernatural; but in all such cases which are the result of established law as distinct from personal agency, the development of science will reduce the number of supposed miraculous or supernatural occurrences to natural phenomena. For whatever is strictly within the domain of nature will be settled on a scientific basis.

But let us apply the force of this reasoning to the supernatural events of the New Testament, and see what must be the unavoidable inference drawn from it. Christ and his apostles wrought strange works. This all admit, at least these events stand in intimate connection with their lives, and unless, as is the case with the "Tübingen School," we reject everything as unhistoric which will not stand the test of their canons of criticism, are deemed upon any fair trial well authenticated. These works are held by the Christian mind to be miraculous, achieved by the direct interposition of God. By others, however, they are regarded, if facts at all, as natural phenomena, owing their origin in some way to natural causes, and therefore explicable on grounds of natural causation, because it is maintained that "the inevitable progress of research must, within a longer or shorter period, unravel all that seems most marvelous"* in these works of Christ and his apostles.

Now either those who wrought these assumed miraculous works were in possession of vastly greater knowledge than their contemporaries, and were, therefore, able to control the forces of nature in such a manner as to produce results which seemed to the beholders miraculous, or as they affirm they performed these works as the specially appointed agents of God. But is it not a greater improbability to suppose that Christ and his apostles possessed in the infancy of scientific research such knowledge, and with this could do what cannot now be achieved with all the light of modern investigation, vast as that light is, than, that Jesus of Nazareth and his apostles wrought miracles by a divine power? For whence their knowledge of the laws and forces of nature? Were they recognized as *savans*? Was the age one of such advancement in physical research that they might be regarded as the legitimate culmination of a fruitful scientific development of mind, completing what had for a long series of years been in progress? But so far as we know anything in respect of Christ and his apostles, they stood in no such relation, and the works which they did were due not to superior

* Recent Inquiries, etc., p. 123.

knowledge or control of natural forces, but were claimed to be wrought by a direct power from God. If it be said that Christ and his apostles would insist upon supernatural power as more favorable to the establishment of a new religion than superior control of natural forces would be, then it is incumbent on those who take such ground to prove that they had such knowledge, and that the works came within the range of natural causation. But it may well be asked: Has the boasted advance of physical research because of an approximation to a solution diminished in any degree our belief in the supernatural events of the Bible? Have we by any knowledge of causation found out one or more causes, which by possibility might be assumed as a basis even for accounting for these events? And would not the probability be increased in proportion to the greater number of unknown causes? Yet each step as we advance in our researches—as the unknown in the clear light of science passes into the known—compels us to reject the inference that the miraculous events of revelation may be accounted for on principles of natural causation, because as the agencies which are discovered are found inadequate to such results, the probability diminishes as scientific investigation is circumscribing the sphere of the unknown, that any will be found.

What, then, becomes of the inevitable progress of research? Science recoils in her efforts to solve the miraculous events of the Bible on principles of natural law. For from the day that Christ converted water into wine until the present time, has science ever intimated that she has unravelled principles, detected secret forces in the arcana of nature, which would lead us to infer that the events were secured by natural means? or by their peculiar combination? or by the greater skill and knowledge with which Jesus of Nazareth wrought? But until this is done it will hardly be expected that the advocates of the Christian miracles will accept as admissible the assumption that some two thousand years ago the son of Mary and Joseph, or that obscure fishermen of Galilee, could so control the forces of nature as to secure the results which are attributed to them.

The supernatural events, then, of the Bible cannot be solved on scientific grounds. Still it is denied that miracles are susceptible of proof, because "a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature;" and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from ex-

perience can possibly be imagined.* And physical science insists that so far as it is conversant with the facts and laws of nature, there is no room for the admission of a miracle as a possible event, since its conception of law is such as forbids the possibility of interruption, so as to secure results which could not be brought about in the ordinary course of nature.†

It will be needful at this point to inquire into the meaning of terms *nature* and *law*. By *nature* we understand the present system of natural and spiritual things, as is implied by the term *natural* from its etymology, *nasci*, to be born, to come into being, and therefore signifies the created universe both natural and spiritual. By a *law of nature* we mean that constitution or principle in accordance with which natural phenomena take place, and this implies an established course of things from which there is no deviation. The phrase, *laws of nature*, therefore, expresses the uniformity of physical phenomena so far as these have fallen under the observation of man and is therefore a generalized statement of his experience with reference to such phenomena. Thus gravitation expresses the uniformities of natural events in regard to a common antecedent state, *i.e.*, bodies which are subject to a like condition of unconstraint will uniformly gravitate, and this uniformity the term *gravitation* enunciates. So electric and chemical affinity expresses the uniform harmonious relation of certain physical objects. Now a miracle is an event which *does not* occur in accordance with a law of nature, *cannot* be produced by any power of nature alone, and *is not* connected with a natural antecedent as its sole cause; but on the contrary, a miracle is an event which is produced by the interposition of a new antecedent outside of natural causation, and which is a violation of some existing law or laws, of nature, as the change of water into wine, where the law by which water remains water, and is incapable of being anything else within the sphere of nature, gives way to an entirely new law.‡

* Hume's Phil. Works, Vol. III. p. 183.

† "If we could have any such evidence from nature [Deity working miracles,] it could only prove extraordinary *natural* effects, which would not be *miracles* in the old theological sense, as isolated, unrelated, and uncaused." *Recent Inquiries*, etc., p. 160.

‡ "The change of water into wine, by an instantaneous process, certainly is not the result of the original constitution of things in the physical world. . . . Nature . . . produces wine by the process of growth and fermentation. Now, [i.e. by miraculous interposition,] she produces it directly without this mediate process. . . . Is there any contradiction here of the former method? . . . Are not the laws and processes of nature still in force? Are

The terms nature and law, however, have been used in a wide and somewhat different sense. The *latter* as evinced in the phenomenal world, is an expression of will, and is properly speaking nothing more than the will of God. What we call law is only a convenient mode of expressing our experience of the uniformity of certain events; but in reality whatever takes place in nature is the direct and immediate result of will.* The term *nature* has been employed as including not only what is actual in the constitution of things, but also what is potential—what is brought about by natural causation, as well as what can be secured by divine inworking.† According to this view of nature, a miracle is as natural as any event in the series of physical antecedents and consequents, and is therefore no exception to the order and harmony of the universe. For the phenomena which come under our observation are the manifestation and the realization of the ideal according to which God planned the world, and all that takes place is in consonance with the ideal constitution of things, so that the distinction between the natural and the supernatural disappears, and when anything is said to be contrary to the course of things, it is so with regard to the usual manifestation of nature, but not in contravention of the original constitution which God has given it. The ideal and divine conception of the world includes within itself both what occurs by natural causation, and also what does so by divine inworking, whilst the ordinary events of every-day occurrence owe their origin to natural causation alone. The former was called the receptive power of nature, *potentia receptiva*, the latter the active power of nature, *potentia activa*.

not vines still bearing fruit, and grapes still yield wine, just as ever?"—*Bib. Sac.* 1862, p. 339.

The relevancy of this reasoning to the question in dispute is inadmissible, since it assumes what has never been affirmed, viz., that the violation of law in the conversion of water into wine, is so total and universal a setting aside of the natural process by which wine is made as no longer to be produced in that way. Hence the exultant inquiry, "Are not vines still bearing fruit and grapes still yielding wine, just as ever?" Those who hold that a miracle is in violation of the laws of nature maintain that it is so *with reference to a particular case*, and not that these laws are universally suspended. If Jesus of Nazareth convert water into wine, is it necessary, on the supposition that a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature, to infer, therefore, that nowhere the ordinary process of making wine exists any longer? The changing of water into wine in Cana of Galilee by miraculous power in contravention of natural agencies, no more carries with it the inference that elsewhere the process of growth and fermentation has been set aside in the production of wine than the interruption of gravitation necessarily interferes with every other natural law.

* Trench on Miracles.

† Neander's Ch. Hist. Vol. VIII, pp. 158, etc., Eng. Edition.

In this way results could be secured by the inworking of God's power in nature, which could not be accomplished by the forces of nature alone. God develops out of nature without infringement of her laws what was not originally implanted in nature, and it is to this divine inworking that the supernatural events are to be referred, which are beyond and above nature rather than contrary to it, beyond and above it in the restricted sense. Thus the objection against miracles, viz., that they are impossible, because in violation of the course of nature, is thought to be met. They contradict the manifestation of nature of which we are daily cognizant, but not that higher nature which God unfolds by his power as the demands of the universe require. Nature is thus amplified and expanded as the means through which God accomplishes what otherwise she is inadequate to without such divine inworking.

There is a sense in which this scholastic view of nature and of miracles is correct. God works in and through nature in the production of miracles, yet the cause of any supernatural event is not something which lies potentially within nature, and only needs the impetus of divine assistance to accomplish its end, but is a power from without acting in and upon nature, controlling it absolutely, and subjecting the merely natural to the supernatural, setting aside the ordinary course of things, and introducing new agents for special purposes. If, however, under the term nature we include all which divine power is able to bring about by special inworking as well as what takes place from merely physical causes, then it is clear that a miracle is an event entirely within the domain of nature, and is above it or beyond it only relatively to our narrow conception, which confines the true *nature* to physical phenomena, to the series of physical antecedents and consequents. Such is certainly a latitudinarian use of the term. But if nothing more is intended than that miracles are part of God's plan of governing the world, and that he made provision for them as he did for the common events of nature, then no objection could be made to such a view, though it is manifestly as improper to call *that* nature as it would be to call his providence, or the scheme of redemption, or the conversion of a sinner, nature.

Much more unwarrantable, however, is the use of the word nature in such an extended sense as to include the entire existence of things and of beings, created and uncreated.* No

* * The Highest of all Powers, of whose mighty agency the universe which sprung from it, affords evidence so magnificent, has surely not ceased to be one of the powers of nature, because every other power is exercised only in delegated

event according to such a view can take place which has not for its antecedent a natural cause, since nature is all comprehensive and all inclusive, and a miracle is neither supernatural nor contrary to nature, but only extraordinary as fulfilling a special purpose. But how shall this special purpose—witnessing to a divine revelation—attract man's attention, unless the event be so signally in opposition to all previous experience as to stamp it as a violation of the laws of nature?*

It has been objected to the definition of a miracle as a violation of the course of things, that the only case in which such violation could take place, would be when the principle of cause and effect is interrupted.† It is manifest, if from causes which are in all respects alike effects be developed which are unlike, we should from our previous experience admit that in such a case the law of sequence had been disturbed. But do the advocates of the Christian miracles claim as essential to their definition of a miracle that the principle of cause and effect should be violated? Do they admit that the antecedent being the same, there may be an irregularity in the sequences? They affirm as stoutly as any do that every effect must not only have a cause, but that every cause, in like circumstances, must produce a like effect. They deny the possibility of miracles, if by violation be meant the irregular connection between cause and effect. For it is equally absurd that the effect should follow irregularly, as that an effect should take place without a cause. No such abnormal action is found in nature. But what they affirm is, that in the case of miracles the different effect is produced by a new antecedent, is an interruption of, a deviation from, or violation of some existing law of nature. It is, therefore, erroneous, as some have maintained,‡ that the only case in which the laws of nature can be supposed to be violated, is when the antecedents being exactly the same, a different consequent results. All, however, that is implied by those who hold to the definition of a miracle as a violation of the course of nature, is that by a direct power of God, either a cause, which in the ordinary course of things would be followed by a uniform consequent, is set aside, and a new cause is introduced by which the same

and feeble subordination to his omnipotence. He is the *greatest of all the powers of nature.*"—Brown on Cause and Effect, note E, p. 225, Andover Edition.

* Taylor's Moral Government, Vol. II, pp. 390, &c.

† Brown on Cause and Effect, Note E, p. 221.

‡ Brown on Cause and Effect; Mansel's Essay in Aids to Faith; Neander's Ch. Hist., Vol. VII., p. 158, &c., have insisted upon this as the only possible instance in which law can be violated.

effect follows, as the miraculous conception and birth of Christ ; or a cause in a particular case is made to cease entirely, and an effect produced, which nature is incompetent to, as the raising of Lazarus from the dead ; and therefore the only question is, is such a mode of procedure, such an event, a violation of the uniform order of things ?

Let us for the sake of a test lay by the side of this definition a single fact of Scripture. Take the raising of Lazarus from the dead. It is a law of nature, so far as the experience of men goes—and the case of Lazarus is not considered as disturbing that experience, both because it is specially provided for, and because we may always as to time transfer our experience back of this anomalous one—that if a man die, he remains in that state : there is nothing in such a condition out of which by any force of nature he can ever come to life again. Jesus of Nazareth speaks the word, Lazarus comes forth from his grave, life ever more reigns in his corporeal nature. If, now, the law of death be not interrupted, violated, what, it may be asked, becomes of the law that held Lazarus under death ? Does it still exist as before ? Can the law of death in his case continue, and yet he be alive ? Can these two laws co-exist in the same person, and at the same time ? Would not such a statement be self-contradictory and absurd ? Can a thing be and not be at the same time ? In a figurative sense, and with reference to different aspects of man's nature, we may indeed affirm of men that they are dead whilst yet alive, (Rom. xvi : 11. Col. iii : 3,) but not as respects the same thing in man. He may be spiritually dead and corporeally alive at the same moment, but not corporeally dead and corporeally alive at the same time. Is, then, the raising of Lazarus from the dead, an event outside of the range of mere nature, not a violation of a law, since it is broken off, and does not act again until Lazarus passes under the power of death a second time ?

It is said, however, that such a view of miracles furnishes ground for a strong, if not an insuperable objection against them ; that the entire force of the sceptic's argument, both that of Spinoza and Hume, as well as that which is drawn from modern scientific and physical investigation, lies at this point ; * so that the only way in which the objection can be successfully met, is by correcting the definition of a miracle.

The evidence for the uniformity of nature, says Hume, is

* Brown on Cause and Effect, Note 2, p. 220 : Nature and Supernatural, p. 338.

as complete as anything can be imagined,* and therefore to affirm that in certain cases this uniformity has been waived, is such a shock to the belief of mankind as to interpose an insuperable barrier to its reception. Yet stranger is the objection as put by Spinoza. Its force lies not in the amount of evidence for the uniform cause of things, but in his conception of God and nature. The laws of nature are God's chosen mode of acting, and therefore he cannot act in any other way; they are the expressions of his will, unchangeable, and therefore not susceptible of interruption; they are so perfect and so comprehensive as to be adequate to all his plans, and therefore are not subject to interference or revision. Nature and God are such a unit in his conception, God is so limited to his decreed mode of action, that a miracle, which implies something different from the settled order of things, is impossible, either, first, because it would argue God's changeableness, or secondly, because it would imply disorder, both of which would be contrary to Spinoza's idea of God and nature. A miracle, therefore, as a violation of the uniformity of nature, is inadmissible, since God who is bound by a necessity to his chosen ways of action, cannot vary the "*leges et regulae naturae*," which are the "*ipsa Dei decreta*."

Now this objection is sought to be obviated by substituting a truer definition. A miracle is not a violation of the laws of nature, nor does it imply disorder, but only a subordination of natural laws to ulterior ends. God's government of the natural and the moral world is perfectly harmonious. No part inflicts injury on the other, but the lower is made subject to the higher. By thus preserving the harmony of the universe and the uniformity of nature, a miracle is an event as readily admissible as any occurrence which manifestly subjects a lower force to a higher one.† Thus, it is said, if we raise the hand a result is produced by subjecting the law of gravity to the power of will and muscle, but the law of gravitation is not violated or discontinued.‡

If now this example is chosen by those who deny that miracles are a violation of nature as an exact illustration of their view of the manner in which miracles affect the cause of nature, it is signally infelicitous, since it makes them common events, deprives them of all special marks of power, and puts them within the reach of human ability. We submit, therefore, whether such a view of miracles has a tendency to im-

* Phil. Works, Vol. III, p. 183.

† Trench on Miracles, p. 20.

‡ Nature and Supernatural, p. 338.

press us with their transcendent power and significance. Besides, the fallacy of such a conception of miracles lies in the fact, that no distinction is made between a state or condition in which a *tendency to the contrary can not exist*, and a state or condition in which such a *tendency does exist*. In a state of death, for example, there is no tendency to resurrection. If life be communicated to a dead body it must be by a direct interposition of God, as absolutely as at the creation of the world. But in any temporary overcoming of the law of gravitation nothing of the kind occurs. The law still acts, is a living, vital force, and the moment the counter-force is withdrawn the law becomes apparent again.

The objection, however, which is made to miracles on scientific grounds lies equally against miracles regarded as an interposition, as against miracles regarded as a violation of law.* If a single law of nature according to the data of science be inviolable, *a fortiori* that invariable order of the universe which is in accordance with law. If law be so absolute and inflexible as to be beyond any power to vary it, how much more that vast and interdependent physical system, which is the expression of law, since it is assumed that the highest conception which we can have of Deity, is God working according to law, and therefore he is bound by a necessity as absolute as law is rigid.† The scientific reasoner maintains that the phenomena of the physical world must have natural antecedents, must be a necessary part of the series of material agents which are at work, and that nothing can come out of nature which is not in nature; as Spinoza says: "Quod ex iisdem [legibus naturæ] non sequitur."

There is, then, no room for any variation of the order and constitution of things, and thus miracles defined as an interposition, *i e.*, as the introduction of a new antecedent outside of natural causation, are as inadmissible on scientific grounds as violation is, because the wedging in of causes other than natural agents would be as hostile to the harmony of the physical universe as the interruption of any of her laws would be.

* Those who define a miracle as an *interposition in nature*, mean by this that a new antecedent is introduced by which the miracle is produced, but that this antecedent *does not* disturb the order of nature, whilst those who hold to miracles as a *violation of natural law*, admit the fact of a new antecedent, but maintain also that this antecedent *does* infringe on nature's harmony. Both are agreed as to miracles being an interposition of God, but differ as to its influence on the natural universe.

† This would be a natural and obvious inference, not only from the position which Spinoza occupies, but is the basis of the entire reasoning of Baden Powell against miracles. These imply change or interruption of that order which everywhere meets us as the exponent of Deity.

No modification, then, of the present order of things is possible without disturbing the "series of eternally impressed consequences;" for the forces of nature are so mutually related and interlaced as to make such an event impossible,* because either the whole universe must be disturbed, or a series of miracles must be wrought co-extensive with nature and indefinite duration.†

From this it will be seen how much is gained by defining miracles as an interposition rather than a violation of the uniformity of nature. The question still comes back: what *is* interposition? How does it affect the physical universe? Does it imply a disturbance of the present constitution of things? or is it by previous arrangement of natural agents provided for, so that it occurs without violation of the uniformity of physical order? And yet interposition cannot be dependent upon natural antecedents, for this would be the same thing as if it was classed with the series of physical phenomena, and therefore no longer an interposition of special significance, as though springing from a cause *extra naturam*.

So far as the naked question of physical causation is considered, it is true we cannot conceive of a disturbance in antecedents without admitting an entire change in the consequents. Thus we may select any natural phenomenon, and by supposition put it under new conditions, as the position of a pebble on the sea-shore, which has been determined wholly by physical causes.‡ If now we suppose this pebble removed some feet inland or seaward, we must also admit a different state in the antecedent causes by which it was placed where it is, and thus the series of physical phenomena must have been other than they were. As, however, physical nature subsists together in definite relations, and any modification of the present order of things must introduce disorder into the whole, since in view of the accurate adjustment of the material universe, if from one of the outer-planets a particle of matter should be taken and carried to one of the inner-planets, a definite though inappreciable disturbance must be introduced, and in the ages to come, were there no power exerted to counteract the disorder, the planets would come into collision, and a universal destruction must follow; therefore, the inference

* Recent Inquiries, etc. p. 150.

† This must be accepted as an unavoidable inference from the cosmical reasoner's position that law is inviolable. But in the supposition that it is violable, then we need continuous miraculous interposition to meet such an emergency as would be induced by the first violation of nature's harmony.

‡ Bowen's Principles of Metaphysical and Ethical Science, p. 98. Quoted and translated from Fichté.

is drawn that a miracle as an interruption of the order of nature is inadmissible as a possible event. Such an inference, it is conceded, would be legitimate on the supposition that nature is under the control of Fate, and that in obedience to inflexible law, "she casts up from her dark abyss only eternal transformations of herself."* But the question assumes quite a different form when a new factor is admitted. Substitute for Fate intelligent Being, and for inflexible law, free-will, and is it not demonstrable that the series of physical antecedents and consequents could have been interrupted at any point without the necessity of a change in the anterior material agents? And, if so, are the advocates of physical science prepared to say that such interruption by a free moral agent, as distinct from a material agent, stands in as rigid connection with physical causes as if accomplished through material agency? For example, the pebble if placed in some other spot than that in which it now is, would if governed wholly by material agents compel us to infer a different state of things from that by which it is placed where it now lies; but would such an inference follow if we assign as the immediate antecedent cause of the pebble's removal inland or otherwise the agency of man? And if so does he not become a link in the series of physical causation as absolutely bound by forces and laws beyond which he cannot act as the material agents are? But such a view can leave us no room for moral agency, and therefore the acts of man as well as the phenomena of material nature are governed by inflexible physical law. Against an absurdity, however, as gross as this, viz.: that man's acts are connected with a series of physical antecedents precisely as a link of physical causation is, with its antecedents, the common sense of mankind rebels. At all events, physical research cannot demonstrate this to be the fact, and until it be established upon such a basis, even the advocates of physical science are compelled to reject it, however well such an assumption might favor their objections against the Christian miracles.

Meantime all except "highly cultivated minds and duly advanced intellects," persist in denying that man is in any sense an agent subject to physical law as material agents are, and therefore maintain that whilst within the domain of physical nature the most rigid law and sequence is observed, yet because man as a free agent does not come under such necessary control as material agents do, he may at any time interfere

* Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, p. 29, quoted from Jacobi.

with and disturb the series of natural antecedents and consequents, and thus secure results which would not be secured, if left to the action of natural causation.

Those, therefore, who deny that any of the forces of nature are susceptible of disturbance, forget that by voluntary agency such disturbance is constantly taking place. If only law and matter are to be dealt with and mind be eliminated from the universe, then no such infringement on nature were possible. But once admit mind as an element into the question, and its whole *status* is changed, and that which seems, and for ought we know is an impossibility, looking at it from the point of inflexible law, becomes not only possible, but actual. For are there not effects produced by the agency of man which would not occur by any of the laws of nature, independent of such agency? From the mouth of a Parrott gun a projectile is sent into the air, and though as soon as it leaves the cannon's mouth, it is subjected to and governed by the laws of nature, such as gravitation, atmospheric resistance, etc., is it not clear that the projection itself is not the result of these, nor indeed of any natural law, but purely of a cause which the agency of man has created? Here, then, is an event which has no involuntary physical cause as its sole antecedent, but is produced by a cause outside of the order of natural agents. Here, too, is a disturbance of the physical constitution, an interruption of the "series of eternally impressed consequences," without prejudice to the general order and harmony which nature presents.

It must be clear, then, that physical phenomena may and do occur which owe their origin partly to the agency of man, others which are wholly dependant upon such agency. Either the flexibility of law and the violability of nature in some form must be conceded, or the agency of man must be classed as a member of the series of natural phenomena.* The former, if we conceive of law, as the cosmical reasoner does, should seem to involve some serious obstacles, whilst the latter, unless we be willing to yield all that is worth contending for in religion, is wholly inadmissible. For what is revelation and the evidence for it worth, or of what use can these be, if man, like material nature, be governed by forces and laws, over which he has no control? Consciousness testifies to man's freedom, experience teaches that within a certain limit he is master of law, and not merely the servant of it. But if it once be ad-

* Thus Fichté, as quoted in Bowen's *Principles of Metaphysical and Ethical Science*, p. 99: "I myself with all that I call mine, am but a link in this chain of a natural necessity."

mitted that human agency can in a measure control and modify the ordinary course of things, we are furnished with an exercise of power, analogous to that which may be supposed to take place in the production of supernatural events, ascending from the finite efficient will to the Infinite First Cause.*

Nor do the advocates of the Christian miracles admit what is either asserted or implied by cosmical reasoners, that God is limited in his activity to the laws of nature which he has chosen for the government of the physical universe. There are other modes of the divine activity besides that which we see in physical nature. Her laws are adequate to all the ends for which they were ordained. They neither exceed their aim nor fall short. They need no revision or re-adjustment. They are perfect. But they do not limit God's power of working in other respects, as that, for example, which is exercised in the realm of spiritual life and existence. Whether the advocates of scientific research are prepared to admit the spiritual world as distinct from the material, and therefore under a system of laws different from those which govern the physical universe, or whether all may be classified under the head of natural, the whole theory of religion implies something other than mere nature, and that material law is not an exhaustive expression of the divine mind. "Doing all things after the counsel of his own will," are words which find their significance and their fulfillment not in nature, but in the supernatural. The Christian consciousness is settled in the conviction that God manifests himself in other ways than in physical nature. Nor does divine interposition argue any change in God, since miracles may be assumed as provided for, and are part of his comprehensive plan of working. They are not natural, but supernatural occurrences. Their peculiarity consists in the fact that they for the attainment of higher ends contravene the ordinary course of things. The disorder which may be supposed as following from such violent interference is counteracted. For he who created all things and made them subject to his will, and placed the physical and the moral universe under a system of laws, has the power to waive his methods in the natural world, if the demands of the moral world require it. And who can say that God has not thus

* It must not be inferred, however, that man's agency, so far as it may be supposed to act upon nature, is in any sense miraculous. It is only analogous to that power which operates in the production of miracles in so far as results are secured which do not depend upon natural causes for their existence, and therefore affords a sufficient answer to those who deny the possibility of miracles on scientific grounds, because it is maintained that all phenomena owe their origin to natural agents.

chosen to violate the laws of physical nature, in order that he might impress more signally upon man's mind his miraculous interposition?^{*} Would not something as stupendous as the miracles of the Scriptures be necessary to attest a divine revelation, since its magnitude transcends all difficulties which the violation of natural law seems to present?

It would be well for those who, from the uniformity of nature, argue the impossibility of miracles, because such an event contravenes her laws, to consider the power or capacity of nature, to be interrupted without destroying her constancy in the main, or without introducing the disorder and ruin which should seem inevitable. This power or capacity of nature, either of contraction or expansion, is a wise provision to meet emergencies. One thing stands over against another, one law counteracts the tendency of another law. In chemical operations we observe affinities and repellances, forces which attract and cause particles of matter to cohere, and forces which repel and cause these to separate. Matter, therefore, subjected to the laws and forces of affinity alone would become immovably knit together, and if only the laws and forces of repulsion act upon it, *these* would rend the particles apart, so that a plant which needs for its vitality that sap should ascend from the roots to all the branches, would, if the forces of expansion and capillary attraction were abstracted, be without the means of life, because the forces of affinity must bind the particles into a solid mass. In like manner the atmosphere, if under the laws of expansion alone, would become too diffuse for the present arrangement of animal and vegetable life, but in opposition to this tendency to separation is found the law of compression,—elasticity and gravitation complementing each other, so as mutually to repel the injury which the other singly would induce. The same holds true of the laws which govern the heavenly bodies, and which give to them their uniform motion. Yet within this uniformity is discovered an irregularity. For example, the moon's orbit was found to be slightly diminishing, and the obvious inference was, that at some future period it must fall to the earth. But this contraction was discovered to occur in cycles, and that by forces in nature of which little is known, this diminution is counteracted,

^{*}A careful distinction must be drawn between God's violation of the laws of nature by miraculous interposition, and his contradicting himself. These are confounded by the sceptic. He imagines, if miracles contravene the order of nature, that God must, therefore, be changeable; whereas these are events developing under a plan which includes them, and which were decreed as part of his comprehensive manner of working. Gen. vi: 6; 1 Sam. xv: 10, would argue the same by parity of reasoning.

and enlargement of the orbit takes place after contraction has gone on for a time.

All through nature we discover in some form this principle of compensation. The loss in one direction is met in another. The generation of heat stands related to that of cold. The earth in different localities is subjected to various degrees of temperature. Too much heat in one section will, if allowed freedom to diffuse itself, invite a surplus of cold from another. The intense heat at the equator and in the tropics expands, and in connection with the earth's rotation gives place to the intense cold at the poles and in arctic regions. The drought which comes upon the land, and for a time defeats the toil of the husbandman, contracting full-swelling rivers on which commerce holds sway into mere threads of water, and silencing the voice and hum of industry, is compensated in the earth's freer absorption of carbonic gas, which is as essential to productiveness as heat and moisture are.

Were it not for this capacity in nature of expansion and contraction, of diastole and systole, in a world of violence and disturbance from without in a thousand forms, we should find abnormal results as the rule and not the exception. But an inherent power surmounts these when confined within certain limits, and thus is accomplished what are classified as natural phenomena. The human system has vast elastic power in accommodating itself to climate, temperature, food, exposure, etc., which in one sense is natural, in another sense acquired capacity. It is said of the bee, that if transferred from a cold to a tropical climate, it ceases to build cells and to gather produce for the future. Powers of mind are repressed or enlarged by conditions of life, and of discipline, which secure for a deficiency in one direction, a compensation in another. And thus we shall find that nature in general reveals such a power, and that the principle of compensation is one of her grand and constant laws, by which she subserves the purposes of an intelligent Creator. In this way a free agent, acting independent of natural causes, can impinge upon what we regard the rigid and unalterable course of nature, without shocking her harmony, or plunging the universe into chaos.*

But also in nature is discovered what may be termed the principle of restoration. Provision is made by which in-

* Bib. Sac, Jan. 1863, Article, "The Law of nature's constancy subordinate to the Higher Law of change," where will be found many of the facts of this paragraph stated by one who is regarded authority in such matters — Dr. Hitchcock.

juries to a certain extent are repaired by an inherent power in the constitution of things ; as, for example, the bark of a tree, if it be torn, has the injury repaired by new formations ; or trees, if denuded of their foliage by destructive insects, clothe themselves anew with a vesture of leaves ; or the vine-dresser, if he lop off vigorous sprouts, others shoot forth to restore the waste. We trace the same law as regards the human system : wounds heal over, fractured bones knit together again, and in most cases the restoration is so complete, that the organs of the system perform their functions as regularly and as accurately as if no interruption had taken place. Sometimes violent contraction of the muscles occurs, so as to induce settled deformity, as when the head is powerfully deflected from its normal, erect position upon the spinal column. This difficulty may be obviated by severing the muscles of the neck which bind the head to a lateral position, and thus giving it freedom to assume its proper position. But how shall the head be controlled in obedience to the will, since the severed muscles are no longer capable of giving it motion ? In securing an erect and normal attitude to the head encroachments have been made upon other facts of the system, injuries inflicted. Note now, how the work of restoration is carried on. The muscles, after being cut and parted, exude at the several ends a fibrous substance which is converted into new formation, and thus a species of growth takes place, until the separated parts come together, and a new section is added to its length. More marked still is the formation of new blood-vessels in cases of flesh-wounds or surgical operations. Health and strength depend upon free and uninterrupted circulation to all parts of the system. How, then, where the veins and arteries have been severed, where incisions have healed over or new matter added ? How shall the blood which is forced into these interrupted channels get back again to the heart, since it cannot retrace its course through the same avenues by which it flows out ? Nature meets the emergency. The violence done to the venous and arterial systems is repaired by the formation of new channels, and blood is distributed through the super-added sections by what surgeons call *out-growth*. For example, from capillary blood-vessels passing by the edge of the new formation projections are formed, and in process of time these become canals through which the fluid is conveyed to those parts which are without a supply of blood. These projections spring from two determinate points in an imperfect arch, and work their way toward each other until they meet in the crown of the arch, and the par-

tition-wall which is formed at their junction being cleared away, a free channel is made for the blood to pass.*

By these examples which may be traced amidst the phenomena of the world around us, we see how an elastic power has been given to nature, by which she admits of expansion and contraction, and possesses an inherent capacity of repairing encroachments upon her harmony. Thus a concurrent development of nature in a series of physical events, and the development of nature in connection with free agency, where interference occurs without appreciable disturbance, may argue the admissibility of miracles on the ground that they, though in violation of natural laws, do not because of restoration disturb the harmony of nature as a whole. For if we can trace in the world of physical nature a capacity of accommodation to emergencies, it would be difficult to make out so strong an objection against the possibility of miracles on the ground of the inflexible uniformity of the course of things. Nor can it be argued that miraculous interposition should so disturb the grand order of the universe as to imperil its future stability, since as in numerous cases nature has a restoring and compensating capacity, so in the plenitude of His wisdom, whose plan and mode of working nature in part is, provision may be made that the interpositions which have occurred in connection with the introduction of the Christian religion, should be met by a capacity of nature specially provided. From the fact, therefore, that within the sphere of nature is found a principle by which any temporary interruption is overcome, we may infer that the disorder which the working of a miracle might be supposed to create, would also be corrected, not by inherent forces of nature, but by a provision previously ordained. The event is supernatural, but so located in the plan of God, that it demands a divine interposing cause, and is defensible against the charge of an irregularity which must introduce chaos and ruin into the universe on the ground that here as in nature simply the principle of compensation and of restoration may stand in juxtaposition with the miracle itself. The analogy of nature would afford a sufficient basis for such a conclusion.

It is evident, then, that the claims of scientific scepticism cannot be admitted, and instead of being an insuperable objection to the Christian miracles, must itself contend with very formidable obstacles, such as have been pointed out.

* Paget's Surgical Pathology, pp. 146, etc.

For the miraculous events of the Bible are not susceptible of solution on scientific grounds, since neither Christ nor his apostles come before us as cosmical philosophers, nor has the advance in physical research approximated in the least to a solution, though its progress has been vast, and amidst a halo of light. Nor is it true as has been seen that natural law is so rigid and absolute as to admit of no variation in obedience to higher interests and the will of God. But on the contrary, the phenomena of nature furnish a basis of reasoning, that instead of the disorder which is supposed must follow in the event of miracles, provision has been made for their occurrence without ruinous infringement upon the harmony of the universe. If now this view, which is warranted by the development of physical phenomena be a correct one, then it should seem clear to any mind capable of unbiased reasoning, that the evidence in favor of the Christian miracles—their possibility being conceded—is as complete and as overwhelming as in favor of any question entangled with so many apparent and real difficulties.

So far, then, from establishing, as physical science claims to be able to establish, that a miracle is an *impossibility*, a different conclusion should seem to be reached; for not only do phenomena in nature suggest their possibility, but the existence of a physical system in conjunction with a moral system in which personal agency is constantly disturbing in a degree the harmony of natural agents, points clearly in the same direction. The question, therefore, of their *actual existence* is affected by considerations of their *probability* in view of a divine revelation being made to man, and the amount and worthiness of direct personal testimony in their favor.

The objection to the Christian miracles is indeed a formidable objection, such as human testimony alone, be the actual degree whatever it may, cannot successfully meet. A miracle, argues Hume, taken by itself, is such an event, as cannot be established on human testimony alone. Its occurrence in the world, contrary to universal experience hitherto, is such a shock to the laws of human belief as to raise at once an insuperable presumption against the event unless we can offset this by some counter presumption. But *this* is what Hume is most careful to keep out of sight. He viewed a miracle as an event which shall be judged by naked human testimony. He supposed other considerations, without which mere personal witnesses are summoned in vain; for without an over-mastering purpose being assigned for which the miracle is wrought, it is a futile effort in arraying in detail the testimony either of one or of a score of witnesses.

We may, therefore, briefly examine the evidence in favor of the Christian miracles. The miracle or supernatural event may be expressed under the form of x , and the incredibility of such an occurrence, arising from the uniformity of nature, may be assumed as equal to y , then it follows that if x is to be proved as an actual event, the evidence in its favor, whatever that may be, must be a quantity transcending y . Let this be represented by z . Now it requires no great logical insight to see that x may be supposed to be affected in two ways: either, *first*, by a direct reduction of the value of y through human testimony, which is Hume's supposition, or, *secondly*, by an indirect disturbance of the value of y , in subjecting x to antecedent probability, which Hume is careful to suppress. If, then, we suppose that x , instead of being a neutral case, *i. e.*, having neither probability nor improbability for or against it, be subjected to antecedent probability, *this* is equivalent to a diminution of the value of y , which expresses the incredibility of the event.

Applying, now, this abstract reasoning to the case of the Christian miracles, and we may suppose them to be affected, either, *first*, by removing all antecedent presumption against them, which is the same as preparing the way for their reception on human testimony; or, *secondly*, by assigning a moral end of sufficient magnitude and worthiness, so as to make them not only suitable, but according to the demands of human belief. As regards the first, *viz.*: the presumption against miracles, *that* rests on the fact that a miraculous interposition is contrary to the known laws of nature as established by universal experience. There is, however, as Butler remarks, no presumption against some things, which if now transpiring we should call miraculous: none, for example, against the supposition that at the beginning of the world God made a revelation to man, since we do not know what the course of nature was when the world was peopled, and therefore cannot from this draw an inference against such an event.*

On the other hand there have been at different periods special divine interpositions, as the introduction of organic life upon the earth, after its existence for ages in an inorganic state, or the repeated introduction of new species of animals in the place of others that have disappeared, and finally the consummation of the present order of things in the introduction of man himself upon the theatre of life. Against any of these interpositions, which are established upon evidence

* Butler's Analogy, Pt. 2, c. 2.

beyond the possibility of doubt,* on the principles of cosmical reasoners, who maintain that nothing occurs in nature which has not for its antecedent a physical cause, the presumption would be as formidable as against miraculous interposition itself, since they have no antecedent in nature as their sole cause. Organic life does not spring from inorganic; new species, except in the theory of Darwin, do not come by natural causes, nor is the higher and the more perfect only a development of the lower and the less perfect, as has been maintained by Lamarck and the author of "*Vestiges of Creation*." Their existence by a divine interposition, as distinct from natural effects following from natural causes, is as absolute as the existence of matter by original creation, and thus is furnished a basis of belief that God may interfere in other respects should the universe demand such an interposition.† For who can say that in view of our total ignorance as to the causes on which the present course of nature depends, it may not have become necessary, in the space of five or six thousand years, that miraculous interpositions should take place.‡

But secondly, if we take into view the moral system of the world, we then may assign very particular reasons why such a divine interposition should occur, and why miracles are worthy of credibility.§ For surely man's need of a divine revelation is most crying; his moral darkness without it, is extreme and pitiable, his ignorance of God's purposes so total and complete, as to furnish a strong presumption in favor of such an event. All that is needed for the credibility of any extraordinary agencies, is a sufficient reason, and if in regard to the Christian miracles this be not found in a divine revelation, which was destined not only to meet a most urgent want in man as respects his condition and his knowledge of God, but what is of infinitely more value, was destined to revolutionize his moral nature, and re-create in him the image of his Maker, what can be assigned as such? For the benevolence of God, the moral degradation and ruin of man, his capacity

* Dana's *Geology*, pp. 394, etc. *Bib. Sac.*, Oct., 1854, Art. "Special Divine Interposition."

† It is true the introduction of organic life upon the earth after its existence for a long period in an inorganic state, or the beginning of new species in the process of time, are not strictly miraculous events. "For," as Butler says, "a miracle in its very nature, is relative to a course of nature, and implies somewhat different from it, as being so;" but organic life and the existence of new species form part of the present constitution of things. Still they serve to remove the presumption against miraculous interposition, because, as Mansel observes, "the beginning of a spiritual system at one period is as credible as the beginning of a material system at another period."

‡ Analogy, Pt. 2, c. 2.

§ Analogy, Pt. 2, c. 2.

for eternal happiness, and his exposure to eternal misery, and the consequent glory which would come from redeeming him from darkness and sin, furnish the most transcendent motive for a divine miraculous interposition in his behalf. And should we not expect, too, that an event so unique as a divine revelation, would be accompanied by demonstrations of miraculous power in keeping with its character? Once admit the fact of a supernatural revelation from God, and the step is easy and natural to the conclusion, that it will be sealed by the exhibition of miraculous agencies. For "revelation itself is miraculous, and miracles are the proof of it." * And, moreover, if the Christian religion, which professes that it was introduced by the help of miracles, have on this very account promoted man's spiritual welfare, then is furnished in their behalf an ample reason, far superior to any which may be urged against them, drawn from scientific research. For man's spiritual restoration, on account of which miracles are wrought, is of such vast magnitude as completely to annihilate the seemingly insuperable objection which is raised against the Christian miracles on physical grounds.

At this point then it is that the advocates of the Christian miracles are prepared to consider the question of human testimony. And here we need not linger, since *that* is a matter of ample publicity. We need only ask: Is this testimony, both in respect of numbers and of character, not as trustworthy as that on which we accept multitudes of facts which are no more *a priori* † within the range of possibility than are the supernatural events of the Bible? And would it not be difficult to imagine a more formidable array of testimony in support of any extraordinary event than that which can be adduced in support of the Christian miracles? That Jesus of Nazareth wrought such works is proof of his divine mission, is attested by disinterested and trustworthy persons; and Christ himself occupies such a prominent position in the history of the world, and all events bear such a witness to him as has never been borne to any other person, that his claim as a divine messenger from heaven is placed upon an immovable basis. For in him centres the history of the Jewish nation, both before and after his coming, ‡ as well as that of all

* Analogy, Pt. 2, c. 2.

† "*A priori*." By which we mean to express an impossibility founded not in the nature of things, but which would be so regarded until either our own experience or credible testimony had demonstrated the contrary.

‡ "*After his coming*." This from the fact that the Jews since the coming of Christ have been dispersed, and have had a fragmentary history, might seem at first not to furnish any proof in favor of Jesus as the Christ. But as the nation

Christian nations. He exactly meets the prophetic descriptions of the Bible as no other person does, he is the complement of all the types and shadows of the Jewish economy, his appearance on earth is the time in which the Jewish temple and its impressive ceremony are brought to a close, his kingdom has advanced in the earth as no other kingdom ever did, and the religion of Jesus Christ has subdued enemies and surmounted obstacles, which no other system has been able to do; and is this not a testimony for Jesus of Nazareth of unexampled strength?—for his advent and for his resurrection? and, therefore, for the miracles which he claimed to have wrought in his own name and power?

Miracles, then, are susceptible of proof, and therefore of credibility. They are not common events, and therefore demand more than common evidence to prove them. They are not free from grave objections, and which must be confessed to be insuperable, if we seek to establish miracles on the ground of human testimony alone. But that physical science presents an unanswerable objection to their credibility, has not been settled upon such a basis as to command the assent of moral reasoners, though it may satisfy the minds of cosmical reasoners who evince more than a partiality for what they term the grand harmony of the universe and the absolute inflexibility of natural law.* And, therefore, whatever may be the results to which physical research may lead, however firm and unyielding and oppressive we may find that order in which nature moves, so that we are appalled at its grand harmony and rigid inflexibility no less than charmed with its beauty, and feel tempted to believe that law which is so universal is likewise so absolutely inflexible as to suffer no control from without, we must turn to that other, yet sublimer truth, viz., that above and beneath and through all law is the ever-present omnipotence of a Free Divine Lawgiver, who has established the laws and the harmony of nature as the executor of his will, and that therefore he who made these may, if necessity demand, turn them to the fulfillment of his divine purposes of love, which is as much higher than the material universe as mind is above matter. Miracles are the agents of a higher law than that which we see in the physical universe,

in its history and development pointed manifestly to the Messiah, so since the appearance of Jesus of Nazareth, who claimed such a character, its history and disintegration should seem to indicate that Christ was the promised Messiah, that God incarnate was no longer prophetic, but historic. In this sense the Jewish nation centres in Christ after his coming.

* Recent Inquiries, etc., p. 151.

and their credibility is to be judged by that law. And as has well been remarked by an English divine, "Their *possibility* cannot be denied without denying the very nature of God as an all-powerful Being ; their *probability* cannot be questioned without questioning his moral perfections, and their *certainly*, as a matter of fact, can only be invalidated by destroying the very foundations of all human testimony. *

ART. II.—DELIVERY IN PREACHING.

By REV. THOMAS H. SKINNER, D. D., Prof. in Union Theol. Seminary.

1. AN intelligent observer of the common preaching of the times, who compares it with the New Testament idea of preaching, or attempts to resolve it into its proper principles as claiming to be a species of public eloquence, cannot but see that in several radical respects, it needs to be reformed. He must remark in it, as quite ordinary and prominent features, violations of oratorical unity ; want of the freeness, directness and pungency of appeal which individuate the oratorical style ; want of the impassionate, the unction, and the agonistic force, by which the oratory of the pulpit, more than any other, should be characterized. But, with a just estimation of its share of importance in preaching, must he not above all, note and lament an imperative demand for reformation, in the particular which forms the subject of this article ? Long ago, the pulpit was reproached very sharply for a very bad manner of delivery. Said a celebrated ecclesiastic to a celebrated actor of the former century : " How is it that you who deal in nothing but fiction, can so affect your audience as to throw them into tears ; while we who deliver the most awful truths, can scarcely produce any effect whatever ? " " Here," replied the actor, " lies the secret : *you deliver your truths as if they were fictions ; but we deliver our fictions as if they were truths.*" There has been, it would seem, no material change for the better. It has been recently remarked,† that action in speaking generally, is so little approved or designedly employed, that it is hardly any part of the orator's art. In reference to preaching, the fact has been spoken of thus : " Why are we natural everywhere but in the pulpit ? Why this *holoplexia*, on sacred occasions alone ? Why call in the

* Van Mildert, " Boyle Lectures."

† By Archbishop Whately.

aid of paralysis to piety? Is it a rule of oratory to handle the most sublime truths in the driest manner? Is sin to be taken from men as Eve was from Adam by casting them into a deep slumber?*

2. *This is not a matter of small moment.* If preaching be indeed a kind of eloquence, and if its efficacy depends at all on its being true to its principles as such, nothing relating to the practice of it is weightier. Delivery comprehends all the modes of expression in public speaking. "It is," says Cicero, very admirably "*the eloquence of the body* ; and implies the proper management of the voice and gesture." According to the masters of the art and practice of speaking, it is the chief thing in eloquence. "What we have composed," says Quintilian, "is not of so much consequence as how it is delivered ; because every one is affected in proportion as he is made to hear. There is no proof so strong, but it will lose its force, unless it is aided by an emphatic tone in the speaker ; and all passions must become languid unless spirited-up by the voice and countenance, and the attitude of the body." In like manner, Cicero gives more importance to delivery, than, apart from it, to what is delivered. "Without a good delivery, the best speaker can have no name, and with it, a middling one can obtain the highest." Demosthenes goes further : "Being asked what was the greatest excellency in oratory, he not only gave the preference to delivery, but assigned to it the second and the third place ; whereby it appeared that he judged it not so much the principal, as the only excellency." His own practice accorded, it would seem, with his judgment. "After Æschines had lost a cause, he retired in disgrace from Athens to Rhodes, where, at the request of the Rhodians, he read to them that fine oration which Demosthenes had pronounced against Ctesiphon, which he did with a charming voice. When everybody was expressing their applause ; "How would you have applauded," says he, "if you had heard the author himself deliver it? Whereby it appears what a vast influence action had, since the change of the actor could make the same speech appear in quite a different light."† Let us not wonder at this estimation of this part of oratory. Who that has been much employed in speaking has not often found a good discourse spoiled, and a poor one made quite a success, by the manner of pronouncing it? The preaching of Whitefield, apart from his delivery, was in no respect extraordinary ; in-

* Sidney Smith.

† Cicero de Oratore.

cluding his delivery, it has never been equalled. "To ignorant and semi-barbarous men," said John Foster, "even common truths, in Whitefield's preaching, seemed to strike on them in fire and light."

3. *In the tones of the voice alone, there are elements of eloquence, of inconceivable force.* The human voice and the human mind, both inscrutable marvels of divine handiwork, were made for one another. "The voice, together with the look and the whole frame, is responsive to the passions of the mind, as the strings of a musical instrument are to the fingers which touch them. For as a musical instrument has its different keys, so every voice is sharp, full, slow, loud or low: and then each of these keys has different degrees which beget other strains, such as the smooth and the sharp, the contracted and the lengthened, the continued and the interrupted, the tender, the shrill and the swelling."*

4. But the voice, with its wonderful modulations, is unmeasurably aided by *the other part of the eloquence of the body.* "No man expresses warm and animated feelings with his mouth alone, but with his whole body. He articulates with every limb and joint, and talks from head to foot with a thousand voices."† And how does the accession of fitting gesture to vocal expression emphasize and enhance the latter? In Paul's address to Agrippa, what vivid, overcoming eloquence was added to his vocal utterance, by his displaying his chains? "Except these bonds." How did Anthony intensify the words of his oration over the dead body of Cæsar, by uncovering it before the eyes of the people, and counting over its wounds one by one? To the peroration of Burke's speech, in the impeachment of Hastings, what an overwhelming force of eloquence was given, when with streaming eyes and with a suffused countenance, he raised his hands with the documents in them as a testimony to Heaven, of the guilt of the person charged?‡ What had Whitefield's apostrophe "to the attendant angel" been, abstracting from it his *supplicatio pedis*, and his lifting up his eyes with gushing tears, compared to what it was, by virtue of this accompanying gesticulation? Take from the celebrated conclusion of Webster's argument before the Supreme Court, in

* Cicero.

† Sidney Smith.

‡ "Never was eloquence more triumphant. His audience could endure the agony no longer. Mrs. Siddons confessed that all the terror and pity she had ever witnessed on the stage, sunk into insignificance before the scene she had just witnessed. Mrs. Sheridan fainted; and the stern Lord Chancellor, Thurlow, who had always in the most headstrong way insisted on Hastings' innocence, was observed for once in his life to shed a tear."

the case of Dartmouth College, the quivering of the lips, the trembling of the firm cheeks the choked voice, the eyes overfull of tears, of the great Advocate, and that conclusion would never have been celebrated or remembered.*

5. *Delivery holds the same place in Preaching, that it has in natural eloquence.* The human in it is not less complete or normal from its subordination to the Divine. The supernatural does but tend to and require perfection in the natural. If therefore delivery is the chief thing in eloquence as such, it is the chief thing in preaching. There are congruities, proprieties of delivery, peculiar to preaching; but they are not in any disagreement with nature; they are, in kind, only such accommodations to occasions and circumstances, as nature requires in different instances and moments of secular oratory. They are but requirements of nature in a peculiar sphere. No eloquence applies more completely and naturally the principles of oratorical art, than the genuine eloquence of the pulpit. *Delivery here also, then, has the supremacy.*

6. There is therefore no justification of the common disparagement of delivery in preaching; and no apology for it. It implies a violation of order beyond a mere violation of nature, a violation of it, also in the sphere of the supernatural—a *counteraction of order in a work, in which the chief part belongs to the Holy Spirit: a counteraction of the Spirit's influence and agency in it.* The part which the Spirit has in it, imposes, as its corollary, an obligation on the preacher, to give to delivery his principal regard. Being first in itself, it is first in the regard of the Spirit, who cannot but estimate things as they are. If the preacher puts it last, or aught else above it, he is therein at variance with the Holy Spirit, and impairs if he does not entirely thwart his operation. By the inversion of order for which he makes himself responsible, he cannot but grieve, if he does not altogether quench the Spirit of God. And he will be likely to gain little by misapplying to something else, attention which is due to delivery. He will not

* "The court-room during these two or three minutes presented an extraordinary spectacle. Chief Justice Marshall bent over as if to catch the slightest whisper; Mr. Justin Washington, at his side, leaning forward with an eager, troubled look; and the remainder of the court, at the two extremities, pressing as it were to a single point, while the audience were wrapping themselves round in closer folds beneath the bench, to catch each look and every movement of the speaker's face. If a painter could give us the scene on canvass—their forms and countenances, and Daniel Webster as he then stood in the midst—it would be one of the most touching pictures in the history of eloquence."—*Prof. Goodrich to Mr. Choate.*

compose as well, he will not make as good a sermon, in any respect, as he would if in making it, he concurred with the Holy Spirit in his estimation of delivery. Not having been made with just reference to good delivery, it will doubtless be little suitable to it; perhaps incompatible with it; that is to say, as an instrument of oratory, it will be at fault, if not directly opposite to what it should be, in respect to the exigency of eloquence in its chief element. Underrating delivery, therefore cannot but be inexpedient, in the whole business of preaching. It is a capital mistake and its fruits are after its kind. It is the bane of pulpit eloquence.

7. Proceeding now with our main design, which is to present as far as we can in a few brief remarks, the theory of delivery in preaching, we first of all premise, as its chief principle, that *even more if possible than in making the sermon, the business of delivering it, is spiritual; consisting in the highest activities of spiritual life.* Cicero makes action in speaking radically different from that of the stage: "Orators," he says, "are the actors of truth; players but its mimics." Infinitely greater is the difference between action in preaching and in other oratory; since the distance is infinite, between nature and spirit.* Just action in speaking, therefore, quite as much as the discourse itself, is of Divine-Human agency. It is impossible to the preacher, except as he is moved and actuated thereto and therein, by the Spirit of God. It is infinitely beyond his ability on two accounts: in the first place, he cannot have the kind of knowledge, the spiritual light and sense necessary to it; and secondly, having this knowledge, he still needs the co-operation of the Spirit, in order to express it appropriately in delivery—the *eloquence of the body*. As to the former, the continued agency of the Spirit is indispensable because spiritual knowledge, unlike the other kind, cannot from its nature, be retained, or recalled, apart from the unintermitted working of the Holy Ghost in the soul. The preacher may have had the Divine aid in making his sermon; the sermon, both as to its matter and words may be a spiritual one; its delivery nevertheless will not be spiritual, if spiritual knowledge or discernment be required in it; only the *incessant* operation of the Spirit within him, can fulfill this condition.† "I fear," says Pascal, with admirable judgment, "that you do not sufficiently distinguish, between the things you speak of (spiritual things) and those of which

* The infinite distance between body and mind, is a figure of the *infinitely more infinite distance* between mind and love,"—the fruit of the Spirit.—PASCAL.

† In a letter to his sister.

the world speaks ; since it is beyond doubt sufficient to have once learned these latter things, in order to retain them, so as not to require to be taught them again ; whereas, it is not sufficient to have once learned those of the other kind, and to have comprehended them in a good way, that is to say, by the internal operation of God, in order to preserve a like knowledge of them, though we may well retain the recollection of them. There is no reason why we should not be able to *remember* them, or why we should not retain in our memory, an epistle of St. Paul as easily as a book of Virgil. But the knowledge which we acquire in this way, as well as the continuation of it, is but an effect of memory ; whereas in order that those who are of heaven may understand this secret and strange language, it is needful that the same grace which alone can give the first understanding of it should *continue it, and render it always present, by graving it incessantly in the hearts of the faithful, so as to keep it always alive.* As in the blessed, God is continually renewing their beatitude which is an effect and consequence of grace ; as also the church holds, that the Father continually produces the Son, and maintains the eternity of his being, by an effusion of his own substance, which is without interruption as well as without end." But in a spiritual delivery, the continued influence of the Spirit, is on another account required ; spiritual knowledge, its indispensable condition is not sufficient for it of itself. It cannot express itself in the appropriate action, without being aided therein by the Spirit : it is not provided for by knowledge alone. Action, which is more than knowledge, needs aid for itself. In elocutionary action, as well as in thinking and writing, the preacher, however qualified by self-culture, can attain to no degree of spirituality, by merely natural effort. If the activity of a preacher in speaking, the eloquence of the body, be indeed spiritual, it is doubtless a higher exercise of the spiritual life, than either of its other exercises in the business of preaching. It must needs be so, if it be answerable, in all respects, to the unique and mysterious exigencies of such a work, as delivering appropriately the inspired word of God as a vehicle and representative of the Holy Spirit. Apart from a very special operation of the Spirit himself, who is sufficient for the just performance of this work ?—spiritual things, expressing themselves fitly, in spiritual modulations of the voice, spiritual looks, spiritual attitudes—the supernatural exerting itself proportionately in and through these bodily signs of thought and feeling—think of one's having in himself, an independent sufficiency for this !

The apostles, with all their gifts for other uses, had it not, nay, even our Lord's spirituality of mind and knowledge, added to the perfectly natural use of the human powers did not qualify him adequately, for the business of dispensing the word, independently of the continued co-agency of the Spirit in this specific business; even He delivered his discourses, under the anointing and in the power of the Spirit of God.* After his resurrection, it was still, through the Holy Ghost, that he gave commandment to the apostles whom he had chosen.†

8. It need hardly be added, that in all preliminary work with reference to delivery, the preacher must abide in communion with the Holy Spirit. He is not sufficient, of himself, for the least of the exercises of self-culture prerequisite to just pulpit action. The teachers of elocution, with their utmost assiduities, cannot make him independent of the Spirit's aid, in practising aright, the rules of art, relative to delivery in preaching, or in studying aright the philosophy of voice and gesture. They cannot instruct him, in what he chiefly needs to know and do, in order to act well his part in pronouncing his discourses. No appliances, whether simply natural or artistic, can effect anything to this end of themselves; they may suffice for the orators of the world; they come infinitely short of meeting the necessities of preachers. As far as preparatory practice for pulpit delivery proceeds on the contrary supposition its failure is inevitable. It is so of necessity; were it otherwise, it might become so, by real, if not conscious visitations of Divine displeasure. It is an offence, a glaring disrespect to the Holy Spirit whose proffered aid it declines. Let not the ministers of the word forget for a moment, the most intimate and sacred relations—relations never for a moment suspended—between the work of their office and the high prerogatives of the Holy Spirit in the economy of the gospel.

9. In regard to particular points of attention, the details of application in cultivating delivery, there is no substantial difference between preaching and other kinds of public eloquence. Preachers cannot be too well acquainted with the theory of elocution; cannot know too well the principles of emphasis, the science of the passions, and their inter-relations with each other; how they naturally express themselves, in the tones of the voice, the looks, attitudes, movements of the body, etc.‡ The spirituality of pulpit, action, and the

* Luke iv, 18, cf. 21, iv. 14.

† Acts i, 2.

‡ See Cicero, de Oratore, lib. III. c. 56-61.

part in it belonging to the Holy Ghost, interfere in no degree with the highest culture in reference to it. On the contrary, they favor and promote it. It is one of the proper designs of the Spirit's influence, to secure attention to it as far as possible. It is among the ends to which he lends his aid ; and it is not to be doubted, that the general neglect so much to be deplored, into which delivery in preaching has fallen, is to be ascribed in great measure, to aversion to pains-taking with regard to it arising from being out of the Spirit's counsel in this matter. It is not of him that preachers have been inclined to neglect the scientific study of elocution. The labor which this study requires is doubtless the explanation of its being neglected. The labor unquestionably is a severe one ; but had the Holy Spirit been obeyed, it would have been accepted as itself a pleasure.*

10. But supposing that no preliminary pains have been omitted, and that nothing remains but delivery itself, *what method should be followed in this part of preaching?* The actual methods are three : *Reading, Reciting, and Extemporising.* Reserving the last for the moment, which of the first two should be preferred? Both reproduce a written discourse, which does it in the better manner? Taking them in their best form, Reciting doubtless has the advantage. In general, reciting is injured by requiring an effort of memory, in order to recal the words of the discourse. But there is a kind of recitation which has no such inconvenience ; the reciter in this case, has no more concern about his words or linguistic forms than the extemporiser ; he uses the very expressions he has written ; but he does this from his perfect possession of his subject, not from a consciously distinct exercise of recollection. He has his composition so exactly and thoroughly *by heart*, that to reproduce it, he has but to open his mouth ; his utterance of it is as spontaneous as his breathing. We speak what to us is a mystery, but we are acquainted with an eminent person, in whom according to his own assertion to us, it is actualized. His language in speaking, though elaborately written is as spontaneous as it would be if he were extemporising. So intimately identified and united, are his thought and the form of it in his manuscript, that it would require an effort to separate them. Such a way of reciting as this, is undoubtedly preferable to the best way of reading. But it is very uncommon ; except to a few privileged geniuses, it is extremely difficult if not impossible. To almost every one who prac-

* Labor ipse voluptas—when performed in the strength of the Spirit.

tices it, reciting is a labor of recollection, requiring even for an imperfect performance of it, an anxious mental application. This fact is a very grave objection to this method's being generally adopted. For by how much the mind is occupied in recalling forms of expression by so much is it disabled for the work itself of delivery. This is no part of the business; it is another business; the common reciter attempts two things at once. He puts himself to an impracticable task; his delivery is bad at best; and, what is another serious disadvantage he is apt to betray a solicitude, lest the words of his manuscript escape him; and the hearers perceiving his embarrassment, are hindered from attending to what he says by sympathetic trouble, fearing that his memory may fail him. Generally, therefore, reciting is much inferior to reading, at least to the best way of reading. It is inferior, we think, to reading as commonly practiced. Bad as this is, there is no interference in it, from a distinct exercise of thought about another matter, and whether interested by it or not, the hearers are at ease.

11. *Delivery by reading may rise to high excellence.*—In this method one may be exclusively occupied by the sense; the words are before his eye; but he does not think of them; he is not conscious of seeing them; the subject with reference to its purpose wholly engrosses him; he has no concern except through reading, to possess his hearers of it, and compel them to yield to its force. Into his delivery, such as it is, he throws himself entirely; his action may be very defective; his gestures, especially, may be awkward or ungraceful; but his hearers are so interested with what he says, that they see nothing amiss. Infinitely different is reading like this from ordinary reading, which simply reports what is written on the page. This reading does more than inform; it is full of living fire; it conveys the preacher's soul, all aglow with the inspiration of his subject, and the purpose for which he treats it. Such was the method of Chalmers, the most eloquent preacher of his age. He read, but what was his reading as an instrument of oratory? Edwards, too, was a reader,—a quiet reader,—but in what demonstration of the Spirit and power was the preaching of that great man of God?

12. But neither in Reciting nor in Reading *does the ideal of delivery reside.* As to reading, the best of these methods, a very high authority, would hardly admit it into a comparison with that which we named last. "Pleadings which are read," says Pliny,* "lose all their force and warmth

* Epist. iv: lib. ii.

and well nigh their very name, as being things which the gestures of the speaker, his bold advances, even his changes of position and the activity of his body, in harmony with all the emotions of the mind, are wont at once to enforce and kindle. But the eyes and hands of one who reads, which are the main auxiliaries of delivery, are fettered, so that it is no wonder the attention of the auditors flags, since it is sustained by no charm, and awakened by no excitement from without." Edwards, also, notwithstanding his contrary practice, which, in the latter part of his life, he thought it had been well had he never followed, pronounced delivery without notes the most natural way, and that which had the greatest tendency, on the whole, to answer the end of preaching. It appeared evident to him, to have been the manner of the apostles and primitive ministers of the gospel.* A thousand examples demonstrate the incomparable superiority of this manner. By the side of that of Whitefield, what is the best possible way of reading? In his looks; his tears; the flashes, glances, suffusion of his eyes; in his attitudes and changes of position; in the sudden effects of reaction on himself from observed impressions on the hearers, what matchless eloquence—utterly impossible in any other than extemporaneous speaking! Admitting that it was spiritual as well as natural, as it doubtless may have been and was in a high degree, the conclusion is intuitive, that delivery can rise into its highest sphere, only in extemporaneous discourse. Think of the spiritual and the natural combining harmoniously in such an instance of the eloquence of the body as the following: "Treating of the sufferings of our Saviour, as though Gethsemane were in sight, he would say—stretching out his hand: Look yonder—What is it I see? It is my agonizing Lord. And as though it were no difficult matter to catch the sound of our Lord praying, he would exclaim: Hark! hark! do you not hear him?" Wonderful preaching! We admit that it is of the best in its kind; but we are contrasting with it the very best in the best of any other.

13. We go on to say that it is *against true art, against nature, and, of course, against the dominion of the Holy Spirit, in Delivery, to put among preparatives for it, a prescribed or premeditated scheme, for regulating it; to determine beforehand what the emphases, looks, gestures, are to be in particular parts, and perhaps to preactualize them, in a rehearsal "practiced at the glass."* On two accounts, this must be a prepos-

* Life of Edwards, by Dr. Hopkins.

terous way. In the first place, just action in speaking, cannot be anticipated: the time for it must indicate it. It is only the critical moment itself that can give its idea; it is contingent on the unimaginable futuritions and incidents of elocution. But were it otherwise, good delivery after this method would be an impossibility. With a programme of action artistically perfect, the speaker would have no advantage; he could not carry it out justly. He could make no good use of it. The very attempt to use it would disable him for proper elocution. What art could conceal the art he would be trying to practice? and what effect on his delivery, from the labor to conceal it? The hearers doubtless would not fail to know; itself the surest testimony to its absurdity. As to all earnest action having an object ulterior to itself, it is an instinct of nature, that not its *manner* but its *object*; or, in such a business as that of public speaking, its subject with reference to its object, be exclusively regarded at the moment of performing it. Even a good reader obeys this instinct. "A reader is sure to pay too much attention to his voice, not only if he pays any at all, but if he does not strenuously labor* to withdraw his attention from it altogether. He who not only understands fully what he is reading, but is earnestly occupying his mind with the matter of it, will be likely to read as if he understood it. And in like manner, with a view to the *impressiveness* of the delivery, he who not only feels it but is exclusively absorbed with that feeling, will be likely to read as if he felt it, and to communicate the impression to his hearers. But this cannot be the case if he is occupied with the thought of what their opinion will be of his reading, and *how his voice ought to be regulated*; if, in short, he is thinking of himself, and of course, in the same degree abstracting his attention from that which ought to occupy it exclusively."† It is therefore certain that there should be no labor in speaking to carry out a scheme of delivery. The study of delivery, now, must be forborne; proper application to this study is *previous*, like the educational training by which one is furnished for artistic action in all particular art-performances. One who applies the principles of art (*e. g.*), in writing or in playing on an instrument of music, gives while doing this no direct thought to these principles; they have become a second nature to him, through his familiarity with them. Scarcely more does the bee act by instinct in building its cell according

* In order to overcome a contrariant inclination, too wont to be besetting him.

† Whately

to the principles of mechanics, than he does in his exquisite exemplifications of art. So acts the accomplished speaker in delivering his discourse. He has studied delivery ; but he is not studying it now. He knows the theory of delivery ; this has acquainted him with his old faults in speaking. He has corrected them ; he has formed good elocutionary habits. Hence, and hence alone, his security for proper action on occasions as they arise.

14. In accordance with this principle of Delivery, *very eminent proficients in it have protested strongly against all attempts to follow out a forecasted programme of action.* The great tragedian of the recent past,* after experience of the disadvantages of this method, gives his testimony concerning it, in these striking terms : " It has been imagined, even by enlightened minds, that in studying my parts I place myself before a glass, as a model before a painter in his *atelier*. According to them, I gesticulate, I shake the ceiling of the room with my cries. In the evening on the stage, I utter the intonations I learned in the morning ; prepared inflections and sobs of which I know the number ; imitating Crecentini, who, in his *Romeo*, evinces a despair beforehand, in a passage sung a hundred times over at home, with a piano accompaniment. It is an error : *Reflection* is one of the greatest parts of my labor. Following the example of the poet, I walk, I muse, or even seat myself on the margin of my little river : like the poet, I rub my forehead ; it is the only gesture I allow myself ; and you know it is by no means one of the grandest. Oh, how a thing becoming historical remains true ! If any one should inquire how I have found the greater part of my greatest successes, I should reply, by *constantly thinking of them*. We were rhetoricians and not dramatic personages. How many academic discourses on the stage ! How few words of simplicity ! But one evening chance threw me into the parlor, with the leaders of the Gironde Party : their sombre and disquieted appearance attracted my attention. There were written there, in visible characters, great and mighty interests. As they were too much men of heart to allow these interests to be tainted with selfishness, I saw there manifest proofs of the danger of the country. All were assembled for pleasure, yet no one thought of it. Discussion ensued ; they touched the most thrilling questions of the crisis. It was beautiful : I imagined myself present at a secret deliberation of the Roman Senate. It is thus, thought I, that men should *speak*. The

* Talma.

country, whether it be named France or Rome, employs the same accents, the same language. If they do not *declaim* here, neither did they declaim in the olden time, it is evident. These reflections made me more attentive. My impressions, though produced by a conversation void of all *emphasis*, became profound. An apparent calmness in these men, thought I, agitates the soul. Eloquence then may have force without throwing the body into disorderly movements. I even perceived that discourse uttered without effort or outcry, renders the gesture more energetic, and gives more expression to the countenance. All these deputies, thus assembled before me, appeared far more eloquent than at the *tribune*, where, finding themselves a spectacle, they thought it necessary to utter their harangues in the manner of actors as we then were; that is to say, of *declaimers* fraught with turpidity. *From that moment I caught new light, and saw my art regenerated."*

15. After proper self-culture in elocution and renewing the prerequisite communion with the Holy Spirit, the only condition of success, the only object of preliminary concern, in a particular instance of preaching, *is to be fully possessed, to be thoroughly inspired by the subject and the occasion.* This is the prime necessity of all eloquence; it was the discovery of the great French actor, when his eyes were opened to see the true secret of delivery. Hence it was that *reflection* became his great labor; that he walked, mused, sat on the margin of the river, rubbed his forehead after the manner of the poet. He sought to absorb himself in his subject: he left action to itself. Being qualified generally for his art, by acquainting himself with the philosophy of the voice and of gesture, and by just self-culture, in accordance with it, he assumed that what remained to him, as the prerequisite of success, was to get perfect command of his subject; or, to speak better, to give the subject perfect command and supremacy over him. This, with the qualifications just mentioned, is all that remains to the preacher; and his is no other than the player's way of gaining it. That way is the thorough rumination of the subject, meditating on it over and over again; not the committing to memory the words he is to repeat, with premeditated action, but the working their meaning, their strength, into himself; the filling himself with their total sense; the vitalizing himself with it in its breadth, length, depth and height; the making it so live and rule in all his life, that its procession from him in delivery shall be rather a spontaneous outflow than the result of a separate memori-

ter effort. Doubtless the memory is exercised, intensely exercised, even when this is done ; but not exclusively or distinguishably to the consciousness from the other powers of the mind. The memory and these are united, are inter-blended in the operation, as rays in the sunbeam. There may be moments when it acts by itself, even in a delivery very good on the whole ; but they are exceptive and anxious moments ; and the delivery now deteriorates, and witnesses against itself as violating its norm. As soon as the recollective faculty is distinctively exercised, the speaker generally betrays the fact ; his hearers see his hesitation, and begin to tremble for him, lest his memory should lapse, and to wish he had his manuscript lying open before him.

16. *It is impossible to prescribe a standard of action for all preachers.* There are peculiar congruities of pulpit delivery which must not be violated : the preacher with his hearers is in the temple ; he is the representative of the awful presence of God ; on matters of infinite moment he acts in the name of the great and dreadful *Unseen*. The difference as to interest between his business and that of any orator of the world, makes the latter, however great in itself, less than nothing comparatively. Without being under a total eclipse of spiritual illumination, and entirely out of communion and harmony with the Holy Ghost, he cannot be insensible to this fact ; and if he has but a faint impression of it, he cannot allow himself in certain modes and ways of action, which in secular orators are sometimes proper, and even highly admirable ; they would be unnatural, monstrous, in the elocution of the pulpit. Nevertheless, who may give the preacher an absolute rule or criterion of delivery ? Beyond self-evident, palpable improprieties, every preacher is a rule to himself ; his idiosyncrasy is his rule. What would be a just measure to one, would be a defective or an extremely excessive and absurd one, to another. The lion does not more differ from the lamb, than preachers from one another in elocutionary gifts. In different preachers, vehemence and gentleness, commotion and stillness, thunder and whisper, whirlwind and zephyr, are both alike appropriate characteristics ; as they are also very suitable and natural, in the same preachers at different moments. Both too are alike acceptable to the Spirit, who attempers his influences to the natures of his instruments, making them now as the softest breath, now as a rushing mighty wind, or as lightning and fire. It is not by the quantity, but by the quality of pulpit action that the holy proprieties of it are on the one hand violated, and on the other maintained.

There may be the sublimest form of spirituality in abundant and stormy action ; and there may be nothing better than the affectation of tenderness, in a quiet, soft, reserved manner of delivery.*

17. It follows from what we have just been saying or rather is included in it, that *imitation can have no place in just action in speaking*. In this as well as in invention, in disposition, in the entire construction and the finish of his discourse, a true speaker is himself and not another ; he is generally true even to his habitual imperfections of manner. Without renouncing his own identity he may profit by observing excellencies and faults in the elocution of others ; he may thus acquaint himself better, with his own defects, instruct himself better generally in the regulation of his voice, emphasis, attitudes, etc. ; and stimulate himself in studying the principles and philosophy of delivery ; but he could not but mar his own action by endeavoring to model it after another's. He might as soon change himself into another man as be natural any longer. If his hearers happen to be acquainted with the example he is striving to copy, they will not fail to see his weakness, and—what of itself sufficiently confutes all such imitation—they can not but think it unfortunate for him ; a palpable vanity. A tolerable speaker he might perhaps have been if he had been content with himself ; he has made himself an intolerable one by his pitiable emulation. It remains that after studying models with reference to general improvement, the only thing in which they are to be imitated, is that by which they made themselves models, namely, their absolute independence and forgetfulness of models in delivery.

18. It seems to us that one of the chief causes of bad deliv-

* How far violent or very demonstrative action may have place in preaching without indecorum, no rule can determine. Whitefield was often exceedingly demonstrative, but so far as we know, never undignified or ungraceful. The severest criticism, that of Hume, Chesterfield, Franklin, Garrick, gave it transcendent praise. How vehement was the delivery of Chalmers ! how terrible that of Knox ! how lion-like that of Luther ! Each a mighty man of God, a chosen and an eminent vehicle of the power of the Holy Ghost. We once heard a sermon from the elder Mason, the delivery of which, combined with unexceptionable propriety, a manner in the highest degree bold and even dramatic. He began with a rap on the desk, personating one knocking at the door—"a messenger from the world of spirits." He used personation freely in the midst of the discourse, and at the close, it rose to sublimity. The subject was *deliverance from bondage through the fear of death*. (Heb. ii. 15.) He first dramatized the death-bed scene of one who died in his sins,—a wilful neglecter of this great salvation ; and then that of a triumphant believer. His manner was to the last in keeping with its surprising outset. We had no sense of anything at all amiss in this wonderful instance of pulpit elocution. It seemed to be no less proper than unusual.

ery in preaching, a sufficient cause of it certainly, is *the character of the ordinary sermon, so called, especially its defect in respect of the oratorical element, the business-like character of all true oratory*. Delivery in discourse takes its stamp, in part, from the sort of discourse which is given; oratorical delivery requires an *oration*; that is to say, a discourse which is an *affair*, an earnest, agonistic speech, which has a single point ulterior to itself, and which has no other concern than to carry that point. Preaching is too seldom discourse like this. It is sometimes chiefly expository, as perhaps it should be. But when preaching is not of this form, when it uses what has the name of *the sermon*, which, by its etymology behooves it to be an *oration, par excellence*,* it is frequently, if not generally, as a whole, no oration at all: it has several points instead of one; perhaps indeed no point in particular. It treats several coordinate propositions; it is rather an analysis than a synthetic speech, like that of a pleader at the bar; it makes a treatise or an essay: it is without oratorical unity; of course, it cannot but be defective in oratorical delivery: and if such be the actual character of preaching, as undoubtedly it is to a great extent, this defect is but its natural and proper concomitant. Nor is there a possibility of the desired change in the elocution of the pulpit, while preaching retains this abnormal character. It surely ought not retain it, as extensively as it has done. Preaching in its ideal is a species of oratory; the noblest form of it. In its ordinary efforts no discourse should excel it, in singleness of design, or in strenuous, suasive, synthetic urgency to attain its end. In some of its specimens (those e. g. of Baxter, Edwards, Chalmers), no discourse, not that of Demosthenes or Burke, does in these respects excel it. Let preaching be generally true to its own idea, its supreme law as a means to the highest of all ends, and with just cultivation of delivery, preachers, in respect to this part of eloquence, will cease to hide their "diminished heads" in the presence of other speakers. At least, it is only on this condition that even with the utmost attention to delivery, much proficiency in it is to be expected. The character of the discourse will continue to overrule and determine that of its delivery, in conformity to itself.

19. There is, let us add, a conventional restraint on pulpit elocution, *from the preacher's place in the assembly*. He stands above and at a distance from them, behind a desk, which conceals more than half his person. His seclusion may give him

* Why, else, should the term *sermon* (speech), be restricted to sacred discourse, as if a secular oration was, comparatively, not a *speech* at all?

some conveniences in conducting the immediate preliminaries of preaching ; but it should be no privilege to him in delivering his discourse. If an earnest speaker "articulates with every limb and joint, and talks from head to foot, with a thousand voices," how much is an earnest preacher curtailed of his means of bodily expression, by the narrow enclosure which he occupies ? He is without advantage from his lower limbs ; his bust only is seen ; he cannot change his position ; his attitudes are but half visible, and for this cause, probably, disagreeable. How must his delivery be marred by these subtractions of "the eloquence of the body ?" Compare with it that of a speaker who stands fully in view, and presents in his entire person, a complete, graceful example of this crowning glory of oratory. That preachers, exclusively, should be thus restricted in elocution is but a prescription of arbitrary tradition ; nothing in the peculiarity of spiritual eloquence requires it ; it maims this noblest of all eloquences ; it presupposes a theory of preaching, which makes delivery in it a thing of little or no moment ; it has doubtless had no small influence in reducing it to this estimation, in the general practice, if not also in the opinion of the pulpit. If in the pulpit of the future, delivery is to assume its rightful supremacy, tradition, in this matter, will dominate no longer ; the principles of true art, which are, at last, but the principles of simple nature, will assert their authority ; and preaching, like speaking in the forum or the senate, will be free of all such abridgments of elocutionary force as tradition has so unwarrantably prescribed to it.

20. *Is it to be expected that the reform will actually have place ?* A change in the form of preaching is doubtless at hand. The renovating power which has been changing all things in science, in art, in the physical, social and civil life of man, cannot but be felt, indeed has manifestly been felt by the modern pulpit. Already preaching, as to form, is, in several respects, different from what it has ever been. In some respects we think it is better. It is by no means changed as much as it should be. It ought to be in advance of the other instruments of change which are exerting themselves with such astonishing efficiency in every sphere of human life. There is no object of deeper interest to every true philanthropist, every one who identifies the progress of humanity with the success of the gospel, than that preaching should receive a new and healthful impulse, which shall give it the precedence to which it is entitled,—a just adaptation to humanity in its present excited and over-active state, and a regulating power

over all the changes which, with such unparalleled rapidity are coming to pass everywhere in the world. But it is as yet very far from having this preëminence of control. There is an imperative demand for further variance, we might almost say a revolution in the form of it. And is not this demand to be met? In that Future of overwhelming interest, which all men feel to be just before us, which indeed is now opening itself upon us and inspiring us with wonder at what is surely and swiftly coming, what will preaching be, if accommodated, as it should and must be if it is to play well its part—to the unparalleled circumstances in which it will find itself? Imperfect as our anticipation of them must be, we cannot but be sure in general, from signs before us, that they will be circumstances of earnest, intense materialism, of an exceedingly practical, matter-of-fact bearing, such as have not been dreamt of in all the past; causes are already in operation before our eyes, which make the anticipation of this almost as reality itself. Surely amidst such circumstances, preaching, if true to its mission, will not take from the present or any former period, its measures or its methods of practice. There must be, in these respects, a novelty in it, parallel, or, when need be, antithetic to the novelty of its unexampled surroundings. Its character cannot be precisely foreseen; it will be, we would hope, as didactic, as discriminative, as solid, in all respects as scholarly, as it has been at any time; we cannot but hope it will be so from necessities which will be upon it and from its present advantages of culture. But how changed must it be, especially in its chief performances, in respect of oratorical freedom, force and action? It cannot but be, preëminently, it would seem, of the nature of business—"business which is a business:"* It will still treat "subjects;" but it will need to treat them, not as terminating in themselves, or in the way of analysis or disquisition, but with reference to issues or specific ends: to determine first, not on either texts or subjects, but on points to be carried, on things to be done; and, as in all earnest oratory, to be, in all its propositions, enlargements, utterances, ornaments, but a strenuous means of attaining definite ends: to strive of course to avail itself of the

*Preachers, your business is a business; yet more than Senators and Advocates, you are Advocates and Senators: Be both. Let your pulpits be to you alternately a tribune and a bar; let your word be an action directed to an immediate object: Let not your hearers come to hear a discourse, so much as to receive a message. Possess yourselves, possess them, of all the advantages, which pertain to the subjects of the pulpit. Your eloquence has more artless aspects, and more vivid tints, than that of the Senate or the Bar; nothing condemns it to abstraction; everything impels it toward sensible facts." Vinet, p 503.

advantages of just delivery, the peerless eloquence of appropriate action. This, its chief means, it may no longer forego or neglect. Due attention to delivery, and due provision for it, will be a deeply felt necessity. It will suffer no traditional trammels; it will follow out the inviolable principles of eloquence; it will obey nature and the free Spirit of God. If it meet the high exigencies of the epoch, it cannot take the word of command from tradition, or the perfunctory examples of these or former times.

21. But will the change after all have place? Will delivery in the preaching of the all-pregnant future, whose dawn is already advancing, have its rightful pre-eminence? Will this form of preaching, which cannot but be new, be what it should be, in this grand respect? Or will the construction of the sermon continue to be the all-absorbing concern of preachers and its delivery comparatively as nothing? We cannot confidently say. The undervaluation of delivery at the present moment, and too generally in foregoing times, in view of its inherent unjustness and the standing reprobation of it by the reason of things and the verdict of the human mind, begets hesitation as to the probability of a correction of it, under the influence of any possible circumstances; and yet since it has pleased God to institute preaching as the leading instrumentality, the means of means, in applying his efficacious grace, must not "the wickedness of the wicked" rush on to its climax and its doom, if the correction shall not take place? In a practice of preaching so wrong, so utterly ineloquent, in the thing of chief moment, as that now generally prevailing, will the Spirit of God who can give no sanction to inherent impropriety of any sort, work with that plenitude of his power, which will be necessary to write "holiness to the Lord," on such inventions and aboundings of secular life, as those which we already see in such rapid progress, must become in their culmination? As, then, no change is to be expected in God's plan for reducing men to obedience to himself, must not the change we are speaking of in preaching be a reality at length, if the triumph of the gospel on earth is to be a reality?

22. And *why should it not be inaugurated at once?* The very occasion for it presupposes a high existing culpability in the ministers of the word. No tongue can express the evil of delivering Christian truths, *as if they were fictions*. As far as preachers are chargeable with this evil, they have cause for the deepest humiliation. Next to counting Christ himself a myth, *nay identical with it in effect*, is so represent-

ing his doctrine. What infidelity whether in itself, or in its consequences is worse? We know it is pleading for a paradox to insist on the reform, as an immediate necessity; but if a paradox be true and the truth important, these facts imply criminality in its being a paradox,* and imperatively require that it be so no longer. Think of it as we may, the prevailing way of delivery in preaching, is matter for the profoundest regret to the ministry and the church. Whether it is to remain in the coming times or not, it should for the sake of the times now present, from henceforth cease, or cease to be excused, or tolerated. Infinite interests demand that the reform begin without delay.

23. *Let not the change seem impracticable.* No circumstances, no powers of argument or persuasion, can of themselves effect it; these can produce no spiritual fruit whatever; and this, as we have seen, is the highest perfection of this kind of fruit; but there is on this account no cause for discouragement. The power to be ultimately relied on, in the whole business of preaching, is the power of the Holy Ghost. It is the privilege, it is the duty, of preachers, to be full of the Holy Ghost, and workers together with Him, in every part of their labor. The chief thing, the only thing virtually necessary to the change, is what they cannot be wanting in, without sinning alike against themselves and against the highest law of their function, the law of all its laws. Remembering the Divine-human character of preaching, let them rise above themselves, as they should and may without presumption, into the illuminations and sanctities of the Eternal Spirit; and over all difficulties connected with the cultivation and practice of just delivery in preaching, they will be already triumphant. And if they live to be preachers in the opening Future they will pass into it prepared for its eventful activities and developments; and whether they live or die, under the consciousness of their new impulses and experiences, they will well fulfill what remains of their sacred mission; and for that part of it at least, be able to endure the fiery ordeal through which every preacher's work with himself will have to pass in the judgment of the great day of the Lord.

* Paradox—Something against prevailing opinion.

ART. III.—ORIGIN OF HOMER'S PURER RELIGIOUS IDEAS.*

By FRIEDRICH KÖSTER.

WHAT reflecting and attentive reader of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* has not been struck with the strange contradictions of the poet in his description of the nature and agency of his gods? Nägelsbach, in his excellent work on the Theology of Homer (Nuremberg, 1840), has referred to this point. These gods are superhuman beings, yet in form and power they are but moderately superior to men; only once or twice are they described, after the oriental view, as gigantic beings. (*Iliad* 2: 272, Nägelsb. p. 14). They work in distant places, but only in isolated instances, and in a limited way, (Nägelsb. p. 16). The omniscience and omnipotence ascribed to them are only partial and transient (p. 18); but they can, for example, expedite the processes of nature, kill men and bring them again to life (p. 26); and yet they stand under the influence of Ate, the goddess of delusions (p. 68), and in part under the dominion of Fate (*Moirai*, p. 126). They are good and just, but only in individual cases; at times they mislead men with craft, and plunge them into misfortune by misdeeds (p. 31); they are to be appeased and yet are envious (p. 35); they are blessed and free from care (*Il.* 24: 526) while subject to all human passions (p. 29). By immortality alone are they sharply distinguished from men, yet even this springs not from their essential nature, but from the eating of ambrosia (p. 38). And what, too, shall we say of those base scandals, by which the poet degrades the gods far below the level of humanity? Homer magnifies the virgin modesty of Nausicaa, and yet depicts with satisfaction the shameless intercourse of Ares and Aphrodite in sight of all the gods. In Penelope he describes a pattern of the holiness of marriage, and yet prefaces this holiness by the scene between Zeus and Hera on Mount Ida. He blames vulgar scolding among men, and yet describes gods and goddesses as abusing one another in the most violent terms. These and similar scenes have indeed been interpreted, from Plato to Heraclides Ponticus, as a conscious symbolism to explain natural phenomena; but such an interpretation is wholly arbitrary, and the poet himself indicates nothing of the sort. Nägelsbach (p. 11) ex-

* Translated from the *Studien und Kritiken*.

plains these contradictions by the fact that the Homeric theology, conceiving of the gods as made in the image of man, was not able, much as it strove to do so, to break through the limits of human nature. "The gods," he says (p. 72), "were originally the powers of nature, but were by degrees shaped into persons, and represented as a tyrannical race, whose history was made up of revolt and victory. Hence (p. 49), they sometimes interfere in a remarkable way in the conduct of human affairs, but not in the order of a providential plan; and bold men can even resist them." This certainly explains the human way of thinking and acting ascribed to the gods, but it still remains inconceivable how such rude anthropopathic notions and such unworthy stories could be combined in one consciousness with the purer and more ethical ideas of God elsewhere avowed.

It lies on the surface, that in Homer there are two religious standpoints, or religious *systems*, alongside of each other; the one more rude, peculiar to the people, as he found it among his landsmen; the other more noble and of foreign origin, which he designedly interwove in his poems, to educate his Greeks gradually and imperceptibly. Nägelsbach, in his Introduction, holds that the origin of the Homeric religion is partly Pelasgic and national, and partly oriental, that is, foreign; yet he has not followed out his general view in detail. From the primitive Pelasgic stock are derived the representation of the gods as mere powers of nature, air and earth, fire and water, life and death and the like; these were afterwards represented as persons, an aristocratic family, with superhuman endowments, but having at the same time all human passions; here too belong the wars of the Olympic divinities with the Titans and Giants. But Homer in his wanderings had come upon worthier conceptions of the gods as supersensible and moral beings, governing human destiny with wisdom and justice. This appears, too, from the fact that he almost always calls the old national deities *the gods*, with the article, while he designates as *gods* or *God* (without the article), the nobler divinities, so to say, the Divine God in the abstract. (See Il. 4: 1; Odys. 1: 32.) *God* (*Θεός*) can do all, and give to every one as he will; *Gods* know all (Od. 4: 397), and can do all (Il. 19: 90). Their providence determines destiny (Od. 9: 592); and they rule with wisdom over the plans and undertakings of men (Il. 16: 688). To them we must pray; for all men are in need of the gods (Od. 3: 49). They must be feared and their commands obeyed. Sin, and the source of all sin, is in selfishness, pride (Nägelsbach, p.

274), rising up against the gods. We may even find an approximation to monotheism (Nägelsb. p. 100, 108) in Zeus, the father of gods and men; and in the frequent and prominent union of the three chief divinities: Zeus, the mighty; Apollo, the revealer, and Athena or wisdom, there is a Trinitarian intimation. In this theology there are indeed great imperfections; Homer knows nothing of the love of gods to men, or of men to the gods, nothing of submission to the Divine will, or of universal human love; sin is in his view that which is hurtful, but not an inward corruption; there is no trace of the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins, or of such sayings as this: "Obedience is better than sacrifice." (Nägelsb. p. 183). But could this be otherwise, since the poet, alongside of those purer religious ideas, still retained, and must retain, the sensual and immoral elements of polytheism?

The question, now, spontaneously suggested is this: Whence could Homer have received his higher religious ideas? Out of himself he could not draw that which nature never gave to man, and which has become known only through a revelation. Here we must call to mind, that, from the times of the Phœnician Cadmus, the Greeks were under Oriental influence, and received from the *Orient* their first impulse in the way of progress; and that also in later times, according to sure reports, the founders of a purer religion and morality, Pythagoras, Solon and Plato, received their views from the same source. To which land of the East are we chiefly to trace this influence? The Phœnicians, with their lascivious worship of Baal, Astarte and Thammuz, found entrance among the Greeks in later and more degenerate times. Many hints point to Egypt; and undoubtedly the great Grecian tribes thence derived many useful arts and sciences, especially geometry and astronomy. But the Egyptian popular religion, with its worship of animals and the grotesque forms of its gods, could not possibly harmonize with the Grecian innate sense of beauty; and the esoteric doctrines of the Egyptian priestly caste, a kind of diabistic philosophy of nature, were unfitted, by their speculative character, to reform the popular religion of the Greeks. The same holds true of the wisdom of the Magi, as found among the Assyrians and Babylonians, and the Medo-Persians sprung from them. And so we are led to the *people of Israel*, to whom, by Divine revelation, had been imparted a simple, popular religion, monotheistic, ethical, and adapted to human welfare. But where do we find the bridge over which the Greeks, seeking after wisdom (1 Cor. 1: 22), could come to the religious belief of the Hebrews? The

latter, a despised, and relatively small nation, were not even known by name to Herodotus, the Grecian historian at the period of the Persian wars; and even in the times of the Roman emperors their doctrine respecting God was derided by Juvenal in the words: *Nil præter nubes et coeli numen adorant!* And yet an indirect way may be pointed out, by which, even in the times of Homer, single rays of light from the revelation given to the Jews might have been brought into Hellas. Homer, it is well known, abounds in allusions to the thriving commerce of the Phœnicians with the cities of the Greek coasts.* Add to this, that Ionia, the birth-place of the Homeric songs, called in the Old Testament Javan, was not far from Palestine; and that the Homeric poems were written about the same time that the Hebrew nation was at the height of its glory under David and Solomon. Consider, further, that Tyrian artists helped in the building of the temple of Solomon (1 Kings, v.); and that the Israelite seamen made long voyages with the Phœnicians to Ophir and Tarshish (1 Kings, ix: 27). I need refer only to Zebulun, who dwelt at the haven of the sea, and had a haven for ships, whose border was unto Sidon (Gen. xlix.: 13). Is it not then possible, nay even probable, that the Israelites or Phœnicians might have imparted to the inquisitive Greeks many things about the religion of the Hebrews? Naaman, captain of the Syrian host, declared (2 Kings, v: 15), "that there is no God in all the earth, but in Israel." Might not such monotheistic confessions have been spread abroad? Homer knows about the Solymi, and the name of the river Jordan (*Ιάρδαρος*); and he seems to comprise three chief branches of the Semitic family (Eber, Arab and Aram), under the name of the Erembians (Odys. 4: 83), whom he places between Egypt and Phœnicia.† The industrious Tob. Pforner ‡ finds ground for the position that the Greeks might have received many truer representations of God from the Old Testament, in a less direct way than that of intercourse with the Jews.

Accordingly, the course may have been something like this. The poet of the Iliad and the Odyssey—we assume that there was one, so far as the language, customs, and views of life in both poems are identical—found among his people a very imperfect, native religion, the Pelasgic, in which the gods, originally only the forces of nature, had been transformed into

* See the author's *Erläuterungen der heiligea Schrift aus den Klassikera*. Kiel, 1833, p. 150 seq.

† Ibid, p. 142 seq.

‡ *Systema Theologiæ Gentili's purioris*. Basil, 1879. Cap. 1: 65.

a tyrannical and lordly race, which lived and ruled upon the summit of Olympus. What this "wise man" had heard, in his wanderings among the Hebrew and Phœnician seamen and traders, about the religious views of the Israelites, that there was one God, above the world, almighty, and alone good, who had revealed himself to them; this knowledge he used in order to educate his fellow countrymen silently and insensibly, under the veil of a heroic, popular saga, to higher and better views. This could be effected only as he allowed the popular mythology of the prevailing polytheism to stand along with the sayings that breathe a genuine religious spirit; for without the former he would have been reputed an atheist, as was Socrates in later times; and as to the purer doctrines, he might reasonably anticipate that they would gradually make their own way. He planted an *ethical* principle in the midst of the merely physical conceptions of the Greek popular faith. Especially in the *Odyssey*, which depicts family life, do we find the fair sentiments of a true piety (Nägelsb. p. 50). Thus: "May the gods endow you with all virtue;" "The gods can make the wise to be fools, and change the vain to prudence" (23:12). "The destruction of scorners is proof that the gods still rule" (24:351). "A youth guided by the gods cannot become evil" (3:375). "Let not the rich be presumptuous, but enjoy in quietness the gifts of the gods" (18:140). There was good reason why Homer did not name the source of these truths, for he wished to make them current imperceptibly. Thus, too, is to be explained, the origin of the names of honor given him by posterity, the *wise man*, the *divine singer*. His poems became a popular religious work, as it were, the Bible of the Greeks. But in the following centuries, the seed-corns of truth which he scattered around were choaked by the rank growth of popular superstitions. Only the wisest of the nation, Pythagoras and Socrates, Pindar and Sophocles, Plato and Aristotle, tried to bear these truths aloft. May not Plato have known the Hebrew doctrine about God? Numenius, the Pythagorean, called him "the attic speaking Moses," as is testified by Clement of Alexandria, in his *Stromata*, i. p. 251.

When the time was fulfilled, the Son of God appeared upon earth and revealed his glory, and his disciples proclaimed the pure faith of God for all creatures, as a testimony that it was to become the common heritage of the whole human race. Thus was fulfilled the prophecy of Isaiah (lxvi.: 19), Jehovah will send his messengers "to Javan," as well as to other nations, "to proclaim his glory among the Gentiles." And so,

too, the Lord rejoiced when he heard that the Greeks desired to see him (John xii.: 20). The great apostle to the Gentiles preached to the Athenians, that the *unknown God*, whom they worshipped, was the creator of heaven and earth, who had sent his Son to bless mankind (Acts, xvii.: 23). There were then even in degenerate heathendom points of junction for the divine word of salvation. Such points are also found in Homer; and hence we may say that God himself may have elevated his clear understanding to the great idea of breaking the way in Hellas for the pure doctrine of God.

What we have here presented is indeed to be called only a *conjecture*. But no one will look for a strict proof of such secret, Divine workings; enough if the conjecture be conceded, under the circumstances, to be probable. Thus is set in a clearer light the destination of Christianity to become the religion of the whole human race.

ART. IV. FOSTER ON FUTURE PUNISHMENT.

By FRANCIS WAYLAND, D. D., Providence, R. I.

TO THE REV. THOMAS H. SKINNER. D. D.

My Dear Brother:—In our conversation last summer, you spoke particularly of Foster's letter upon the "Duration of Future Punishment." You were of the opinion, that the deserved celebrity of the writer was liable to give currency to his views which they did not really deserve; and that a benefit would be conferred on many a serious inquirer, if the teachings of revelation on the doctrine of the final condition of the impenitent were fairly presented. This labor you urged me to undertake.

Since I had the pleasure of seeing you, an opportunity has been afforded; I have read this letter with attention, and will here give you the result of my reflections. I have done more. I have read again the "Life and Correspondence of Foster" with renewed admiration of his knowledge of the human heart, his profound and original thought, his power of generalization, and his sincere but pensive and somewhat sombre piety.

His biography will well repay the deepest attention. The child of poor parents, whom during several years of his youth, he assisted in their labors at hand weaving, he enjoyed but

scanty opportunities for early literary culture. Under all the disadvantages of his situation however, his intellectual superiority made itself manifest to his friends. They discovered in him a nervously diffident and solitary youth, the germs of distinguished eminence. He early gave evidence of piety, and it was naturally believed that God had chosen him to be a minister of the gospel. In order to qualify himself the better for this service, he spent some time in the family, and under the instruction of the Rev. Dr. Fawcett. He then entered the theological academy at Bristol, where he remained for two or three years. His tutor was the Rev. Joseph Hughes, the parent, and one of the first secretaries, of the British and Foreign Bible Society. Here, he was associated with many learned and able men, and was introduced to the treasures of a valuable library. He studied with so intense application, that his health suffered a shock, from which it is doubtful if he ever recovered.

On leaving the academy at Bristol, he devoted himself to preaching the gospel. He was employed in several places as a candidate, and in some of them became for a few years a settled pastor. His success was not, however, such as his unquestioned talent would have led us to anticipate. While his great ability was universally acknowledged, and his kindness of heart appreciated by his intimate friends, yet nowhere did the audience increase under his ministry. Sometimes the number of his hearers continued during his residence unchanged, sometimes it increased, but as often diminished. In every place he formed a few life-long friendships, but he was little known to his people at large. His thoughts were abstract, his sentences involved, his voice was weak, and, though his delivery is said to have rendered his meaning with great precision, yet he could not be understood in continuous discourse without closer attention than an audience will generally bestow upon a minister of religion. On one occasion, his novel mode of treating a subject led an old man to remark, "I don't know what he has been driving at all this afternoon, unless to set riddles." "He is going to take us to the stars again," was a frequent observation of his hearers.

His friends, who appreciated his intellectual ability, frequently urged him to write for the press; being confident that his mind was better adapted to written than to oral discourse. Yielding to their suggestions he first published his celebrated Essays, which at once gave him a position among those writers whom the world will not willingly let die. Soon a disease of the throat rendered it impossible for him to

preach steadily, and he was obliged to relinquish the ministry, and devote himself to literature. For several years, he was the most important contributor to the *Eclectic Review*. From 1806 to 1839, one hundred and eighty-five articles in this periodical were written by him. From time to time he published volumes on important subjects, preaching occasionally but only in retired places, and in small houses of worship. His health, always feeble, in his later years became exceedingly delicate, so that he rarely traveled from home. He died October 15th, 1843, at the age of seventy-three.

He was from youth, remarked for great originality of mind and stern independence of character. That an idea had been entertained before, was no reason why he should still entertain it, but rather the reverse. He seemed instinctively impelled to examine every subject for himself, and this he did with great acuteness and deep penetration. Shams of all sorts, whether in church, or state, or society, met his utter detestation. He delighted to remove the veil, with which unquestioned authority had covered a subject, and present it in the simple light of unambiguous truth.

This sturdy and uncompromising independence is one of the rarest and most valuable elements of character. But like other endowments, it is liable to mislead, unless it be tempered by a wise and sagacious discretion. He who resolves that he will doubt, until he investigates everything for himself, must ignore the testimony of the past, and find his life exhausted before half of his doubts have been dispelled. Of things generally believed, though many may be false, yet a portion must certainly be true; and he who equally doubts them all, while he successfully exposes hypocrisy and cant, may sometimes find himself stubbornly questioning self-evident truth.

The most striking peculiarity of Foster's mind, was, however, if I mistake not, his unequalled power of reflection. His mind was always turned inward upon itself, observing its own processes, watching its own emotions, and inquiring for the cause of every intellectual or moral phenomenon. As he was a devout lover of nature, he spontaneously associated every appearance of the world without, with something which he discovered or felt in the world within, ever seeing each in grand parallelism with the other.

I know of no man, of whom it could be said with more emphatic truth, that his mind was a kingdom unto itself. From youth he loved solitude above all other enjoyments. To walk alone, to spend hours by himself, in the field or the forest, to

observe nature in all her forms, especially the gloomy and terrific, and to find in his own mind some emotions that corresponded with what he saw was his constant habit. Hence arose the remarkable subjectivity which displays itself so prominently in all his writings; and hence also the richness and originality of his imagination. He was scarcely conscious of a spiritual fact before there arose before him some appearance in nature to which it seemed closely analogous.

As he advanced in years this mental peculiarity was somewhat modified. As he grew older, the outward world presented itself to him with less vivid coloring, and his mind turned the more exclusively upon itself. The world within occupied more fully his thoughts, and attracted more powerfully his observation. His mind, or, we may more properly say, his feelings became as it were the unit, by which he measured everything about him, and he recoiled at once from every thing that jarred in the least upon his sensibilities.

It is almost painful to observe in his Letter his frequent gasping after sentiment, and his feeling of utter loneliness unless his acquaintances come into special sympathy with himself. Indeed it sometimes seems to be a little more. He almost thinks of himself as a being of a peculiar organization, as one of a different and perhaps a higher species, while he looked upon the men around him as beings of another caste, to whom he would by any self-denial willingly do good, but who were shut out from him by a barrier of grossness, which could never be removed. Whatever might be the qualities of others, if his feelings did not sympathize with them, his first impulse was to withdraw from them altogether. He was, however, under the control of so high religious principle, that this emotional bias did not often lead him far astray. Nevertheless, such, I think, was the first acting of his mind; it tinged many of his beliefs, and to a perceptible degree warped some of his most important opinions.

The effect of this peculiar mental habitude may, I think, be seen in his views of Future Punishment. He does not pretend to establish his beliefs or disbeliefs by any testimony of Scripture. All he does is to question whether the passages in which this doctrine is spoken of, *may* not mean something different from what they plainly indicate; *may* not the words used signify a *definite*, when they speak of an *indefinite*, time; *may* there not be a reason for supposing that something else is meant than eternal misery? What that something is, when the termination is to occur, what there is to cause such a termination, what is to be the final result, whether annihilation

or restoration and eternal happiness, Foster does not pretend to have determined. He clearly has no definite opinion on the subject; he offers no argument either direct or indirect from the Word of God. His state of mind seems to be simply this: There is something so awful in the idea of eternal punishment for the deeds of this transitory life, that I cannot reconcile it with my conceptions of the perfections of God, therefore I cannot believe it, though I cannot tell what to believe in the place of it. Yet he would have thought it very strange, when he declared that he would punish one of his children for a grievous fault, if his other children had told him that they did not believe a word that he said, because they could not reconcile the punishment with their conception of his kind and benevolent character.

While forming his opinions on this subject, Foster seems to have taken it for granted, that God may be summoned before the bar of sinful man, that the Infinite may be measured by the finite, that God can do nothing that is not in harmony with our conceptions of his perfections. While looking on the future consequences of sin he seems never to have thought of the awful misery which it has brought into the world, of the holiness of God, or of that necessity of his being, which obliges him to arrest the progress of transgression in the universe of moral agents. He takes his stand-point on earth, and from the feelings of a sinful creature, determines what may or may not be done by the just and holy Sovereign of the universe, eternal and omniscient, the God of an infinite majesty.

But it is time to turn to the Letter itself, and examine it with due attention. The argument is on this wise: The author first presents us with some striking views of eternity and clearly shows that to conceive of it adequately is a task far transcending the province of our limited capacities. Thence he turns to man. He sees that we come into being strongly inclined to evil under circumstances which render a life of sinfulness certain, if not necessary. Help from ourselves is hopeless; it can only come from above, and this help is granted to but a small portion of mankind. But few of our race know even the existence of God, still fewer know anything of the nature of his law or the way of salvation by Christ. Many die in infancy, and of those who know of the offers in the gospel but a few are chosen to eternal life. Yet, according to the doctrine which he disbelieves, a God of infinite love consigns a whole race, with the exception of a select few, to eternal punishment, it may

be for *even a single sin*. And all this is rendered more incredible from the fact, that this punishment has not been made known as the result of sin to one in a million of those who suffer. And, in addition, it is to be remarked that this eternal misery is to be inflicted on all but a select few of the children of Adam, without regard to differences of moral character. This is a brief statement of the views of the author on this subject. He only doubts. He presents no positive doctrine. He does not determine what that period of punishment should be which might exist without shaking his feelings. He offers no evidence either direct or indirect, positive or circumstantial, in proof of his views. All he asks is that punishment shall not be eternal; this granted, his feelings are at rest.

I do not propose to consider these opinions in detail. Each separate article might well occupy an essay by itself. I prefer to pursue a different course. The doctrine of a future state is, exclusively, a matter of revelation. Without revelation all is doubt, inference and uncertainty. Shadows, clouds and darkness rest upon it. Foster's objections must of course then be to the doctrine as revealed in the Scriptures. Evidently then the first question to be considered is, what is the teaching of the New Testament on this subject? This we will now endeavor to do.

So far as I am able to understand the New Testament, it reveals to us the following truths:

1. In the beginning God created man upright, in his own image, that is, I suppose, in his own intellectual and moral likeness. That is, he created him with an understanding capable of arriving at knowledge from premises; with a conscience by which he can distinguish between right and wrong, and be impelled to the one and repelled from the other; and with a will perfectly free to choose between any two objects presented to him. Being a moral, and of course a responsible being, it is essential that he be endowed with such a will. God having thus created him, respects the nature which he has made, and ever treats him as a being endowed with an understanding, a conscience and a will, and responsible to him for the proper use of each.

2. It is probable that all the moral beings whom God has created were subjected at first to a state of probation. Thus we read of the angels who *kept not their first estate*. It is certain that such is the case with man. His condition in the present life is probationary. The character formed in youth, is the foundation of the character developed in manhood and in old age. Thus also the whole character of man in the present

world, is probationary to the character which he will manifest in the other world. No other reasonable condition of being for moral agents can be conceived. Being thus formed, God made known to man his will, and denounced the punishment of death in case of disobedience.

3. One of the laws of the constitution under which we are created is, that the *character of the probation* of every man is effected either for good or evil by the acts of his predecessors and by others over whose actions he can have no control. This law affects us everywhere. It is the foundation on which rests the indefinite progress of our race. Abolish it, and every generation, without advancing a step, would stand precisely in the tracks of that which preceded it. Our progress in the useful and ornamental arts, in literature and jurisprudence, in all the conveniences of life, as well as the moral progress of our race, are the results of this universal law. Not that the acts of others necessitate us to do either good or evil; the will of man remains perfectly free to choose or to refuse. The actions of others, however, create facilities and allurements for doing the one or the other, and having chosen the good or the evil, we create in ourselves a tendency to do as we have done before. Under this law Adam was created, and the condition of the probation of his posterity was suspended on his conduct.

4. With perfect freedom of will, with every moral principle soliciting him to filial love and obedience, man disobeyed God, and chose to obey his own appetite in the place of the infinite, all-wise, and all-holy Creator. He changed his God and chose to worship the creature rather than the Creator, who is God over all, blessed forever. His whole character was thus reversed. Instead of being the loving and beloved child of God, he became the slave of Satan; and dislike of God took the place of holy reverence. Henceforth he did not like to retain God in his knowledge. Instead of being the companion of angels he became the associate of devils. The earth was cursed for his sake, and paradise became a wilderness, bringing forth thorns and thistles.

5. Hence the conditions of our probation were of necessity changed. Adam commenced his existence in a holy world. God had looked upon it and pronounced it all very good. Everything that he saw and knew, both his intellectual and moral nature, urged him to filial obedience. But by the sin of our first parents all this was reversed. His children entered upon life in a sinful world. Everything around them was polluted by examples of sin. Instead of entering a world peopled by children of God, they beheld on every side his enemies. Com-

mening life under such conditions, infancy, childhood and youth being subject to such examples, that they should become sinners seems a matter of course. We can hardly conceive how it could have been otherwise. Suppose an angel to be created an infant, and let him commence his life in the world of the lost, would he not grow up a demon as certainly, as, if commencing his existence in heaven, he would grow into a seraph? All this must render the depravity of our race certain to beings endowed with passions and will, entering upon life in a wicked world as infants. We, however, by no means affirm that this is all. From our first parents there may have descended a tendency to sin, to love the creature and disobey the Creator, so that in another and more important sense it is true that the carnal mind is enmity to God. Thus one generation after another has become more strongly addicted to sin, and has become more and more thoroughly penetrated with guiltiness, or a bias of the affections entirely in opposition to God.

While all this was going on, let it be remembered, that the free will of man remained unchanged. It was in his power as much as ever to choose or to refuse; he was as free to resist his passions and conquer his wicked inclinations as to yield to them. His intellect continued the same, though it may, in various cases, have been deteriorated by his own act. He was still capable of reasoning from premises to conclusions, and from effects to causes. The handiwork of the Creator everywhere surrounded him, from which he was capable of learning the existence and attributes of the Deity.

6. This subject is treated with great distinctness by the apostle Paul in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. He is addressing himself to the Gentiles. He tells us that *the wrath of God is revealed* against all impiety and wickedness of men who hold the truth in unrighteousness; that is, those who know, or might know, the truth and do not obey it.

The reason of the wrath of God, is that what may be known of him is manifest (placed directly before them), for *God hath shown it* unto them. But how has he shown it? Thus: the invisible things of God, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, *so that* they are without excuse. Professing themselves to be wise they became fools and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things.

7. Against this shocking and universal impiety, the *wrath of God was revealed*. But *how* was it revealed? The apostle

shall inform us. Wherefore *God gave them up* to uncleanness. He gave them up to vile affections, receiving the recompense of their error, which was meet; and even *as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge*, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things that are not convenient, being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, deceit, malignity, haters of God, inventors of evil things, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful. The teaching here is plain, and so far as I see indisputable. It is this. God gave men the means of knowing his perfections and his will. From these they turned away, because they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, and chose and worshipped the meanest reptiles, nay, even the images of beasts instead of the Creator. Against such awful impiety he displayed his displeasure, or made known his wrath, by allowing them without restraint to pursue their own course. He gave them over. The consequence was, a condition of the most degraded iniquity, and more than brutish sensuality and lust.

Mr. Foster's opinion of the human race does not seem to differ from that of the apostle Paul. To him the world seemed so steeped in wickedness, that the death of a young person was to him a source of pleasure rather than of pain. He says, (Letter 139, Vol. 2d, p. 58) "I constantly and systematically regard this world with such horror, as a place for the rising human beings to come into, that it is an emphatic satisfaction, I may say pleasure to me, except in a few cases of rare promise, to hear of their prematurely leaving it. I have, in a number of times, been amazed that parents should not, in this view, be greatly consoled for their loss. Let them look at this world with sins, temptations, and snares of the devil, bad examples, seducing companions, disasters, vexations, dishonor, and afflictions all over it, and their children to enter the scene with a radically corrupted nature, adapted to receive the mischief of all its worst influences and impressions—let them look at all this, and say whether it would not be well that their children are saved from these dreadful dangers."

Such, then, Foster himself being judge, is the moral character of the human race. The moral perils of the present state are so awful that the death of a human being in infancy is to him a source of pleasure rather than of pain. And we may add that this state is in consequence of the displeasure of God against sin; it is that at which sin arrives, when men are given up of God, when he has said, "Ephraim is joined unto idols, let him alone." That is to say, God spreads around

men the evidences of his existence and attributes, and gives them an understanding, by the legitimate use of which, they might arrive at the truth; but they became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened, and they chose brute animals and idols in preference to Him. He gave them his written law, and they rejected it, blinding their eyes by sin, they walked as though in the thickest darkness. God then gave them up to wickedness, to vile affections and a reprobate mind. Such do we find men to be at present. Civilization, and the reflex influences of the gospel may and do in particular regions, and in special conditions of society modify the exhibition of these sensual tendencies; but their prevailing element is the same; it is in one word *ungodliness*—they do not like to retain God in their knowledge.

8. Such being the moral character of our race, probation terminates at death. A separation then ensues, which is determined by the moral affections of the individual. Those who love God, are in virtue of the redemption by Christ, admitted to his more immediate presence. Those who are at enmity with him go away into banishment. They said unto God, Depart from us, for we desire not a knowledge of thy ways, and he departs from them. They have taken their choice in this world, and he ratifies it in the next. They refused obedience to a law holy and just and good, and God appoints them a condition in which there is no law. They chose to obey their own passions and lusts in the place of God, and he leaves them to the unrestrained tyranny of their evil tendencies. They would not live to him, but lived to themselves, cultivating selfishness in all its forms; he assigns to them a condition in which selfishness reigns supreme in every being, where every evil bias of the human heart is allowed to bring forth its fruit without restraint, in its bitterest intensity. What can be more awful than such a state of existence? Every element of happiness has been excluded, and nothing is left but unsatisfied appetite wrought up to madness, envy malice, rage, cruelty, implacable and unmerciful, all acting without control, and each seeking nothing but the misery of all. And more than this, every one is conscious that he is receiving nothing but the result of his own choice. Maddened with rage against God, they know that it is all just, yet they cannot but rise in fruitless enmity against omnipotence and holiness. They curse their God and their King looking upward.

A state of existence more awful than this cannot be conceived. It is not necessary to suppose that God is directly

inflicting pain as the punishment of sin. 'Tis enough that he allows it without restraint, to come to its inevitable results. It thus furnishes the most impressive lesson to the universe. It thus presents as vivid a picture of the tendencies of sin as heaven of the tendencies of holiness. This is evidently in harmony with one of the great principles of the government of God. The Lord is known by the judgment which he executeth; the wicked is snared in the work of his own hands.

I know that the state of the wicked in the other world is in the Scriptures frequently spoken of as caused by the wrath of God. True, but in what manner does this wrath make itself known? Can it in any manner display to the universe so effectually the evil of sin, as by thus allowing it to receive the results of its own choices? Can any degree of physical pain be compared with the misery of beings who exercise without control every evil passion of the human heart, and who know that they have brought all this upon themselves? The spirit of a man can sustain his infirmity, but a wounded spirit who can bear? This is the manner in which, according to the apostle Paul, the wrath of God is displayed in this world. Can any reason be assigned why the same mode of manifestation should not be employed in the world to come?

9. The question then occurs: How long shall this condition continue? Is there anything in the state itself which has a tendency to change? The exercise of every evil passion must increase continually in energy, and the enmity of the soul against God must rankle with more and more hatred, what then is there in such a condition to fit men for heaven? There can be no hope from this source. There is no more reason to suppose that the continuance of hatred to God would in the end prepare men for heaven, than that the love of God growing age after age more intense, would, in the end, render them fit for hell.

The testimony of the Scriptures it seems not necessary to consider in detail. Foster evidently places little reliance upon his *interpretation* of the Word of God. When he asks what say the Scriptures? he answers: "There is a *force in their expressions* at which we well may tremble. But I *hope* it is not *presumption* to take *advantage* of the fact that the terms everlasting, eternal, forever, original or translated, are often employed in the Bible under very great and various limitations of import, and are thus withdrawn from the predicament of *necessarily* and absolutely meaning eternal duration." The whole argument here evidently turns upon this: That the words in question are occasionally used in a somewhat differ-

ent sense. It is however true that in the passages on *this* subject *they are so used* that their meaning cannot be doubted. The Scriptures clearly teach us that there will be a day of judgment for all men, that then and there a decision will be had, after which there will be no change; that the wicked shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal. The word which designates *duration* is the same in both cases. If God had meant to teach us that one state was temporary, and the other eternal, he would surely have distinguished them here by different terms. If the doctrine of future punishment be in truth at variance with the attributes of God, he would not certainly have vindicated them by a mode of interpretation which annihilates the certainty of every doctrine of revelation.

But it is said that Christ died for all, therefore all *will* eventually be saved. True, Christ died for all, that all *might* be saved; but his death is effectual only on those who believe. He died that he might offer eternal life to all those who will forsake their sins and accept of it. He treats men, therefore, as free agents. But if a man will not accept of it, it is the same to him, as though Christ had not died. This is the condemnation, that light has come into the world, and men have loved darkness rather than light because their deeds are evil. Again, Christ is the Saviour of all who believe. Belief is the temper of heart which it becomes a sinner to exercise to his Father in heaven, and towards the Saviour who died to redeem him. He that has such a temper will be saved. But sinners when on earth did not manifest such a temper, and it surely could not be produced by the experience which they suffer, or the beings with whom they associate in the world of the lost. They have disobeyed law and rejected Christ, what have they to hope for from either, whether in this world or the world of retribution?

10. It has been objected to the doctrine of the eternity of future punishment that, so far as we can see, but a small portion of our race will be saved, while the great majority will be lost. It is believed that this must be irreconcilable with the goodness of God.

On this objection we would remark:

(a) The proportion of the lost to the saved cannot be known until the history of this world shall have been closed. The Scriptures teach us that the reign of Christ is yet to come, that the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth as the waters do the sea, and that this reign shall continue for a thousand years, or a period of unlimited duration. If this age

should resemble the cycles of millions of years with which geology makes us acquainted, during which time the earth shall be densely peopled beyond our pre-ent conception, and the inhabitants all righteous, the number of the saved may exceed that of the lost, who can tell in what vast proportion?

(b) But setting aside all proper discord from this world, let us look at the subject from another point of view. This earth, though a constituent part of God's dominion, is but an infinitesimal part. Yet it is, we believe, intimately connected with the whole moral creation. It is on this little world that to principalities and powers in heavenly places there is made known the manifold wisdom of God. Our earth is the selected theatre on which the Holy One unfolds his choicest attributes to the whole creation. Here he in a special manner displays his hatred of sin, his love to sinners, his truth and holiness, and the completion of the work of redemption on earth, taught in heaven a new ascription of praise to God and the Lamb forever. Why should not also the nature and the necessary results of rebellion against God, be held up forever in the presence of the whole universe? If it be said that this might have been accomplished by the sacrifice of a smaller number, I answer, the only question is, Is the sentence just? This has nothing to do with the number who may or may not suffer the penalty which it denounces.

11. But it is said that this fearful destiny is increased by those who never knew of these consequences of transgression. Human laws always tell us what will be the penalty for violation. Justice requires that the Divine law should at least be equally explicit.

To this we reply that human laws have to do merely with acts and not with the tempers of the heart. Human law is satisfied if it prevents murder, though there may lurk in the heart any amount of murderous propensity. It therefore holds up the punishment in terrorem and is satisfied if it prevents actual transgression. The divine law proceeds upon a totally different principle. It forbids not only the evil, but the disposition of heart from which the evil proceeds. Nor is this all. To do or not to do, from fear of punishment or hope of reward, is of no avail in the sight of God. Nothing is virtuous in his eyes but that which proceeds from the love of goodness, and from filial obedience to his commands. He distinctly takes the ground that filial obedience to him, our Father in heaven, is our first duty, and without this nothing is acceptable to him. Hence the monition of conscience teaches us an indefinite dread of result from the doing of

wrong, but gives us no information as to what the result is to be. In the New Testament the result of sin is explicitly revealed, but at the same time we are assured that no action is really good unless it proceeds from *the love of God*. We are in the gospel promised rewards for all the losses we suffer in consequence of our profession of religion. But if we do it *for the sake of the reward*, we are not entitled to the promise. The promise is given to those alone who without hope of reward, act only for the sake of Christ.

12. It is also objected that if the doctrine in question be true, then those who have lived in pagan darkness, though they have never heard of the way of salvation, must of necessity be cast out to dwell for ever in eternal despair.

This is not we think the statement of the Scriptures. We learn from the New Testament that all men are justly under censure ; that the Redeemer died for all and offers life to all ; but that his sacrifice is available only to those who believe. Belief or faith is a temper of heart, a temper such as responds to the character of the blessed God and of his Son Jesus Christ our Saviour. This temper of heart may exist in those who have not known of the coming of Christ, and they may be saved in virtue of the sacrifice of a Redeemer, of whom they have not heard. It is on this principle that Abraham was saved by faith ; nor Abraham alone, Moses, David, Samuel, and all the saints of the Old Testament, were saved in the same manner. This principle may be applied to the heathen. They have the light of nature, and the apostle being judge, they are without excuse. If they obey that light, though it be imperfectly, and exercise the right temper of heart, they may also be saved through the merits of a Saviour of whom they have not heard. The heathen are lost, not by the force of any necessary doom, but because they have not improved the light which they have enjoyed, and because the moral temper of heart which they cherish is enmity to God.

It is also objected, that according to the doctrine in question, all must suffer alike ; the infant and the man of gray hairs, and especially he that has sinned but once and he that has sinned during a life time.

On this last case I would make a single remark in passing. When men speak of the consequences of a *single* sin as unduly severe, they seem to forget the nature of sin itself. To sin is not merely to rebel against a holy and good being—the law, on obedience to which is suspended the happiness of the moral universe—but it is a deliberate rejection of the authority of God and submission of the soul to the desires of the

human heart. This one act transforms the whole nature ; the being instead of the friend of God becomes his enemy, and thus the carnal heart is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. It is not therefore surprising that he should be treated as the enemy of God.

But to return. It is nowhere asserted in the Scriptures that the condition of all men will be the same, but clearly the reverse. Our Saviour has said, he that knew his Lord's will and neither prepared himself, nor did his Lord's will, shall be beaten with many stripes, but he that knew not and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes, for unto whomsoever much is given of him shall much be required. Here we are not only taught that there are differences in the destiny of man, but that an important element of difference is, the degree of knowledge that may be possessed by various individuals.

13. But it is said, God certainly knew that man would sin, why did he then create him ? Or after he had created him why did he not prevent him from sinning ? Or since he sent his Son for man's salvation, why did he not make the fact of his coming known to the whole world ? God had power to do all these things, why should he punish men for doing what he might so easily have prevented ?

We see at a glance that this is no other than the old question of the origin of evil. It is simply this : How came sin to exist at all under the government of a God of omniscience, holiness and love ? We know that God is infinitely good, wise and holy, and that sin exists in this portion of his universe, and this is all we know about it.

The same question is put to the apostle Paul (Rom. ix.: 19 sqq.), and we have his answer : "Thou wilt say then unto me, *Why doth he yet find fault, for who hath resisted his will?*" His answer is as follows : "Nay, but O man who art thou that repliest against God ? Shall the thing formed say unto him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus ? Hath not the potter power over the clay to make one vessel unto honor and another to dishonor ? What if God willing, to show his wrath and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction ; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had before prepared unto glory, even unto us whom he hath called, not of the Jews only but also of the Gentiles." This is Paul's answer to the question. I do not see that we can go behind it.

And, lastly, Foster argues that this cannot be true because even those who acknowledge it to be true do not act as if

they believed it. To this we may reply, that what is alleged may prove the moral insensibility of men, but it has nothing to do with the truth of the doctrine. In the same manner we might prove that the happiness of heaven is limited, because those who say that they believe it, act very inconsistently with their profession. The manner in which a doctrine is received is no evidence either of its truth or falsehood.

This Letter has been already prolonged greatly beyond my anticipations; yet bear with me while I add two brief suggestions.

1. How unspeakably intimate is the connection between this life and the life to come. Every act that we perform, every word that we utter, nay, every thought that we harbor, is doing its part to give shape and coloring to our eternal destiny. If we turn away from our Father in heaven, and choose for our gods sensual or intellectual pleasure, social position, wealth, power, or the applause of men, then there is nothing to prevent us. God respects the free agency with which he created us. But let us remember we must abide by our choice forever. As a man soweth so shall he also reap. He that soweth to the flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption. We shall find in another world that we have moulded our destiny with our own hands. We must associate forever with the enemies of all good, hateful and hating one another, rising in endless hostility against the ever-blessed God, ever crushed by the hand of omnipotence, knowing that all our suffering is just, and that we on earth had chosen it.

2. How does all this teach us the unspeakable importance of seeking now to be reconciled to God through the death of his Son. Through the atoning sacrifice God can be just and justify him that believeth. A full, free pardon, without money and without price, is offered to every penitent believer. Nay, more, to all who thus come the Holy Spirit is given, by whom our souls are cleansed from the pollution of sin, our affections set on heaven, and we made meet to be inheritors of the saints in light. All this is fully offered to us by the blessed Saviour. If we reject it—and we can if we choose—we consign our souls to the abodes of the lost. Let us not delay for a moment. Now is the accepted time; behold, now is the day of salvation.

Thus, my dear Brother, I have endeavored to comply with your request, and am,

With deep veneration and Christian love,

Yours truly,

F. WAYLAND.

ART. V.—GIBBON AND COLENZO.

By WILLIAM ADAMS, D.D., New York City.

Traveling in the country, the eye frequently notices in the fields, those large rounded rocks, which are known to geologists as boulders. The peculiarity of these masses is, that they are out of place, transported from their original bed, by some convulsion of nature, most probably by water; as when, on the surface of a recent formation, we see a boulder of granite. There are some events in history which may be compared to boulders. They are quite extraordinary in their dimensions; they attract attention; but they are unrelated to other events which precede or follow. They lie on the surface, large and massive, but disconnected with all around them. They might be rolled away out of sight and not be missed. They would leave no chasm in history, to be supplied by some other object. If left unrecorded, we should be conscious of no interruption to the dramatic plan of historic unity.

On the other hand, there are events in history which may be likened to the stones used in the foundation or walls of an edifice. They are clamped and cemented together in solid masonry. They lie in place, fitted and grooved into other blocks, after such a manner, as shows that they are integral parts of one structure, designed by one architect. They are not thrown together accidentally, but arranged in reference to what is beneath them and above them, and on either side of them: nor can we remove one of them, unless we put something in its place, without the risk that the whole building will tumble to pieces.

The American Revolution, for example, and its presiding genius, George Washington. Suppose that a man should be found of such enormous scepticism as to doubt whether such an event ever occurred, or such a personage ever had a historic existence. You will immediately say to him: These are not boulders, which you can roll out of the way as if they were isolated and independent objects. They are figures wrought into an extensive tapestry; you cannot take them out without destroying the whole texture. They run back into the past; they are related to English history, to well attested facts in colonial life, and they are inwrought with the whole structure of our nationality; its constitution, its flag,

its coinage, its observance of the fourth of July, and the honor conferred on that great man, in the use made of his name in connexion with cities, towns and monuments immortalizing his fame, and the whole body of our literature. Such events, whether they be modern or ancient, can not be questioned, or denied, without unraveling the whole fabric of history, knit together, as it is, out of so many correlative facts and precedents. You cannot disbelieve them unless you disbelieve everything else. You cannot take them out of the building, without letting down the building itself in a heap of ruins. If you could venture to doubt such events as these, then you create a chasm which must be supplied by some hypothesis which will account for all the observances and usages and monuments and associations which compose the present life of nations.

Now Christianity is preëminently an object of this description. It does not lie like a bowlder in the open pastures of history a solitary and independent fact; but it is jointed and compacted into all other facts, so that is impossible to separate it from the historic mass. Its roots run back into the past, and penetrate the entire present. Any attempt to displace it from its historic bed, would be like pulling up a tree by the roots, disengaging at the same time the entire mass of sod and mould in which it is planted. Not a few have deluded themselves and others with the notion that if they could succeed in raising rational doubts concerning the historic life of Jesus Christ as portrayed in the New Testament; if they could but throw discredit on the few miraculous events recorded in that extraordinary book,—then infidelity has achieved a victory, and Christianity is extinguished. Such men do not appear to have the first conception of the task they have undertaken. The personal life of Jesus of Nazareth upon the earth occupied only the brief space of a third of a century. Before you can dislodge it from its natural place, you must demolish the whole structure of the Hebrew polity; the entire body of Hebrew literature; the history, liturgy, prophecies, and life of the most extraordinary nation the earth has ever seen. You must re-adjust the relative position of all the nations of the earth; and then it will devolve on you to dispose of the most palpable monuments of the Christian faith, as they are distributed all over the civilized world, and incorporated into the very life and habits of all Christian nations: the Christian Sabbath, the holy communion, the rite of baptism, the mode of computing time, the various observances of the ecclesiastical calendar, the history of the church inwrought with the history

of states: the Crusades—the religious wars of many centuries—the laws, the literature the civilization of all Christendom—the best productions of the arts—the immortal pictures of Raphael and Guido—the Transfiguration and the Crucifixion; in a word, he who would disprove the historic existence of Jesus Christ must unravel the whole warp and woof of modern history; instead of detaching a single stone from a promiscuous mass, dropped there eighteen centuries ago, he must upheave the old foundations, draw out the key-stones of the arches, withdraw the pillars, detach the connecting beams from the walls, remove everything which gives unity, symmetry, form, completeness to the edifice, and bring down dome, roof and all into shapeless ruin.

Towards the close of the last century, Mr. Gibbon gave to the world his celebrated work on the "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire." Devout persons, at the time, and ever since, have deplored the effect of that book in reference to Christian belief. In this case, as in so many others, what was intended for disparagement is overruled for advantage to the very cause impugned. It is not enough to say that the weapons employed against Christianity are unavailing, they rebound upon the heads of the assailants to their own discomfiture. Regretting that any man, like Edward Gibbon, should misuse signal talents in an attempt to undermine the prevalent faith in Christian evidences, we shall always be thankful that his own pen unintentionally and unconsciously has furnished testimony irrefutable in support of the very religion whose foundations he aimed to sap. Undertaking the history of that magnificent Imperialism which filled the world with its power and fame, unexpectedly, shall we say, he comes in immediate contact with Christianity. This new religion lies as in its matrix, in the very heart of Roman history. It could not be evaded. To write the annals of the later ages of Rome, without a distinct mention of Christianity, would be like describing the rainbow without specifying the colors of which it is composed. What disposition should be made of Titus and his campaigns in the East, and the monuments which were reared in the metropolis in token of his triumph over Judean superstitions? What should he do with the frequent allusions to the Christian faith found in Roman classics, particularly in the annals of Tacitus? How could he make a passage through the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian, the Antonines, and Julian—the invasion of the Barbarians, the persecutions of Nero and Diocletian, the conversion of Constantine, the insertion of the Cross into the labarum of the Roman

legions, the planting of the religious ensign on the prostrate capitol of the Cæsars—how could he undertake such a history, with any show of impartiality, and omit a distinct mention of the rise, power and prevalence of the Christian Religion? An alternative now awaits his choice; either he must abandon his great undertaking as the historian of Rome, or he must account for the prevalence of the religion with which he is confronted. Had he been disposed to admit the Divine origin and supernatural character of Christianity, his task would have been superlatively easy. But this was the last concession he was inclined to make; so that the problem which he was compelled to grapple was this: How to account for the progress of the Christian religion by natural laws and natural forces. The *ingenuity* displayed by the distinguished author in this discussion,—the *skill* he has exercised in the endeavor to maintain his own reputation as an impartial registrar of facts, while he is averse to the concession of the Divine origin of these facts, has placed those famous chapters—the fifteenth and sixteenth, devoted to this discussion, among the prodigies of English literature. Observe, he makes no profane assault against Christianity. He does not pretend to disbelieve its historic reality. There it stands, as positive a fact as the existence of the Roman Empire. A superficial reader of the chapters would not even suspect the temper and design which moved the pen that wrote them. He might imagine that it was a Christian apologist undertaking a defence of Christianity, in excess of candor and impartiality. A closer inspection detects the mischief. The studious omission of the one essential element—the presence and power of God impregnating and impelling his own revealed religion; the attempt to bring down that religion to the level of natural deism; the cold and unimpassioned manner in which he prosecutes his work, in contrast with his usual élan and enthusiasm; the latent sneer; the adroit sarcasm; the involved implication; the ill-concealed bias and jealousy with which he weighs the motives of Christian believers; and at last the emphatic satisfaction with which he descants on the corruptions of the church in days of later degeneracy; these are the poisonous shafts which were intended to strike deeper into the vitals of Christian faith, by reason of the prefatory pretence of unusual historic candor.

This work of Mr. Gibbon furnishes evidence in demonstration of the Christian religion. We make a particular use of this discussion of his in the construction of an argument for the inspiration and for the historic accuracy of the Old Testa-

ment, which so many, even in our day, are disposed to impugn. We have already referred to the fact, which arrested the eye, and challenged the admission, of the deistical scholar, that Christianity was as palpable an object as the imperialism of Rome; that its rise and progress interpenetrate Roman history, at every point, through and through, in all its provinces, and books, and laws: and therefore cannot be denied as a historic fact, without denying all history into which it is grooved and morticed. Mr. Gibbon was not tinctured at all with the modern philosophy which transmutes historic occurrences and personages into myths, disposing of them as mere ideas, engendered in the ever-advancing consciousness of our species: for to him the Christian martyr was a real person, as much as a Roman soldier or Emperor; and signal is the service which he has thus unconsciously rendered for the demolition of all the mythical theories concerning Christianity, which have been spun by the sceptical ingenuity of our times. This, however, is not the purpose for which this testimony is here adduced. We employ it for another object, which we now proceed to explain.

Public attention on both sides of the Atlantic has been directed, with no inconsiderable interest, to recent issues of the English press, which are designed to modify the prevalent faith of the church in regard to the inspired accuracy of the Holy Scriptures. The book of Dr. Colenso is the most notorious of its class. Its professed design is to set aside the authority of the Pentateuch as an historical record. His mode of reasoning is, that the things which are therein contained, from the times of Jacob, his residence in Egypt, the exodus of his descendants, the observance of the Levitical ritual during a sojourn in the wilderness, down to the days of Joshua, were impossible occurrences, and so are not to be received, by us as facts. Meantime he does not dispute that God held communication, by his invisible Spirit with the spirits of men; or that those ideas, which are still retained by the church concerning the attributes of God, and the principles of his moral law, were actually imparted by the Divine effluence to Moses and his contemporaries. What he affirms is, that there is no ground to believe that this inspiration was ever attended by any of those occurrences which the Pentateuch describes as historical; but that these are a congeries of mistakes, contradictory fables, fictions, imaginations, impossibilities, which are attached by tradition to the record of what is distinctly true, as sand and stone adhere to particles of precious ore. Precisely this is the position assumed by Dr. Colenso. He does not challenge us to abandon belief in inspiration as im-

parted of God to the Hebrew consciousness, in the times of Moses ; but he summons us to relinquish all faith in what the Pentateuch contains as facts, pronouncing them "*unhistorical and impossible.*"

That such a book, from such a source, is adapted to work injury in many minds, it is idle to question ; all the more because associated with apparent honesty of criticism and great conscientiousness on the part of its author. One method of refuting such a book is to subject each of its specific assertions to careful investigation. This belongs to the department of criticism. We have only to say in this connection, that the volume under notice contains nothing that is new ; only a repetition of what long ago was suitably explained by eminent biblical scholars, of whom it is enough to mention Archbishop Usher, Warburton and Hengstenberg. The first idea of *impossibility* as associated with the Hebrew exodus, and sojourn in the wilderness, this author confesses was suggested to his mind, not in the process of a theological education, but when a missionary in Africa, by an intelligent Zulu convert, himself addicted to the life of a shepherd, who inquired of his teacher, whether the Mosaic account of taking through a wild district flocks and herds in sufficient numbers to maintain the rites prescribed by the Levitical law, was in the range of *possibility* ; and with this clew in his hand—leaving out of account the supernatural and miraculous element—he proceeds to specify any number of particulars, which on natural principles, he asserts are clearly fabulous and "*unhistorical.*" There is a mode of disposing of this subject which carries absolute conviction. Those events which the Pentateuch treats as historical occurrences were not boulder-stones lying solitary and disconnected on the fields of antiquity. The very things which are now affirmed to be impossible, entered into the very structure of the Hebrew nationality. You cannot deracinate them, without at the same time pulling up and destroying the best attested and most palpable facts of general history. What Colenso is disposed to pronounce unreal and fabulous and contrary to facts, is so inwrought with other facts universally admitted, and patent to our own senses, that they cannot be dislodged without producing universal chaos.

It is in this connection that we make use of the testimony furnished by Mr. Gibbon in the passage of his book already mentioned. Undertaking to account for the spread of the Christian religion throughout the Roman Empire—that palpable piece of history which he could not deny nor evade,

the first cause which he assigns is the "inflexible," and, if he may be allowed to use the expression, "the intolerant zeal of the Christian, derived from the Jewish religion, but gradually purifying from that narrow and unsocial spirit which had deterred the Gentiles from embracing the law of Moses." Regarding Christianity as an outgrowth of the religion of the Jews, Mr. Gibbon describes that religion in most forcible terms, as something which preserved this one nation distinct and separate from all other nations. This is his own language. "While other nations embraced, or at least respected each other's superstitions, a single people refused to join in the common intercourse of mankind. The Jews, who under the Assyrian and Persian monarchies, had languished for many ages the most despised portion of their slaves, emerged from obscurity under the successors of Alexander, and as they multiplied to a surprising degree in the east, and afterwards in the west, they soon excited the curiosity and wonder of other nations. The sullen obstinacy with which they maintained their peculiar rites and unsocial manners, seemed to mark them out as a distinct species of men, who boldly profaned, or who faintly disguised their implacable habits to the rest of humankind. Neither the violence of Antiochus, nor the arts of Herod, nor the example of circumjacent nations could ever persuade the Jews to associate with the institutions of Moses, the elegant mythology of the Greeks. According to the maxims of universal toleration the Romans protected a superstition which they despised. The polite Augustus condescended to give orders that sacrifices should be offered for his prosperity in the temple of Jerusalem; whilst the meanest of the posterity of Abraham, who should have paid the same homage to the Jupiter of the capital, would have been an object of abhorrence to himself and to his brethren. But the moderation of the conquerors was insufficient to appease the jealous prejudices of their subjects, who were alarmed and scandalized at the ensigns of paganism which necessarily introduced themselves into a Roman province. The mad attempt of Caligula to place his own statue in the temple at Jerusalem was defeated by the unanimous resolution of a people who dreaded death much less than such an idolatrous profanation. Philo and Josephus give a very circumstantial, but a very rhetorical account of this transaction which exceedingly perplexed the governor of Syria. At the first mention of this idolatrous proposal, it is said king Agrippa fainted away, and did not recover his senses until the third day. In a word, the attachment of the Jews to the law of

Moses was equal to their detestation of foreign religions. The current of zeal and devotion, as it was contracted into a narrow channel, ran with the strength and sometimes with the fury of a torrent." Thus far Mr. Gibbon himself. No one has described more graphically than he the unique and distinctive history of the Jews, especially in their abhorrence of idolatry, and their undying attachment to certain rites enjoined on them by their Mosaic law. The admission of the Divine authority of Moses and all the parts and observances of their religious system, was, according to this historic authority, the basis of Christianity, and the secret fountain of its zealous life.

We ask for no better premises than these, in an argument for the historical accuracy of the Pentateuch. A fact so marvellous as the religious history of the Jews, running down through so many centuries of time; coming in contact with so many nations, and such different forces, political and religious; yet all the while maintaining its independence, like a river refusing to coalesce with other waters, is something not to be passed by without notice or explanation. Is it possible to account even in imagination for the long-continued and distinct religion of the Jews, made up as it was of so many peculiar rites and observances, except on the ground of the *historic reality* of the events to which they relate? The observance of the Passover was one of the universal features of this distinctive religion. Is it conceivable that such a national festival in honor of a national deliverance could by any means, at any time, be foisted upon a people, unless the event which it celebrates had actually occurred? Measure if you can the credulity which claims that a whole nation could be duped into a religious commemoration of an event which never had a historical existence. Can we believe that the whole American people could be brought to agree in observing, as they now do, the fourth day of July in honor of American independence, if such a thing had never occurred, as the declaration and assertion of that independence? Just how and when was it that a whole nation consented to have such a fraud thrust upon them; such a day of the calendar, with no historic basis as its origin?

It will not be allowable to plead that the general outline of the Hebrew polity was historically true, but that this is encumbered with any amount of fabulous tradition and fictitious accretions. Nothing is more remarkable than the mutual dependency of all the parts of the Pentateuchal record of the Mosaic system, from the first Passover, and the Exodus,

to the established worship of the tabernacle in the promised land. The very figures, numbers, statistics, by which many are staggered, are the very last things which admit of mistake or interpolation, inasmuch as these are connected, for a most important purpose, with the taking of the national census, and the collection of tribal and family taxes, in support of the national liturgy, and army, and so, by a system of checks, were effectually preserved from error and confusion.

The central fact of the Mosaic history being conceded, it carries with it all the adjuncts, great and small, with which it is now associated. Take one of these adjuncts, detach it if you can from the mass, after the manner of recent critics; take the Exodus, or the Passover; look at it alone, by itself, irrespective of the entire history to which it belongs; especially, leave out of account the supernatural and miraculous element, and you might readily pronounce it an impossibility: but the Exodus being actually accomplished, and the Passover being established, *then there were lambs enough for the purpose*, and all the circumstances of these original events must have had a being, or as a consequence, you cannot give one good and sufficient reason for these national customs, which by universal consent, constitute that marvel in history, the religion of the Jews. To pick flaws in the joints of that solid masonry and deny the possibility of its constituent parts, and question the items of its historical record, betrays not only a misconception of that immortal polity but a degree of credulity in regard to existing monuments and facts, which is fairly astounding. There is not a better starting-point from which to begin a demonstration of the inspiration of the Sacred Book, this historical record of the one only true religion revealed of God, than the distinctive quality of the Jewish worship, even now refusing to coalesce with anything foreign to itself, and shrinking with special abhorrence from all forms of idolatry; facts never to be explained on any hypothesis save the actual occurrence of those events in the Mosaic record, which are thus commemorated, authenticated, and preserved.

There is another aspect of this same subject, which comes closer to our own personal hopes of salvation. We refer to the manner in which Christ and his apostles regarded the laws and institutions of Moses. From profane history we have adduced evidence of the signal prevalence and preservation of that religious system. Christ and his apostles were born as Jews, and in every way honored the Hebrew Scriptures, and the transmitted institutes of the Hebrew worship. No reference is made now to the theologic connexion which, as Chris-

tian believers we are accounted to hold between the sacrifices of Levitical ritualism, and the one-offering of the Lamb of God, taking away the sin of the world ; for this is the very pith and purpose of the epistle to the Hebrews, the substance of our Christian belief. Just now we refer to something different. At the time of our Lord's abode on the earth, we know in what estimate Moses and his religious institutes, with their minute specifications as to the record of tribes, and the religious enrolling of the census with exact genealogies and pedigree, —an idea, which, instead of being an interpolated blunder, pervades the whole structure of the Jewish polity, obviously arranged with reference to the authentication of ancient prophecy in the birth of the Redeemer—we know how this was regarded by the contemporaries of Christ and his apostles. But our Lord himself was foremost in the honor bestowed on the great leader of the Hebrew people. He does not speak of Moses as a myth, nor of the inspiration of the law as an aroma, an invisible essence floating down out of heaven ; but always and emphatically, as of historical objects. Running through the entire volume of the New Testament are these references to the Jewish history ; and these are so numerous and specific, that you might, had the Old Testament been lost, by a careful collocation of them all, reconstruct the Hebrew annals from the calling of Abraham out of Mesopotamia, the descent of Jacob into Egypt, the exodus of his posterity out of that land, the establishment of their peculiar liturgy, the scene enacted at Sinai, that mount that could be touched, that burned with fire, clad with darkness and blackness, quaking with tempest and the sound of a trumpet, and voices unearthly, at which man and beast were terrified beyond control—the very incidents now pronounced to be fabulous—down to the royalties of David. The first Christian Apologists, Stephen, and Peter, and Paul begin their defences of Christianity with these references to the history of their fathers, preserved in all the monuments, rites, and customs of their nation. Christ himself magnified that law which was given on Sinai, that barren range, on which the Arab sentinel still keeps his watchful guard, in preservation of his ancestral traditions ; and all the references which Christ makes to that law, as given to Moses, are as associated with the commonly received historic record of that marvellous scene. Not one word from his lips to abate the faith of man in all the wonders of that unique event. Not one syllable to cast a doubt over the accuracy of these circumstantial details ; but very much in all his discourses to authenticate them as realities. The *main facts*, of the giving of the law

on Sinai, corroborated by the teachings of Christ himself, all the *circumstances* connected with that central event are confirmed also; for if the people were gathered at the Siniatic mount, then their exodus out of Egypt was accomplished, an event now affirmed to have been impossible; yet an event which is incorporated in the very first commandment—I am the Lord thy God, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt, and out of the house of bondage, and if the Passover was actually observed after the method prescribed on that Arabian plateau, then there were animals in sufficient number for the purpose; though it be now affirmed that the taking of so many flocks through the wilderness was an impossibility, something unhistorical and fabulous. Thus, at length, we discover that the very incidents which we are challenged to discredit, as being beyond the range of historic reality, are grooved and morticed into the very body of Christianity; and we stand in front of this inevitable alternative—receive them as facts, facts not to be accounted for on natural causes, but by supernatural and divine force, or part with our faith in the Redeemer, as an infallible teacher, a faultless example, and abandon all belief in that historic Christianity, which is immortalized by so many monumental evidences and compacted into the very fabric of modern history. The notion of maintaining faith in spiritual Christianity as an assemblage of *ideas*, in revelation and inspiration as subtle, imponderable, and aerial forces, in disbelief of the historic mould in which that faith is cast, must be pronounced the most chimerical of all things.

By this course of thought we are fortifying faith in revealed Christianity. It might be thought that we were employed in defending an important outpost. We may not feel the need for ourselves of any such arguments in support of the one only religion revealed of God, accredited as it is to our living consciousness by its own divine qualities. But it is all important that our faith be established and settled in the oneness of this immortal Book, which, with no flaw, no falsehood, no fable, no error, contains the only authentic revelation from God to man. You cannot outflank Christianity by any movement however alert and unsuspected. Its lines extend backward too far into the past, and they run out too wide into all the earth, even to the end of the world. The result of all investigation, all discoveries, all sciences, is to confirm the faith of men in the reality and accuracy of historic revelation. The Deism of the last century, frantic with passion, threw itself in one combined assault upon revealed Christianity; but like the waves dashing against the rocks, it was thrown back in harmless spray;

and the Book of God abides firmer in the convictions of the world to-day, than it did before it was assaulted and pelted by infidelity. Judaism blossoms into Christianity. Sinai points to Calvary. The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. At his feet we sit as disciples reverently, gratefully and trustfully. Whatever theme we select, it leads us to that cross of the Son of God, which is the focus of all facts, the center of all history, the substance of all truth, the light and life of every man that cometh into the world.

ART. IV.—CHRISTIANITY AND CIVILIZATION.

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A DISPOSITION to regard the intellectual, in distinction from the moral, as the only important influence in promoting human progress, has recently become quite apparent among literary and scientific men. Even where such an opinion has not been directly asserted or defended, it has been not unfrequently assumed as the unconscious or concealed basis of argument and of practical suggestions. It was, therefore, with some degree of satisfaction that we noticed the publication of two works devoted to the history of civilization and intellectual development,* and discussing, of course, what are the primary elements of social and mental improvement. The peculiar predilections and boldness of the writers warranted the expectation that they would neither avoid the discussion, nor shrink from any results, however unacceptable to the religious public. At the same time the obvious talent and ample reading they display, warrant the confidence that nothing will be wanting to a precise definition and a proper vindication of their theory. The direction of the argument and the style adopted in the two works are very different, being obviously dictated in each instance by the earlier and favorite pursuits of the writers; but we presume no injustice will be done if we take the more elaborate performance of the English author as the fullest and most exhaustive statement of the view we wish to consider. He begins with the assertion that civilization

* History of Civilization in England, by Henry Thomas Buckle. From the 2d Lond. Edit. 2 vols. New York, 1859-61.

A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe, by John William Draper, M.D., LL.D., Prof. of Chem. and Physiology in the University of New York, and Author of a Treatise on Human Physiology. New York, 1863.

does not imply that individual minds under its influence must necessarily possess any larger capacity by nature than those found in barbarous communities. The advantage possessed by the former must therefore be in the opinions, knowledge, and associations, in the entire mental atmosphere in which their powers are nurtured. These advantages, he concludes, must be resolved into those which are either moral or intellectual, and then he inquires which of these two elements are the most effective. His final decision is, that moral motives have exercised an extremely small influence over the progress of civilization, mainly because their power has always been the same under all varieties of human condition, while social progress has been variable. All the moral systems which have ever existed, he maintains, have been fundamentally the same. Even the New Testament, he rather hastily announces, every scholar well knows, contains no maxims or beautiful passages which are not to be found in Pagan authors. To suppose, then, that moral influences, which never vary, can be the source of ever-varying effects, he thinks would be absurd. The influence of both good and bad men's actions he regards also as only temporary; it soon subsides and passes away like a dream, or is neutralized by subsequent generations, and absorbed by the incessant movements of the ages. He even contends that the more earnest and sincere a man is, under the influence of the moral principle, if he is ignorant of the nature of truth and of the consequences of his actions, the more dangerous he will be likely to become, since he will almost certainly become intolerant toward all he regards as wrong. He maintains that history gives us no instance of an ignorant man with good intentions, and sufficient power to enforce them, who has not done far more evil than good. Diminish the sincerity of the man, mix some alloy with his motives, and you will diminish the evil he works, since you may play off his vice against his ignorance, and you may restrain his mischief by exciting his fears. On the other hand, the intellectual element is always active and capable of endless adaptations to the wants of society, and may therefore be a sufficient reason for the extraordinary changes and progress through which civilized nations have passed. It has never been, like the moral element, stationary, but continually augmenting with the advance of civilization, and productive of permanent results. The discoveries of great men are never, like the moral actions of good or bad men, lost to society; they are fruitful of greater benefits, and become more effective with the lapse of ages. These assertions he illustrates by a great variety of

facts, showing that the progress of society has depended, not upon the moral system it has embraced, but upon the amount of knowledge possessed by its ablest men, the elevation which that knowledge takes, and the extent to which it is diffused among all classes. He selects two examples—those of persecution and war—and endeavors to show that moral principles without intelligence have only increased these evils, whereas every advance of knowledge has diminished them, by showing their ultimate tendencies and rendering their practical application more difficult.*

The general object of the American is somewhat different from that of the English historian. Both agree in the conclusion that moral elements have very little to do with human progress, but the former has nowhere given this point a formal discussion. We observe, however, that he never mentions the moral or religious influences among the causes which affect mental or social development. His main effort, as he himself describes it in his closing chapter, is to show that civilization does not proceed in an arbitrary or fortuitous manner, but through a determinate succession of stages, according to regular laws, and that the course of communities bears unmistakable resemblance to the progress of an individual. As the physiologist discovers definite provisions in the nervous structure for the intellectual improvement of each man through the several periods of infancy, childhood, youth, manhood and old age, liable to be disturbed only by accidents and diseases, so the historian finds that groups of men or nations have their ages of credulity, of inquiry, of faith, of reason, and of decrepitude, disturbed only by the accidents of emigration, the mixture of foreign blood, and other exterior influences. So necessary are these individual and social laws, that if any of them should suffer modification on account of changes in the climate, the light, the air, the shape of the country, or the oceanic currents, we might reasonably expect a transmutation not only of individual men, but of our species and of the whole form of society. Man's true interest, therefore, is to improve his individual and national intellect by so modifying outward influences and his own physical organization, that these shall be most favorable to his mental development.†

With the remaining portion of these histories we have at present nothing to do. The objects they had in view and their

* This statement of the author's argument is much condensed; but most of the language may be found in detached sentences of his "General Introduction to the Hist. of Civilization in England," vol. I., pp. 126-163.

† See especially the first and last chapters of the "Intellectual Development."

method of pursuing them were, to some extent, novel, and required considerable courage and much reading, and the public are much indebted to them for their interesting and suggestive volumes. The cause of truth will doubtless gain in the end, in spite of the special pleading and one-sided statements which we regret to find in these otherwise valuable works. But our design is strictly limited to a consideration of the position assumed in them both, that moral motives have no important influence upon the progress of civilization. That the authors intended to include the religious under the moral element, is evident from the specifications of the motives which they designate moral, and from the fact that Christianity is principally spoken of among the moral systems said to be stationary and temporary in their effects.*

Now it certainly would have seemed strange if a system which claims to redeem man from all evil had not *promised* its votaries a high degree of social benefit. Such a defect in its promises for the life that now is, would have thrown great doubt upon those it made respecting that which is to come. In practical experience, its hundred-fold compensations here, are the surest pledge of an eternal life hereafter. And though social benefits are not directly named among the great rewards which follow the keeping of God's commandments, they are virtually included among the separate benefits promised to true religion. The positions rashly assumed by some eminent divines, that civilization never has existed except in connection with the true religion and that no people ever arose spontaneously from a state of barbarism without special assistance from a foreign or supernatural source, can by no means be sustained in face of historical facts. Those who accept the scriptural account of the origin of man, may indeed concede that our whole race has been affected by its original state in Eden, that the knowledge there received in intercourse with heaven could not have been entirely lost. Even after his expulsion from Paradise we have no reason to regard man's state as barbarous, but neither can we look upon it as possessing the advantages of more recent civilizations. With all their spiritual knowledge and ample means of outward comfort, men were evidently left to the development of their own intellectual powers and to the shaping out of their own social arrangements. Those arts and refinements which are usually reckoned among the rudimentary acquirements of civilization are mentioned in the sacred history, among the inven-

* See especially note 14th on p. 129, Vol. I, of the Hist. of Civilization.

tions not only of human discoveries, but of an impious race. Poetry, music, government, mechanical art, and society, had their origin among a people whose direct resources were anything but heavenly. Whatever may have been the skill put forth in the construction of the ark, we have no evidence that it was supernatural. Their religion was from heaven, the moral element was no doubt based upon faith, and had the same influence upon progress in the arts which it had in subsequent ages, but everything else was left to human development. God had given them eminent endowments of mind and heart, a beautiful nature around them, and powerful instincts for perfection, but theirs was the career of improvement. From the Creator's hand they had received a natural Paradise, but in this they were required to erect for themselves in the course of ages, a "City of God" to be the perfection of human art.

How much of earlier civilization was lost in the universal deluge we have no means of ascertaining. The intellectual degeneracy of the patriarchal times, however, does not seem to us as great as many would have us believe. The glimpses which the sacred history affords are not calculated to suggest that the inheritance of earlier periods had been much impaired. Distinct forms of civilization appear to have sprung up around great commercial and agricultural centers, so diverse from one another that we can hardly believe them products of the same original stock. On fertile plains, under temperate climates, by the banks of mighty rivers, whose rich valleys and extensive commerce supplied means for the acquisition of wealth, the minds of men awoke to great enterprises, and turned to the possession of physical comforts. Great as we may suppose the influence of one nation upon another, local circumstances were nevertheless powerful enough to impress upon each of them a peculiar character. Moral causes, it must be confessed, appear to have had very little sway over these ancient civilizations. Even intellectual causes seem to have been active only in the service of material interests. Where no natural advantages of soil, climate and position gave a stimulus to thought, the people remained for ages without social progress. It was in China, India, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Chaldea, that we meet with the first tokens of national and intellectual improvement, while in Media, Persia, Arabia and Scythia, we observe nothing but the extremest simplicity and even rudeness, until their people came forth from their seclusion and were quickened by contact with higher civilizations. In countries, however, where nature supplies all inducements to mental activity, a limit will

soon be reached where that activity will cease. Certain classes will, in course of time, become the only possessors of wealth, capital will go into the hands of the few, and labor will become the lot of the many, indolence will find its natural abode with the one, and stolidity and servility with the other; foreign conquests will be invited, and from the new and old races will be formed dreamy priests and haughty nobles; and as the result of the whole, all progress will be arrested, and social arrangements will assume an immutable form. Such has been the fate of all Asiatic civilizations. The Greeks, Romans and Phœnicians, on the other hand, whose soil and climate were less satisfactory, and whose geographical position invited them to go abroad for their supplies, became more interested in a higher culture, and were thrown upon mental energies of a more illimitable nature. Their forms of civilization consequently became more elastic, their speculations less dreamy, their religion more cheerful, and their institutions more favorable to individual development and freedom. With respect to these early periods the account of the English historian is eminently suggestive and satisfactory.*

Among the Jewish people however moral influences must have had a much greater power. Religion was not among them a product merely of their own mental culture. It was not elaborated by prophets imbued with the national spirit and then ascribed to a pretended divinity, but upon a revelation foreign to the dispositions and habits of the people. Their opinions and institutions were indeed much affected by those of surrounding nations. The inspirations of their lawgiver did not make him regardless of the wisdom of the Egyptians in which he had been educated. With an admirable adaptation to man's infirmity, institutions and habits of thought already wrought into the popular mind, were incorporated into the divine ritual, until all that was excellent and true in Oriental systems was selected, purified and engrafted upon the divine original. It is therefore no reproach to an inspired religion that, like a true educator, it supplies its pupils with only what they could not themselves work out. Still, it must be evident to any candid mind that the political commonwealth, the religious festivals, the devotional and historical literature, the prohibition of foreign intercourse, the minute prescription of each one's manners, dress and food, and the binding of the conscience to a peculiar domestic, social and civil arrangement

* Historical Researches into the Politics, Intercourse and Trade of the principal Nations of Antiquity. By A. H. L. Haven. 4 Vols. London, 1846.

provided for the Jewish people, must have given a religious character to their civilization.

But, though some kinds of civilization may result from influences not moral or religious, we contend that moral and religious influences are in other cases very powerful. We even maintain that no civilization of a healthy or permanent character has ever prevailed without being pervaded by true religion. Those ancient civilizations of which we have spoken, are all now extinct or effete, not because they were destitute of intellectual elements, but because their moral forces were feeble and directed to improper ends. They looked to the promotion of class interests, established social monopolies, excluded foreign influences, and prevented the free action of the social system. In spite of the intelligence and refinement of certain classes of society, they have always been incumbered by the rudeness and stupidity of larger portions, whose vast masses have weighed them down, they had no vital forces to equalize their energies, and they had no elevated aims to stimulate and direct their further movement. Their failure is not to be ascribed to their want of the intellectual element. The world has never witnessed intellectual achievements superior to theirs. To speculate, to invent, to grace with art and to form splendid ideals, they have had no peers. They seem to us to have wanted nothing but the love of God and man, and a pure faith. With these, their efforts might have been directed to the right kind of improvement, and sustained by a sufficient motive. Without these their refinements and arts seemed to have no sufficient aims. We have cultivated minds and lofty speculations, but no adequate purpose of life. No wonder that they all seem to have sunk down into general scepticism. Such mighty efforts with so little profitable result were the aspect of a pompous trifling, and the natural inference would be that truth was unattainable and life was only a glittering illusion.

Guizot, than whom we know of no one who has written more profoundly on this subject, makes all true civilization consist of two elements, the elevation of the individual man, and the melioration of the social life.* He remarks that these may sometimes be disunited, so as to constitute a dejective civilization. On the one hand, society may pursue general advantages to the injury of personal and domestic rights, and on the other, men of more than common energy and wealth may sacrifice the interests of thousands to their own private ends.

* Guizot's Hist. of Civilization. Vol. I, Lect. 1, pp. 23-28, Amer. Edit.

History presents us with a number of ancient states whose citizens were trained only to civil duties, and in more recent times we have had a multitude of societies in which each member was sworn to renounce all private aims, and live only for the interests of his order; and certainly we have not far to look at any time to find those who are themselves refined and learned, without giving society the benefit of their improvement. Now we maintain that true religion supplies the most powerful of all motives to both individual and social progress.

In approaching the individual, its object is not so much to civilize as to save him. In whatever condition it finds him, it seeks first to implant a desire to act worthy of all his relations. He may be highly cultivated already in his intellectual powers, and yet who does not know that he may have no lofty or worthy purpose? His mind may be filled with useless learning, fine sentiments, brilliant fancies, or the most sensual and vicious passions. Or he may be a savage stained with blood, and debased with the lowest superstitions. It does not directly attack his barbarism and attempt to polish his manners. It brings him no demonstrations of science or dogmas of philosophy. It tells him of his immortality, his responsibility to a Supreme Ruler, and his sins. It calls upon him to act as a subject of the divine government, to repent of his sins, and to seek a higher life through the aid of divine grace. He needs no cultivation or preparatory process to understand these simple truths and duties, which only need manifestation to commend themselves to his conscience in the sight of God. The most ignorant savage, the grossest criminal, and the subtlest philosopher, possess nearly equal advantages for perceiving the native lustre and power of these primary truths. Human nature cannot sink below or rise above their reach. And when a man receives them, repents of sin, enters into confidential relations with a Redeemer, and sincerely intends to live a holy life, he has taken the most important steps in personal improvement upon which a human being can enter. The rude and illiterate man may not instantly throw off his uncouthness of manners, or walk the heights of learning, but he has received an influence which may insure both these results. His regeneration does not of itself include or presuppose any refinement of outward manner. We only maintain that such is its tendency and probable result. It is not the highest aim of Christianity to polish a man that he may shine in courts or academic halls, but to pluck him from the mouth of the pit. Before his attention is turned to these accomplishments he may

be removed to a brighter than earthly sphere. Its hardest work is to get possession of the material in the deep mine of our humanity, but when the impure ore is brought up to the light, it is handed over to more leisurely processes that it may be purified and stamped with an ever-growing divine likeness. A new spirit is given to the soul, a new direction is given to our energies, and in following these the mind as well as the heart must be improved.

Then, to a society composed of such individuals, Christianity imparts the most powerful motives to social progress. It goes not to work like a master of ceremonies to train its subjects in courtly postures, movements and phrases, but it calls upon them to be courteous and study a neighbor's wealth. It implants within them an enlarged philanthropy which thinks little of the accidents, but much of the essentials of humanity. Each subject of its power becomes a center of activity for the improvement of others. The surest sign of its existence, and the invariable condition of its growth in any heart, is its longing to benefit all within its sphere, and its power to assimilate them to the divine original. It is not a cold and bright thought passively to be received by indolent minds, but a practical principle to stir up men's hearts and kindle within them a longing to do good. Debasement is threatened by it with penalties temporal and eternal. All men are held up as on the same level of spiritual privilege and amenable to the same immutable law. What system could be devised with more powerful motives or guarantees for individual and social progress?

The surest test, however, of the power of Christianity to elevate the individual or to civilize communities, must be *the actual facts of history*. Has it really transformed the rude man into the polished citizen, the barbarous into the civilized society, and carried forward the civilized community to higher and continually advancing stages of refinement?

When sent forth originally on its beneficent mission, its achievements were principally among illiterate peasants. Never, perhaps, has history recorded so remarkable an instance of elevation and enlargement of mind. Regarding them simply as ordinary men, what could have produced this? Have we any evidence that it was the desire simply for intellectual improvement or social refinement? Have we not rather what amounts to almost a contemptuous denial of this, from their own writings? They were indeed zealous for light and knowledge, but it was wholly of a spiritual nature. They had confidence in the power of the Gospel in due time to effect in-

intellectual and social progress, but their work was exclusively to plant the Gospel itself. In their case, at least, though most of them were unlearned and ignorant men with respect to everything but divine knowledge, and though the most educated of them was determined to know nothing but Jesus Christ and him crucified, power was not productive of evil in proportion to their sincerity and zeal. They were a precise exemplification of what we are contending for, that true religion is not of itself civilization, but the surest and best impulsive power toward it. It is not the thing itself, but the force which secures it. We are not absurd enough to deny that civilization must be attained by intellectual means, but we only contend that the dynamic force, which lies back of and pervades the best civilization, is moral and religious. We affirm that the only civilization which is progressive, which has grasped and made subservient to its purposes all intellectual and social agencies within its field, and has created many new ones, has commenced with a movement purely evangelical, and has derived its principal life and power from the moral element. Its moral heroes are the very ones who exert the most steady and the mightiest influence. If any persons may be sure to live and act in the hearts of men through all time, they may be sure of it. Moral acts, instead of being only temporary in their results, are precisely those which are surest of permanency. The achievements of goodness are seldom forgotten within the sphere where they once exerted their power, and many of them are remembered with enthusiasm in after generations and awaken thousands to emulation. The religious thoughts and deeds of Abraham, and David, and Paul, and Augustine, and Luther, and Calvin, and Wesley, are stirring more hearts to-day than the purely intellectual or political acts of their most highly endowed contemporaries. Grecian philosophy and Roman conquest cannot for a moment be compared with Christianity in their present influence upon the world. What if we shall concede that the moral and religious system of Christianity has always been and will forever be the same? A stationary power may act upon varying materials and produce upon them therefore ever-varying effects. God is for ever the same, but his influence is perpetually accomplishing new results. That system of truth, which is a transcript of his moral nature, may have always lived among men, even among the most benighted nations through some beautiful maxims and traditions, but like the unchanging vital force which is propagated in the vegetable world, it must give existence to ever-varying forms and activities while the earth continues.

The nations among which Christianity began its course were already far advanced in civilization. Its work was not so much to imitate, as to appropriate, fuse, and perfect existing civilizations. Its advent was in the fullness of time when human wisdom had demonstrated its own insufficiency, men's faith had very generally given place to a despairing and mocking scepticism, and the desire of all nations was for a coming One. All earlier intellectual movements were either absorbed by Christianity, or they settled down for ages into a hopeless immobility. The most active among them happened to be within the field of its operation and soon yielded up to it everything valuable among their treasures. Judaism, originally from heaven, and still retaining its divine Scriptures, but at that time, in fact, a degenerate human corruption, having gathered up in the course of ages the mystical wisdom of Oriental nations, contributed its patriarchal faith, its magnificent poetry and ritual, and its pure morality. Hellenism, which, under a beautiful sky and in busy intercourse with all nations, had elaborated imperishable models of literature and æsthetic art, presented her admirable translation of the Scriptures and her immortal language, to be the best vehicle of Christian thought for all ages; and Romanism made over its wonderful legislation from which all subsequent jurisprudence has borrowed, and its tenacious system of government to which so many nations willingly submitted for centuries. With unsparing radicalism Christianity proved all things in these systems, but with equally unflinching conservatism she held fast all that was good. It needlessly destroyed nothing of which it could avail itself, and supplied only what was needful to direct and stimulate human effort. What our divine Founder needed not for himself, he graciously accepted from human servants, the better to draw forth and get into sympathy with our humanity. In his own personality there was such originality and harmony, such independence of social peculiarities around him, and such freedom in the development of his own peculiar nature, that sinful infirmity could contribute nothing to his fullness, but in the practical system he gave to men we find that much was borrowed from previous materials. His own piety was not especially Judaistic, his teaching was not Alexandrine, his tastes were not Grecian, and his respect for authority was not Roman, but his apostles were by no means equally free from outward influence. Their individualities of character were strongly affected by their earlier education, and were obviously impressed upon their respective circles of activity. The treasure was heavenly, but the vessel was

earthly, the light was from the Sun of righteousness, but it came to us through variously colored media. The essential nature of the gospel is like its author, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, but the form of mental culture and of civilization which its votaries assume, depends under divine direction very much upon human conditions. And most providential was it that the form of civilization which primitive Christianity adopted, embraced within its combination Jewish theology, Grecian literature, and Roman law. All the apostles were Jews, and it was with difficulty that most of them divested themselves of national exclusiveness and ritual partialities, and came up to the universal freeness of the gospel. Those, however, whose influence has since been widest upon Christian civilization, were precisely those who owed most to earlier systems of human culture. Paul, especially, whose style of thought and learning has impressed itself most upon European society, was educated at Tarsus as well as at Jerusalem; was familiar with Greek as well as Rabbinic literature, and knew how to plead his rights equally well before a Roman and a Jewish tribunal. Principally from his writings has our Occidental Christianity acquired its peculiar type, and only in a subordinate sense can we give the name of Fathers to those who have conveyed to us his particular spirit and mode of thought.

That the ancient church was at one time indifferent to classical learning is surely not a matter of surprise. In their zeal for the salvation of the world, the earlier evangelists had very little eye or heart for the refinements of philosophy, truly or falsely so called. The law of the spirit of *life* was then more active than that of speculation or of art. Like an apostle, they looked upon society as one great shipwreck from which they longed to save some, and woe was unto them if they preached not the gospel, or if they paused to study the enticing words of man's wisdom. It was not that in general they were opposed to learning or philosophy, but that they had no leisure or active love for them while the Macedonian cry of a perishing world was in their ears. In those instances in which a hostile spirit is apparent, we find some excuse in the fact that Greek and Roman literature was then almost wholly in the interest of paganism. Beautiful as in many respects it really was, to many it seemed a temple to demons, sending forth oracles of sensuality and deceit. Iconoclasts were needed to destroy its divinities before devout minds could quietly enjoy its humanities. Its poetry and art seemed like a mere external glitter upon a rotten substance, which needed to be

wholly swept away before a new social system could be created with body enough to receive, and spirituality enough to ensure an enduring polish. Those exquisite productions of refined art lost all their beauty when in the service of voluptuousness. Public entertainments, theatres, and halls of learning, as well as private galleries and literary circles, became hateful even to the better class of heathen moralists. At a later period was added the shocking brutality of the persecutions. The amphitheatre became a den of devouring beasts, and public shews, miserable exhibitions of ferocity against the Christians. Can we wonder that some should have learned to abhor those polite circles and customs which had become associated with the mangled remains of those they loved? And while themselves resisting unto blood and struggling against sin, shall we be surprised that many were not scrupulous as to the amenities, or uniformly just toward the minor moralities of life? Attention to these is not common even with good men while greater moralities remain unsettled, while persecution is relentless, and learning is frowning or sneering at goodness. And such was the usual lot of Christians in those primitive periods. But in spite of every obstacle their religion conquered and thoroughly renovated the decayed civilizations of the Roman Empire. Many social abuses she was not able to overcome, and some of them she was beguiled for a long time to support, but it was with a perpetual protest of her true heart. Slowly indeed has she been compelled to gain her victories over the inequalities of different classes. Slowly even to this day do her half-instructed votaries recognize and obey her doctrine of the brotherhood of man. But the process is sure, and nothing is more certain than the perpetual tendency of modern society in the direction of a Christian reform. The means may and must be intellectual, but the uniform force is moral and religious.*

A new trial, however, was prepared for Christianity just as she seemed to have achieved a general triumph. She had mastered the ancient civilizations;—could she tame and civilize barbarous communities? Scarcely had she consolidated her conquests in the Roman Empire when an irruption of Northern Barbarians appeared likely to sweep away all her institutions. Hosts of rude nations pressed upon her and threatened, like the Saracens in subsequent times, to exterminate the whole Christianized population before she had had

* Hase's Hist. of the Christ. Church, Div. I., Chap. I. Neander's Gen. Hist. of the Chr. Rel. and Church, Introd. Chapter. F. C. Baur's Das Christenthum Erster Abschnitt, pp. 1-21.

an opportunity to try upon them her spiritual weapons. What could her gentle spirit accomplish against brute force and overwhelming numbers? Here was a trial under which she had good reason to tremble, and gloriously did she then evince her peculiar power. Those barbarians were by nature noble men, and only needed her spirit to become far nobler. Though the effeminate Romans were no match for their rude manliness and martial virtues, in their fiercest impetuosity they paused before the majesty of religion. The very "Scourge of God" humbled himself before a Christian bishop. To the stern mandate of repentance and the call for obedience to the Supreme Ruler, the instincts of nature's children yielded a ready submission. The ministers of Jesus—unlike the imperial soldiers, who, even in despair, frowned upon them, and the mantled philosophers who scorned them as of coarser clay—met them as brethren and trusted themselves to their generosity. It was to their moral and religious nature that the first appeal was made. The intellect was aroused only to reach the heart, and no doubt was felt that a higher refinement would soon be desired, and that every mental energy would be enlisted for its attainment. Christ crucified was the first power applied to them, and when they were thus drawn to the All-Father they had so ignorantly worshipped, they were elevated in every other respect of course. And in not a single instance did this policy prove to be unwise. Nation after nation laid aside its armor, accepted of the gospel, and settled peacefully among the churches to receive their discipline and worship at their shrines. No doubt their views were indistinct, and their practice was imperfect. Multitudes received baptism who knew not the full import of its vows, and in compliance with the example or the suggestion of their chieftains. And yet, who knows how far into their hearts even those faint impressions may have reached, notwithstanding their somewhat whimsical and boisterous humor? What was entered upon with levity soon deepened into serious devotion and an earnest life. It was not long before faith, working by love, produced the complete efflorescence of Christian graces, to ripen into the mature fruits of practical wisdom. Having attained peace with God and with their fellow-men, they found time and inclination to study personal and social improvement. Royal courts had scarcely become familiar with the name of Christ before palatinate schools were established in them, and monarchs strained their blue eyes to read, and schooled their rough fingers to write, the name of Jesus. Isles of saints soon became eminent for learned monasteries and

learned men. Not an instance is on record of a people becoming civilized and then Christianized, as if religion could not be understood or powerfully affect a community until it had received a considerable degree of intellectual culture. Men who knew that they had sinned and could be touched with the story of the cross, were amply endowed to be converts to the Saviour. Then, gathered around the rude church and the simple monastery (then a center of instruction for the people and of industrial employments) they soon lost the uncouth manners of the barbarian, softened into gentleness, submitted to the restraints of discipline and law, built themselves substantial dwellings, and cultivated the fields assigned them. We soon hear of organized governments and ecclesiastical discipline which the haughtiest monarch dared not entirely disregard, moral achievements which will stimulate the hearts of men to the latest time, and a knightly courtesy which sheds a lustre even over a dark age.*

Admirably, too, was then exhibited the reciprocal action of the two prime elements of civilization, as each individual was ennobled society became nobler, and as society advanced it fully returned the benefit by helping the individual. He who had the advantages of a liberal culture received a power he could never have acquired in a debased and ignorant community, and he made a higher achievement possible and probable to all around him. The wealth, universities and libraries which an Alfred and a Charlemagne established in their generation, enabled their successors to exceed them in thought and action. The discovery of printing powerfully promoted general intelligence through which multitudes have grown wiser than their teachers. The refinement of a Raffaele would have been impossible at an earlier period, and his own wonderful creations have bodied forth ideas to quicken inferior natures ever since.

These triumphs of Christianity in converting and civilizing the nations of Northern Europe are only a specimen of what she has often accomplished in later times. In Southern Africa, among the islands of the Pacific, in the American forests, are tribes which have emerged from a state so degraded, that even their humanity seemed doubtful, and have exhibited all the elements of an incipient civilization. But a high degree of improvement has never been realized in a single generation. It has always been the work of centuries. The reality of

* K. R. Hagenbach Kirchenges. d. Mittenalters, Erst., Th., pp. 1-37.—*Oxyrhynchus*. L'Eglise au Moyenage, Chap. Prem., &c.—Hase, pp. 166, 175, 179.

such a process, however, among those tribes should not be questioned, when their languages have been reduced to writing, a system of universal education has been established, regular laws have been promulgated, and constitutional governments organized, domestic relations are respected, public worship is maintained, the lands are cultivated with improved implements, and the costumes and manners of more polite nations are imitated. Individual chiefs among them have laid aside the brutalities and rudeness of their former life, and have been distinguished for a native dignity and wisdom which fairly entitle them to a place among a nation's benefactors. But even our most advanced civilizations are only in their infancy. Modern society, and the church itself, has inherited usages, once, perhaps, wise, but now obsolete and injurious, and to be removed with the greatest difficulty. The subjection of one class to another, which Christianity always enjoined her children to endure as a temporary evil for the Lord's sake, but to abrogate as soon as it could be safely done, has been in some cases needlessly continued and sustained. Oppressive monopolies, insuperable castes, and sectional restrictions have long been tolerated, though contradictory to both justice and expediency. Society, however enlightened by divine and human wisdom, and liberalized by the law of kindness, has been slow to recognize the equal right of every man to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Even in the nineteenth century, and in a community boasting of superior freedom, a new type of civilization has been advocated, the fundamental principles of which are, that civil equality is a blessing only among persons of a superior race, that fraternity can have no proper place where there are differences of rank and station, and that slavery is sanctioned by God and indispensable to the equal happiness of all. The exclusiveness of nobles, the divine right of kings, and the various forms of domestic servitude, have been the basis of prescriptive rights which have been contended for with an earnestness and even a sincerity which belonged to the natural relations. After all that has been done to remove the burdens of society, there are yet multitudes for whom there seems no relief but by some violent process. They cannot rise from their pauperism, whatever their industry or ingenuity, they feel no motive to be virtuous, and to enlighten them is only to make them perceive more distinctly their oppression. Never were there barbarians more degraded and brutal than large masses in our great cities, beneath the shadows of our churches and our palaces, defying our police, and scorning our

schools and colleges. To them, our facilities for intercourse are only means for extending their depredations over our whole country, and they have methods for educating one another in the sciences, the arts, and the language of crime, quite as efficient as our religious and literary institutions for training others to virtue. Even in Christian England, while some classes are progressing in refinement and wealth, another and growing class is sinking deeper in ignorance and vice; every eighth person is a pauper, and more are saved from such a lot by habitual crime.* Christian philanthropy has devised the only method by which the true light can be made to penetrate those dark haunts, and by which their darker spirits can be illuminated. In vain we should wait for the action upon them of merely intellectual and social influences. They will never be reached by our schools nor by our literary and civil institutions. None but those who are actuated by a love of souls will go after them, and none but kind and sympathizing exertions will be effectual. A general effort of this kind may prevent an insurrection, quite as terrific as that which their rulers have contemplated with such complacency in our own unhappy country. A like proportion of our population in slavery has long awakened and deserved the reproach of the civilized world, and has finally proved an occasion for a national struggle of unparalled violence and loss, but our most earnest prayer is that those who have so patiently waited for our political disorganization, may be saved from a more fatal conflict. But the question relating to the Christianization and civilization of these dangerous classes refers not to one, but to every country on the globe, and may well be regarded as the most difficult and most pressing of our social problems.

There is one more line of argument by which we may show the tendency of Christianity in the direction of civilization: The gospel presents before its votaries a perfect ideal of civilization as the object and sure result of all their efforts. At the very commencement of his ministry on earth, our Lord announced that the kingdom of heaven was at hand; that is, that he was then laying the foundation of a sovereignty whose origin, ruler, support, and termination was heavenly. Its consummation and complete inauguration was to be prayed for and contended for in an indefinite future, but its commencement be proclaimed when its King entered upon the scene and set up the royal banner. His apostles taught us more clearly to

* JOSEPH KAY, *The Social Condition and Education of the People of England*. Chap. i. On the Condition of the Poor in England.

expect, in the dispensation of the fulness of times, a restitution of all things to the original course which sin has disturbed, when the dominion under the whole heaven shall be given to the saints of the Most High, and our sanctified humanity shall constitute a great household of God, a building fitly framed together, an holy temple, an habitation of God through the Spirit. So vast are the results thus promised, so glowing the language with which inspired seers have described them, and so imperfect the progress hitherto toward their realization, that many have looked upon them as impossible without a new dispensation of miracles. But the more carefully we read the word of prophecy, the better we understand its high wrought symbolism, and the more accurately we observe the uniformity and stability of God's natural and spiritual laws, the more we are convinced that no other agencies are needed for the establishment of Christ's kingdom, than those now in action. It was the primitive building of God's people which was to *grow* into this holy temple, and the scriptural types of this kingdom were a mustard seed growing into a great tree which was to fill the earth, leaven hid in three measures of meal until the whole was leavened, and a stone cut out of the mountain increasing until it should become commensurate with the globe. Such expressions seem to teach us that this is no preparatory dispensation to be superseded by another, but that it is an ultimate and eternal kingdom, to be completed by causes at work within itself. Its conquering progress is accomplished under the dispensation of the Spirit, whose sword is the word of God, carried forward by human messengers. Our Lord is represented as now in heaven, directing this whole process, until all enemies shall be subdued and put under his feet. We have no hint that this process is to be broken off, or interrupted, or changed until the final consummation shall be reached. And as time advances and the books of revelation and of creation are better understood, reason would seem to dictate, what experience invariably suggests, that a miraculous agency would be less and less needful. The most enlightened philosophers, looking solely upon the the action of present agencies, have not been so incredulous as to the results they may accomplish. The progress which our humanity has already made and the perfectibility of which it appears susceptible, are themes on which they never tire to speak, though many of them are willingly ignorant of the promises which are our only hope. The great critic of pure Reason pronounced "all social movements on our planet slow preparations

for one grand ultimate form of universal social harmony, an organized ecumenical commonwealth, in which all parts shall be related to one another, and a central principle shall animate and attract the whole." We are far from rejecting the great principle, for which Draper, Buckle, Powell, and other writers of their school, have contended with such a profusion of illustrations, viz: that the progress of civilization and all social changes are never arbitrary or fortuitous, but determinable by regular laws. On the other hand, we strenuously maintain this theory, and build our highest hopes upon it. We only contend that those laws are an expression of a divine will, and have been devised and directed with a view to the attainment of precise and predetermined results. Our faith, if not our science, makes us firm believers in final causes devised by Him who sees the end from the beginning, and we regard every power in this universe as working under his control. Whether we must believe that the influence which secures definite ends was put forth only in the original constitution of things, or is communicated as the emergency calls for it, we need not renounce our confidence that every falling hair and every answer to prayer is provided for in the divine counsels. We have very little doubt that, at this moment, causes are in operation which only need to be intensified and extended to secure the coming of Christ's kingdom. Those causes include an almighty Spirit, an incarnate Redeemer, and all natural and spiritual agents, working by established laws, so perfect that they will never need suspension, violation or miraculous intervention. But whatever our views of the means by which God's kingdom is to be established, the believer in revelation has a joyful assurance that all social developments are subject to a divine control, and are working together to bring all nations into one grand Christian commonwealth.*

Defective views of this kingdom have sometimes restricted it to the sphere of the Christian church, and the result has been, on the one hand, that a hierarchy claiming only ecclesiastical power has yet demanded the control of all departments of human society, and on the other, extreme spiritualists have restricted Christ's kingship to matters exclusively pertaining to the church. The scriptural idea seems to us much more comprehensive. The kingdom of heaven or of Christ embraces not merely the church, but the state, whose magis-

* Herzog's Real Encyclopædie für prot. Theol. u. Kirche. Art. "Reich Gottes," by Kling. Aug. Althaus, Die letzten Dinge, pp. 59-66.

trates are ordained by him and his ministers, as truly as apostles, evangelists, and pastors. The various departments of science, art, and common life, are also under him, for even domestic servants are said to serve the Lord Christ. They are *not*, in the same sense, subject to the church, except in their religious character. They have distinct laws of their own, are independent of ecclesiastical control, and have a coördinate jurisdiction under a common Lord. Each of them, too, is susceptible of a peculiar form of civilization, which it has a right to work out without dictation from the church or from any power but its own. Through their joint action and under the government of their theanthropic Head, there is to be a common Christian civilization, in the great "City of God."

The *church* will become a great spiritual family for mutual discipline and divine worship, diversified, perhaps, by national organizations, but one in essential faith, spirit, and purpose—without hostile sects, but with free developments of thought, taste, and social activity, lorded over by no selfish hierarchies, intruding into no departments beyond its measure, unfettered in spirit, healthy in life, and the mother of all spiritual living.

The *state* will have a sphere of activity of immense importance, as the center of all law and association for the common benefit, the arbiter of all rights where honest litigants may appeal to its bar, the common director, through whose wisdom all business may be brought into amity and reciprocity, and all diversities may be harmonized; and the representative of distinct nations in the arrangement of mutual interests. Principalities and powers may be needed, not to lift up sword against one another, or to conduct hostile armies, but to direct widely separated nationalities along the path of unending progress.

Science, unrestrained by authority and guided by her own independent rules, will read from the book of nature a history and a system of the universe in complete harmony with faith, will throw her keen glance into every secret of God's visible handiwork, will develop new powers and combinations of physical agents, and will shew how those forces which now terrify man and make him their sport, may be so tamed as to be his gentlest servants. And if the degree of a people's civilization may be accurately measured by their control of external agents and their substitution of physical for human and animal power, what will be man's position when he shall have that complete dominion over nature which the Creator originally gave him? It is almost within the recollection of persons

now living, when many of our sciences had their distinct commencement, and we have seen how a discovery of only two or three laws, like those of steam, magnetism, and the photographic light has enlarged the circle of human power; what then must be the result when an indefinite number of such laws shall have been discovered, combined, and applied to the service of man and of the kingdom of God?

And will there be no distinct province for *Art* in that kingdom? Its *true* province is, after science has told us what our universe is, to direct us how to use it. In its *industrial* department it gives us rules to apply our knowledge to useful results, and in its *æsthetic* department it teaches us to give all things beautiful forms and arrangements. We have that in our original natures which craves both of these, and grace will not fail to form us more and more like him who has made everything beautiful in his time. What are all our Fine Arts but an attempt to give an expression to the spirit of nature, and what is that spirit but nature's Creator? Who gave melodies and harmonies to sounds, color to forms, grace to motions, and a deep poetic meaning to all things? There is a beauty to holiness, a delightful harmony to truth, and both are a perpetual hymn to our Creator. Heaven is such a profound harmony of thought, of action and of worship that it seems best described as a glorious song. Its streets are paved with gems, and its proportions are the perfection of architecture. And when Christianity has passed through her conflicts and can calmly indulge her æsthetic tendencies, she will thrust aside the tame imitations and romantic falsehoods which a low sensuality has forced upon art, and will embody in her poetry and music, her pictured and sculptured forms, her architectural structures and her useful instruments, a lofty ideal of loveliness and grace, which will render even common life the perfection of holy beauty. And while science traverses our universe as a prophet to thought and a preceptor to industry, and the church follows her to consecrate it as a temple for fellowship and worship, holy art, called and filled by the Spirit of God for all manner of cunning workmanship, will throw over everything the inspiration of mysterious forms, a truly religious light and the most perfect harmonies.

Need we add that from all this will follow a refinement of manners which is frequently mistaken for the whole of civilization, but, which when alone is of very inferior value? Every art pursued as an end is the sign of hollowness and falsehood, and tends to produce increased feebleness. A Chinese over-refinement, or a heartless courtliness, must necessarily be an

affectation and a lie, which is certainly no better than honest rudeness. But when the hidden man of the heart has been ennobled, and the outward life is its unconscious expression, the whole manner becomes not only stamped with importance but with grace. Where each esteems others better than himself, the proprieties of life will be as naturally regarded as the more cardinal virtues.

A Christianity then which appropriates to its use all which is truly valuable, and supplies all which is defective in earlier civilizations, has been the impelling motive and life to all existing civilizations of a healthy and progressive nature, has for its especial work to save and elevate the individual man and to send him forth to save and elevate his fellow-men, and finally, has for its great aim and promise to erect a kingdom which shall be the perfection of holy fellowship and worship, authority and law, science, art and manners, may surely be pronounced a mighty agent in human civilization.

ART. VIII.—THE COVENANTERS AND THE STUARTS.

By Rev. W. S. DETSDALE, Philadelphia.

On the broad top of Dunse Law, within six miles of the English border, on the 7th of June, 1637, was encamped the army of the Covenanters, under Alexander Leslie. Charles Stuart was on the other side of the Tweed, near Berwick, having advanced so far to meet them. Twenty-four thousand Scottish soldiers, with competent officers, sheltered by shingle huts covered with straw or turf, well armed, well clad, and resolute, were patiently awaiting the hour of conflict. They wore a dull gray uniform and blue caps or bonnets, adorned with blue ribbons. A large blue flag, bearing the Scottish arms, and inscribed with the motto, "For Christ's Crown and Covenant," waved before every captain's door. The Blue Bonnets, some months later, with as fearless hearts and in as complete array, were over the border.

There are three eras of the Covenant; the first establishes the Calvinistic type of the Reformation in Scotland; the second extends it vigorously to England; and the third finds it driven back to its original limits, in deadly contest with the Episcopacy of the southern court, which has recovered itself with the restoration of the Stuarts, and has become despe-

rately aggressive. The times in which we live give an unusual interest to these early struggles for liberty. The blue of the Covenanter's flag, as the emblem of truth and fidelity, rallies the hosts of freedom again in the star-spangled banner; and hence a brief sketch of this eventful period of Scottish history will not be thought untimely.

When the sovereigns of Europe, struggling for despotic rule, set themselves against the Reformation, their subjects had either to resign both religious and civil liberty, or to unite and resist. They pledged to each other "life, goods, and blood," and entered upon revolution; and the common judgment of mankind approves their conduct as that of patriots and heroes, because of the righteousness of their cause. The same impulse which made the Protestant camps great prayer-meetings, and gathered the people of France, and Scotland, and the Netherlands in armed crowds to field-preachings, banded together the Hollanders against Philip, the Cavaliers of Dauphiny and Provence against Guise, and the Scottish Presbyterians against the Stuarts. With the last the Covenant was the bond of association.

In 1557 the Protestant lords of Scotland, at a meeting held in Edinburgh, "unanimously resolved to adhere to one another, and exert themselves for the advancement of the Reformation." They subscribed a bond, sacredly pledging mutual help, and renewed invitations to John Knox, then in Geneva, to return to Scotland. They styled themselves the "Congregation of the Lord." The Primate of Scotland, Hamilton, had just sent a grey-headed priest to the flames for embracing the doctrines of Calvin. The Court had determined to proceed instantly against the reformed teachers, and the most eminent of them were summoned before the Council at Stirling. The Congregation armed and rallied to protect their preachers. Mary, Queen of Scots, temporized and collected troops, principally French, to subdue this Protestant party. Too wary to be amused by subterfuges, the Congregation gathered the whole body of peers, barons, and representatives of boroughs of their side, and unanimously resolved that Mary of Guise should be deprived of the office of Regent, which she had exercised so much to the detriment of the kingdom. Scottish nationality and the Protestant religion were then arrayed against the court, with its Romanism and its mercenaries of France. England came to the help of the Presbyterians; and when both English and French withdrew, Scotland was under Protestant control, and the Presbyterian form of worship was fully established on the ruins of Popery.

In 1581, the National Covenant was first subscribed. Scotland had long been in confusion, owing to the obstinate struggle between the Reformers and the Queen's party. Jesuits and seminary priests were swarming into the country. Letters from Rome were intercepted giving dispensations to Roman Catholics to profess the Protestant creed for a time, provided that they maintained an attachment to the old faith at heart, and secretly promoted it by every means in their power. An alarm spread through the whole nation, which resulted in the first public signing of the Covenant by all classes. They pledged themselves "under the same oath, handwrit, and pains, to defend" the King's "person and authority with goods, bodies, and lives, in the defence of Christ's evangel, liberties of our country, ministration of justice, and punishment of iniquity, against all enemies within this realm, or without." The King first added his name, then his household. The Privy Council and General Assembly of the Scottish church passed the necessary acts, and the instrument, under the influence of the ministers, was generally subscribed in all the parishes.

Two generations had nearly been numbered, and the almost forgotten Covenant was revived under more threatening danger, to become an effectual safeguard and be covered with its proudest glory. In the interval, the Reformation in the British isles had been shaping and consolidating itself. Elizabeth, the first James, and the first Charles, were not heartily with the Protestants; and none understood it better than their Protestant subjects. Motives of policy alone kept the daughter of Henry Tudor from union with the court of Rome, and James began to move towards it as soon as his crown covered the southern as well as the northern kingdom. Meanwhile the Reformed party, both north and south of the Tweed, had secured their ascendancy. When Charles manifested unequivocal signs of bringing his realm back again to the semi-Romanism which all understood was a convenient halting-place for the ancient superstitions, the Puritan revolution was at once inaugurated.

Under these circumstances, the Scottish Covenant comes into view the second time. The English had grown unaccustomed to war, but the peasant of the Scottish lowlands still carried his lance and broadsword to protect himself from the raids of the neighboring Highlandmen. Multitudes of Scotsmen had joined their fortunes with Gustavus Adolphus in his contest with the German emperor. As soon as the storm of battle threatened at home, these returned and were scattered abroad over the country, forming an excellent nucleus around

which an excellent army might be collected. The troops of Gustavus were the best disciplined in the world, and these Scotsmen brought home that discipline. In the ranks of Gustavus the voice of prayer arose as it did afterwards among Cromwell's soldiers, and military mingled with religious enthusiasm. It was a fit school of training for the Scottish Covenanter of this period.

The nation had forsaken Rome under the preaching of Knox and his compeers. Men of the same spirit abounded now, afraid of the face of no man, impressed with the belief that God had commissioned them for a mighty work. Their creed, drawn from the Bible, was distinct and supported by a powerful logic. Zeal made them eloquent, and they swayed the minds of their countrymen as men had never better done before, nor have more powerfully done since. The kirk-session, the presbytery, the synod, the assembly, bound clergy and people in one compact mass. Knox and Melville had not labored in vain; and Welch, and Ker, and Bruce, and Simpson, had entered into their labors. Faithful to their flocks, the whole land followed them as good shepherds.

The nation was thoroughly Presbyterian. The Court was determined that England and Scotland should be united in Episcopacy. The struggle had continued from the beginning of the Reformation between the Hierarchy in possession and the General Assembly, grown to be a power. Even during the regency of Morton, whilst James was still in the minority, some of the leading nobles, with too keen an eye to the estates of the church, had attempted to uphold what were popularly styled the Tulchan bishops. Now, a Tulchan bishop was one who brought conveniently into his patron's hand the revenues of his see. Andrew Melville led in the assemblies in defence of the parity of the clergy, and by 1580 Prelacy was routed from the kingdom and the second book of Discipline determined the character of the Scottish church.

But James would be a free and absolute monarch, and it was part of his king-craft to re-establish Episcopacy in Scotland. In 1606 bishops were restored. The General Assembly was subsidized, and the Parliament of 1621 ratified the five articles of Perth which had been passed, enjoining kneeling in the reception of the sacramental elements of bread and wine, the observance of holidays, episcopal confirmation, private baptism, and private communicating. The laws in these matters were dead letters. In Edinburgh, on one occasion of celebrating the communion, only seven persons out of the whole population yielded to the articles of Perth by kneeling. The High-

Commission which had been appointed had not been able to enforce these odious laws.

In 1625, came in Charles to rule over the United Kingdom. His ideas of his unlimited power as a prince placed the church of a whole kingdom at his control. He entered almost immediately into the struggle with the Presbyterians of the north, which proved his ruin. He first endeavored to regain for the bishops the estates of the church, which had been appropriated by the Scottish nobles. His next leading step was to introduce the Service-book or Liturgy among the churches of Scotland. He communicated this purpose as early as 1629 to Laud, whose heart was devoted to his scheme of conciliating the Roman Catholics. In 1636 the Episcopal Book of Canons superseded the Presbyterian Book of Discipline; and to complete the work of father and son, and restore Episcopacy in full to Scotland, it only remained to force the Book of Common Prayer on the people.

The clergy of England of this time were the worthy fathers of those who, a generation later, heavily preached and meekly practiced passive obedience to the sovereign of the realm. This subservience to the court had not escaped the notice of the Stuarts, and was in striking contrast with the freedom with which the Scottish pulpit dwelt upon the royal character and measures. In their extemporary prayers, king and subjects were brought directly to God, their sins alike confessed, and pardon for both alike supplicated; and here too, the Presbyter had a favorable opportunity of conveying sentiments, and dealing censures, that could not so well be expressed in the didactic sermon. Extemporary prayer was the abomination of both James and Charles. A Prayer-book would remedy these and other evils.

The General Assembly was Presbyterian, brain, and hand, and mouth. It had worked its way gradually into a real independence of the king; and to prostrate the Scottish church at his feet, the king must destroy the Assembly. The principle of liberty in alliance with religion had its advocates, men worthy of the cause, in the Presbyterian clergy; and English and Scottish liberty together, both civil and religious, were at stake in the contest gathering blackness over the nation. The success of the king was the overthrow of British freedom, now struggling, though in weakness, to understand and proclaim itself. Charles's policy of "Thorough", clearly defined by his minister of state, Strafford, was nothing short of strengthening and stiffening the king into a despot, and rendering the British realm an Austria under his heel.

Not to dwell upon this period of English history, so familiar to the general reader, we hasten to the crisis of British freedom and the Covenant, by which it was successfully met. Tamely to receive the Service-book was to enthrone the monarch in both church and state, and make him an irresponsible despot over both England and Scotland. The 23d of July 1637, came. A Scottish calm was over the countenance of the land, but Scottish courage and determination were in the northern heart. The Cathedral church of Edinburgh toned the rest; received without dissatisfaction at the High church, the Book of Common Prayer was not likely to excite clamor in other places. The church was crowded upon this revolutionary morning. Archbishops and bishops were arranged in their robes; the lords of sessions and municipal magistrates, with batons and badges, graced the occasion. The bishop of Edinburgh was himself to preach. The dean at length began the new liturgy. Instantaneously the Sabbath quiet of Scotland changes into the angriest storm. The people will not discriminate between the old robes of Rome and the new ones of the court; between the archbishops and bishops of the mass, and the dignitaries and the new religion which they deem just as popish without the mass. Groans and hisses, whoops and hurrahs, and clappings of hands and stampings of feet, drown the voice of the priest in the desk. But the hierarchy will press the service through the riot, and the riot in which the Scottish proprieties are forgotten rises at once into the dimensions and majesty of a revolution. The dean cannot hear his own words and stops for a moment. The bishop calls out to him to proceed with the Collect of the day. A woman's voice alliterates a pun: "Deil colic the name o' ye," she exclaims, and gives emphasis to her words with the movable stool upon which she is sitting, which she aims at dean James Hanna's head. He dodges only to become the mark for multitudes of clasp bibles which are hurled from every direction, after Jerry Geddes' "ticket of remembrance." The congregation is driven out of the church, and the forced service goes on; but as the service goes on, the congregation on the outside mutters and musters and gives the signal to Scotland that the hour has come.

It is but a mob, and the work of change must go on, is the decree of the Court. And on it goes blackening the storm to a tempest. The ministers who have not used the Service-book are "horned" according to the royal proclamation, or declared rebels. The bishops are deserted by the Scottish Council of state, and stand alone, exposed to public execration.

The liturgy is suppressed until the king's pleasure is known. It is to be the same all over Scotland; the whole country scornfully and resolutely rejected the Service-book. But the king's pleasure is that the Liturgy shall be enforced upon the people, as though there had been no outbreak. Four ministers of Scotland petition for a suspension of the horning with which the bishops have threatened them, one of them is Alexander Henderson of Fife. The Council favor the petition and it goes to the king, whose reply will be received by the 2d of September, when the Council meet again. His answer is sent down by the duke of Lenox. Ten nobles, many of the gentry or barons, and crowds of the people, with a little leisure from the finishing of harvest, flock to Edinburgh for the eventful day.

The 20th of September has arrived; Edinburgh is thronged. Lenox is there with the king's answer; he does not relent, he will not relax his efforts to force the religion of the English court upon Scotland. But Scotland has no sin to confess in the tumult at the High church at Edinburgh; the alternative was tumult or submission to tyranny. The determination of the Scots to resist is at least equally as firm as the king's to force Episcopacy. To convince the duke of Lenox and the king, of the nationality of the opposition, an immense concourse lines both sides of the streets through which the duke is to pass to the Council. The flower of Scottish nobility and gentry is here, representatives from numerous burghs and presbyters, ninety ministers, including the whole presbytery of Stirling, and thousands of yeomany from the country. They bow low to the duke as he passes, impressing him by their respectability, numbers, and resolute bearing. A committee present him with a fresh petition, which he promises to bear to the king, and transmit his answer. The answer will come on the 17th of October. In the interval the clergy lead the people in prayer for a favorable answer to their supplication, and four leading preachers go through Scotland, waking up the people to the interests involved in the struggle before them.

The throng in Edinburgh on the 17th of October, 1637, is still greater than that of the last of September. The shires are fully represented, and the band of nobility is even larger. The reply to the petition does not attempt to soothe the discontent. The Council are to be removed to Linlithgow, and the petitioners are to depart from Edinburgh within twenty-four hours, under penalty of being proclaimed rebels. Then riot, the attendant of revolution, bursts forth again; the cry is,

"God defend all who will defend God's cause, and confound the Service-book and all its adherents." A stronger supplication is drawn up and subscribed before night by five hundred of the best names of Scotland; and consultation is hurriedly held, and some agreement reached for combination against the Court for the rights of conscience.

Revolution now ripens fast. The concourse in Edinburgh, on the 15th of November, exceeds that of either of the former days of excitement. Every part of Scotland is fully represented. Aberdeen is the only burgh which has no committee, ministers, or commoners. The earl of Montrose publicly joins the opposition. The Council of Linlithgow is prevailed upon to join commissioners from the people with them in their deliberations; these commissioners give the preponderance to the popular party. The famous committees called the Tables are appointed: one of noblemen, another of gentry, a third of burghs, the fourth of ministers. Each committee has four members; and a chief committee, or table, consisting of one from each of the other committees, becomes the center of organization for resistance to the Court. Charles will not listen to the alarm. His new proclamation approves again the Service-book, condemns the petitions, and prohibits all further convocation of the lieges under penalty of treason.

And now the storm breaks forth. Persistence in tyranny encounters stern resolve not to yield to the Court. The people of Scotland, with their tables, are as ready as the king, with the army of his realm. The earl of Traquair has come from England to publish the proclamation, and proceeds to Stirling, where the council and session are sitting. With all possible quietness, so as to elude the vigilant tables, the earl will accomplish his business, and orders his horses at Edinburgh at two o'clock in the morning of Monday, to ride to Stirling. The ceremony of the royal proclamation takes place at ten o'clock, at the Market Cross; but lords Home and Lindsay are promptly there, with instruments in the hands of a notary, publicly protesting against the proclamation. Stirling is full of armed petitioners, who have flocked in from the whole country around; and after leaving some of their numbers to renew the protest before the council, they march an army two thousand strong to Edinburgh. On Thursday, the 22d of February, 1638, the Market Cross of Edinburgh witnesses a similar scene. The king's heralds, in glittering array, read the proclamation; but their voices are at times perfectly drowned in tumult. Sixteen noblemen have erected a scaffold next the Cross, and no sooner are the heralds through than Archibald Johnston reads

the protest, which the crowd around oblige the royal officers to stand and hear. So everywhere in Scotland the public protest meets Charles's proclamation face to face; and the friends of the cause, as if by concert, leave their homes to rendezvous at Edinburgh, and, if need be, to meet the king in defence of their liberties hand to hand.

The revolution against tyranny is now perfectly ripe. The formation of the tables prepared the way, but at length organization for resistance is about to be completed. Scotland must be one band in the movement; it is made one by the national covenant. Alexander Henderson, one of the ministers so nearly "horned" at the outbreak in Edinburgh, and Archibald Johnston, who had protested against the proclamation, were the leaders in resuscitating the old League against popery, and making it serviceable in the present juncture. It renounced Popery, confirmed Presbyterian worship and discipline, and bound its signers together in opposition to extremity against innovation upon the professed religion. On Wednesday, the 28th of February, 1638, the Covenant was first presented to the public in Grey-Friars church, Edinburgh. Henderson, so conspicuous in these days, opened the meeting with prayer. Lord Loudon made an impressive address. Johnston, afterwards Lord Warriston, read the Covenant, written on a sheet of parchment, not larger than an ell square. Committees were ready to reason with any that had scruples, and then the enthusiasm kindled bright. The earl of Sunderland first subscribed his name, then the other nobility striving who should first have the honor. Then all the people in the church. But an immense multitude crowded round the walls and in the church-yard. The parchment was handed out to these and laid upon the flat monuments over the dead, and signed with rapture and applause. That was independence-day for Scotland. A glow was on the face of the crowd, shout answered shout of earnest devotion to the good cause, and right hands were held up in solemn oath to Heaven as again and again the Covenant was read in a clear loud voice.

Like fire in the prairie, it ran through the city and nation. The popular mind was tinder, and the meeting in Grey-Friars blew the spark upon it. Amidst tears of joy and prayers for blessing, it was signed next day throughout the city by all classes; by men, women, and children. Some punctured their skin and wrote with their blood: others added to their names the words "till death." A copy of the Covenant was sent through the whole country, and with the single exception of Aberdeenshire, obtained the signatures of a vast proportion

of the people, moved by the same impulses of religion and patriotism. "Now," exclaimed a leading royalist, when told of what had been done during the past week, "Now, all that we have been attempting to build up during the last thirty years is at once thrown down."

Charles was obstinate. He sent the marquis of Hamilton to treat with the Covenanters, hoping the League would fall in pieces by delay. But war was in the wind, and all were getting ready. Approaching Edinburgh, Hamilton passed through an array of sixty thousand persons, among whom were seven hundred clergymen. Having accomplished nothing, he returned to London for fresh instructions. When he came back he proclaimed a free General Assembly for the 20th of November. That was a strange and bold body. Elders and ministers attended armed, and Glasgow was filled with their retainers. Every one understood it to be the mission of the Assembly to rid Scotland of Episcopacy. The same Alexander Henderson was elected moderator. Protest followed protest on both sides. The commissioner rose in the name of his majesty and in form dissolved the Assembly; but the Glasgow Assembly would not be dissolved. They protested; the moderator encouraged them in a solemn speech. They would go on without the commissioner; and they persisted, though the next morning he discharged their meeting again under the penalty of high treason. They pronounced the six assemblies since the commencement of the century, which had connived at Episcopacy, illegal; excommunicated and deposed the archbishops and bishops, and restored in full force the old Presbyterianism. The choicest spirits of Scotland were in that Assembly; and there was not a braver one than Alexander Henderson, the moderator.

Charles now mustered for deadly conflict. His sycophant clergy, his courtiers, his Catholic subjects, were all he could count upon at home. The English people regarded his appeal to arms with disgust and dislike. But his lieutenant of Ireland, the "Thorough" Strafford, engaged to supply Catholics for a descent upon the west of Scotland; the Catholic families of the north of Scotland would come to his help, and he bargained with Spain for regiments of Flemish soldiers. The Tables were able to raise a larger and far better army, every man in it urged by religious zeal and ready to fight to the death. France countenanced them; the Protestants of Europe sympathized; the mass of the English wished them success. The men who had seen battle under Gustavus Adolphus were all in their place, and the country north of

the Tweed became a military camp. The grooms even in the king's palace were with their countrymen, and sent down copies of letters which they had found in the king's pockets, which revealed his most secret plans. Old Alexander Leslie, deformed and mean-looking, but who had attained the position of field-marshal under the best general of the age, and in the best army, brought the rich experience of the campaigns of the Swedish king to grace the post of General-in-chief of the Scottish forces. Refractory Aberdeen was taken, whose ladies had tied blue ribbons round the necks of their dogs and called them Covenanters. At the end of May, 1639, the king moved from York to the borders, and Leslie advanced to meet him. All were Scotsmen by birth and staunch Presbyterians, but a single German trumpeter: men strong in body and firm in mind. Prayer, the singing of psalms, and the reading of the Scriptures, were heard in the tents of the soldiers all day long. As Baillie says, "They felt the favor of God shining upon them, and a sweet, meek, humble, yet strong and vehement spirit leading them all along." Charles saw that he must yield or capitulate; and both sides were reluctant, as yet, to shed blood; and Charles consented to the demands of the Scots, and peace was proclaimed.

The king called a General Assembly for the 6th of August, and a session of Parliament for the 20th. The Edinburgh Assembly made a deliverance, formally abolishing liturgy, canons, and every shred of Episcopacy; and the king was obliged to add his signature by deputy. Parliament met, but its spirit was determined, and it was prorogued until June 1640. The royal commissioner did not appear at that date, without whom, according to precedent, there could be no Parliament, but they elected a president, proceeded and resolved themselves into a committee to continue to sit after the regular adjournment, to have sovereign power over matters of state. Thus the power of the Tables passed over to the Parliament, which henceforth led the revolution. Charles resolved again on war: the alternative was yield or conquer. The Scottish army rose up like Roderic Dhu's men at his whistle, ready equipped in concerted bands and regiments, and Leslie was again at their head. The whole nation contributed liberally for the expense. At Edinburgh, under the stirring addresses of one preacher, enough of sheeting was furnished in one day, to provide the troops with tents. Leslie was soon over the border, and the English Parliament would not give Charles subsidies for the war. The sturdy general reached the Tyne and moved up the stream, and after a sharp fight followed the

retreating English to Newcastle. Alexander Henderson was along, and preached a powerful discourse in the great church of St. Nicholas. The Scots were 24,000 disciplined soldiers, and the king could only assemble 15,000 recruits. He was forced to make peace in October, the Scottish army to be paid and remain at Newcastle.

On the 3d of November, 1640, met the Long Parliament of England. Charles was driven to summon it, and its sessions ran through the following ten years. The Scottish spirit had infused itself into England, and its example of successful resistance was closely followed. Intimate alliance was formed between the nations, and the Blue Bonnets shared with Cromwell's Ironsides in the overthrow of the Stuart despotism. The influence of Scotland in the Puritan struggle, with which it mingled, and in whose changing fortunes it was lost, was prodigious. The Westminster Convention was called, and delegates invited from Scotland. Scotland proposed a perpetual Covenant between the two kingdoms, and the covenant passed both houses of the English Parliament and was solemnly sworn to both north and south of the Tweed. Baillie, Henderson, Blair and Gillespie turned the people of London in vast numbers to Presbyterianism. The Scottish delegation were the master minds, and swayed the Westminster Assembly by argument and eloquence. It was Alexander Henderson who preached when the House of Commons and the Westminster Assembly solemnly subscribed their names, in the church of St. Margaret. The Covenant in this period was more than national; it was the solemn League and Covenant of Scotland, England, and Ireland. Its object was "to extirpate popery, prelacy, heresy, schism, skepticism, and idolatry" from both islands, and to endeavor to unite all in one Confession of Faith, one Form of Church Government, and one Directory of Worship. Cromwell and Vane signed the same instrument as Leslie and Johnston, and Hamilton. The Covenanter of this period had visions of civil liberty as well as religious. He was an earnest, pious, praying man, and his Bible was the key to all riddles. The kingdom of Christ was paramount to all earthly interests; it was bounded by no friths or mountains; it was limited to no nation, or tongue, or color, or generation. And in that kingdom he was right who resisted oppression, and freed and elevated the masses of men. Charles Stuart was as amenable to law as the veriest beggar in his kingdom.

The Covenant culminated in the Revolution, which, for a season, bound together the Scottish Presbyterian and the English Puritan. Puritan and Presbyterian in those days were

synonymous terms for the same class of people. The reins had fallen from the hands of the dead Cromwell; the kingdom was in confusion; all classes concluded that there was no other remedy for evils than the restoration of the Stuarts. The Scottish Presbyterians led the way, to find the little-finger of the Second Charles thicker than his father's loins. Divided among themselves, the new king summoned rack, thumb-screw, and boot, to impose the court religion on Scotland. Then came the days of cruel mockings and scourgings, of bonds and imprisonment. The Second Philip was scarcely more cruel with his Netherlanders; Alva was not worse than Claverhouse. The monarch has been gibbeted beyond the possibility of ever taking the carcase down, but there are hands to-day trying to sprinkle rose-water over the putrefaction of the murderer of John Brown, the Christian carrier.

The graves of Presbyterian martyrs are green in the old church-yards of Scotland still. The Covenanters could not be dragooned into love or even toleration of Charles' Episcopacy. The primitive religion, handed down by the Culdees, never lost in the west of Scotland, revived by Knox, and embraced by the nation, held the popular mind too firmly to be superseded. And never was religion more pure, nor more generally practised by the people, than the Covenanter's faith when the Stuarts were restored. We hasten over these days, the pages of whose history are blotted with martyr's blood. The traitor, archbishop Sharpe, is assassinated by a few whom persecution has driven into fanaticism. The divisions among the Covenanters are artfully fomented by the court. The inscription is effaced from the tomb of Alexander Henderson, the giant of his generation, who, with the Covenanters of his times, have fallen asleep. The Covenant obligations are set aside and declared unlawful, and absolute kingship over church and state leaps into the saddle again with a bound. The synods are dispersed, and the blood-hounds of tyranny unleashed upon the leaders in the Revolution of the last reign. Episcopacy must be foisted upon the unwilling land. Then follows the prohibition of Presbyterian meetings, the great gatherings of the persecuted in the glens and fields. But the Prayer-Book at the point of the bayonet does not enter into the affections of the people. Troopers cover the country, but the peasantry carry arms to their conventicles. Welsh and Blackader, and Alexander Peden, of whom the world was not worthy, confirm the people in their faith. A difference of opinion prevails as to the propriety of forcibly resisting the oppressor, the golden opportunity is lost, which,

had advantage been taken when the king first began to reign, would have made these cruelties impossible. Prayer-meetings and family-worship are forbidden under heavy penalty. Human nature can endure it no longer. In 1679 Hamilton and others publicly burn the obnoxious acts of the court, and boldly attach to the cross at Rutherglen "the Declaration and Testimony of the True Presbyterian Party in Scotland." Claverhouse and Dalziel are eager for their blood, and already booted and spurred are away for the west country. Drumm-clog, with the 76th Psalm for its war-shout, brings a victory. The revival of the old Covenant has been a failure; the Presbyterian camp is torn with dissensions. The disastrous battle of Bothwell Bridge follows. The Blue banner floats before the ranks, inscribed with "Christ our King and Covenant;" the Psalm is raised, but owing to the want of military skill in the leaders, the bridge is won and crossed by the royal troops, and the day is with Claverhouse and Dalziel.

The Test Act cannot destroy the affection of Scotland's people for the Presbyterian faith and form of worship. They form societies among themselves, awaiting the dawn of a better day; and the Covenant disappears as Cameron, in the spirit of Knox and Welsh and Henderson, rallies a portion of the discomfited people. The Presbyterians are divided and suspicious, and the Covenanter becomes the Cameronian. There was never more heroic deed than the issue of the Declaration and Testimony fixed to the cross of Sanquhar in 1680, in which Cameron and his followers, representatives of the true Presbyterian church and Covenanted nation of Scotland, disowned Charles Stuart, who had been "reigning or rather, we may say, tyrannizing on the throne of Britain, and declared war with such a tyrant and usurper."

James the Second comes in only a more honest Papist than his predecessor. The Revolution of 1688 succeeds, and Scotland recovers its venerated Confession of the Westminster Assembly. In 1743 the Associate Presbytery, which, with the Erskines, has separated from the church of Scotland, deem it obligatory upon them to rescue the old Covenant, and Burghers and Anti-Burghers into which they divide, hold to the hallowed custom. And far up in one of the beautiful valleys of Pennsylvania, Scotsmen and their descendants have esteemed it a privilege, breathing the free air of their chosen republic, to bind themselves to one another and to God, in the same language in which the Hendersons and Camerons confessed their love of liberty and the pure religion of the Bible.

ART. VIII.—WHEDON ON THE WILL.*

THE CONFLICT between freedom and necessity has agitated all schools of philosophy and theology. Fate and chance, necessity and contingency, divine sovereignty and free will, foreknowledge and self-determination, certainty and power to the contrary, law and liberty—all these contrasted phrases indicate different forms of the same radical problem. The whole question centres in the application of the universal and rational idea of causality to the acts of the Will. Is the Will wholly and purely cause, or does it come under the law of cause and effect? The intricacy of the inquiry makes it difficult; its vital issues make it momentous. The government of God, and the responsibility of man are equally involved.

At the outset, each of the two factors, divine sovereignty and free will, seems to have for itself sufficient evidence. In simple and direct consciousness no embarrassment is felt; but in the reflex consciousness of the philosophic mind there come up conflicting speculations, which either imperil human responsibility or impugn the divine authority. The problem is, to reconcile the two; or, at least, so to state each that the other shall not be deprived of its rights. And here confusion is apt to arise, whether from poverty of language, inaccuracy of thought, or positive inability to grasp the hidden connexions of things so diverse and so profound. It may be, that from the nature of the case, we cannot fully master the consilience of law and liberty, until we can fathom, not only the depths of human consciousness, but also the mystery of the divine agency. And this sole thought, rightly weighed, will dint the edge of many a sharp definition. Man's freedom may be so defined, as logically to exclude even foreknowledge; God's agency may be so defined, as to imply that he is the efficient cause of all human volitions. And though we cannot penetrate the interaction of the two, yet we may see when either is ruled out by the very terms in which the other is propounded. Though we cannot solve a mystery, we may appreciate a logical contradiction. The problem is not a simple one, to be answered by an analysis of one series of similar facts; but it is in the highest degree complex, reaching to the very poles of the moral universe. No one is prepared to discuss it, who

* The Freedom of the Will as a Basis of Human Responsibility and a Divine Government. By D. D. WHEDON, D.D. New York. 1864. pp. 438.

has not an awe-inspiring sense of the divine majesty, as well as a deep conviction of the difficulties that environ the ultimate moral preferences of a responsible human will.

We are apt to imagine that the acts of the will are simple, and easy of definition. As revealed in immediate consciousness these acts are simple, being the direct expression of personal power ; but the will, in its supreme preferences, contains the most complex and subtle elements of our moral life. The will, in fact, brings our whole being into concentrated expression. At the basis are the generic elements of human nature ; these are individualized in a distinct moral personality ; and the person, putting forth power, especially in the form of choice or preference, is the Will. It is only logically that the will is distinguishable from the man or person ; really, it is never so. And all the other so-called powers or faculties of the mind converge here ; they run into, and so complicate, the will's energy. It is usually said, that the intellect acts first, and then the feelings, and then the will ; and this to a certain extent is true, as in formal, deliberate choice ; but this is far from comprising the whole of the will's agency. For a subtler analysis indicates, that it is rather below than on the surface of the other powers of the mind—next to the very person ; and that it is implicated in all putting forth of power, whether internally or externally. Its chief function, however, is in choice ; and this is in the two-fold form of immanent preference and executive acts.

In the idea, and in the act of choice, it is of course implied that there may be (not that there always are) two or more objects or ends in view ; that between them election is to be made ; and that, so far as the general capacity of choice is concerned, there is a natural possibility of electing the one or the other. But the actual choosing is dependent on other conditions than this possibility of different elections ; it includes as well, and by an equal stringency, motives, opportunities, and the moral bias, or antecedent states, of the will itself. These all help to constitute the volition. And, as a matter of fact, the generic bias of the will, its moral habit, determines the special volitions, until some great crisis comes. Every human being is in such a state in respect to sin, until he is led, and only by divine grace, to think upon his ways and come to his right mind. And this moral inability of the sinner to repent and turn unto God, without the impulse and aid of divine grace, is as certain as any fact in man's spiritual history. In human consciousness it is reconcilable and reconciled with the deepest sense of responsibility and guilt ; so

that it is only the logic of sophistry, and not the voice of consciousness or conscience, which sets the two at variance. Whenever man is religious, and so far forth as he is religious, he feels and knows his need, especially as a sinner, of entire dependence on God's grace for renewal and redemption. And when his trust in that grace is most absorbing, when his will and the divine will flow together, then, too, he has the highest conscious sense of freedom ; for his whole soul goes out in unimpeded love to God ; he has found the metes and measure of his moral being, and in the highest moral necessity is conscious of the highest moral freedom. Sin is a bondage of the soul ; and in holiness alone is its perfect liberty reinstated.

These now are patent and substantial facts about human nature, and man's moral experience and history, which every theory of the will is bound to recognize. They bring out some of the main points in the perennial controversy between Calvinists and Arminians, which Dr. Whedon has renewed in his treatise on the Freedom of the Will. The author is well known as the able and diligent editor of the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, and is looked upon as the acutest representative of the theology of the Methodist Episcopal Church. His book, nominally an essay on the Will, is really an advocacy of Arminianism and an attack on Calvinism. And he brings all Calvinists, old school and new school, in New England and in all branches of the Presbyterian church, under the same condemnation. It is rather amusing to see Princeton and Andover, Bangor and New Haven, swept into the same drag-net ; all classed as "necessarians." The utmost he will concede to the Calvinistic advocates, even of "power to the contrary" is, that they are "crude freedomists." He will not admit them into the full Arminian fellowship unless they are prepared to say, that the "power to the contrary" has actually been exercised, or, that they do sometimes choose from the weaker inducement ; or, that God simply foreknows and does not fore-ordain—for, after all, it is the divine decree which most gravels a consistent Arminian. Yet still we think, the author has been rather hard on some who have gone as far as they could in his line, and only stopped just short of absurdities and contradictions. He seems to think that there are but two words in the whole discussion, *freedom* and *necessity* ; that these have invariably the same sense—which of course he defines ; that there is no debatable land between ; and that Arminians have the monopoly of freedom ; while Calvinists are fixed bound to fate. This is about the upshot of his argument. Even when a Calvinist says that by "necessity" he means only "cer-

tainty," Dr. Whedon retorts that by "certainty" he must mean only "necessity." He cannot get quit of the notions, that Calvinism is the same as pure necessity, and that predestination means that God is the author of sin. Nor will he allow to Edwards and his school the benefit of their own nice distinctions and emphatic disclaimers. Taking his prominent terms in an isolated way, he never thinks of making joints, or of harmonizing antagonisms; and so he finds it hard to understand such processes in other minds. More than half of his volume is devoted to a perversion and attempted refutation of the "necessarian arguments," especially those of the elder Edwards. For each new advocate of Arminianism must still storm that citadel—though it has been so often demolished. But every fresh "freedomist" is dissatisfied with the work of his predecessors, and has to provide himself with new weapons, that is, a new set of definitions, which have not yet run the gauntlet of the Calvinistic logic. Our new knight thinks that "self-determining power of the will" is an infelicitous expression; that "liberty of indifference" is inapt; that "contingency of volition" excites misapprehensions; that "power to the contrary," implies what it should not; and comes into the contest, armed cap-à-pie, in a complete panoply of new and strange words, phrases and definitions, which bristle defiance.

An author has an undoubted right to make his own definitions; and a writer of authority may now and then introduce a new and needed term, which will be welcomed to the language. But Dr. Whedon's volume is fairly disfigured by *verba insolentia*, and awkward, not to say barbarous, phrases;* such as, 'freedomism', 'volitionate', 'volitivity', 'motivity', 'intuity', 'definiting', 'certained', 'mustness', 'transgressoriness', 'resultant cause', in the sense of the cause producing the result; 'free to alterities', 'eternal, divine, free volitivity', and the like. Such grotesque novelties and freaks of expression add nothing either to the purity or the force of style. They are needless, especially in the case of an author, who is often clear and concise in his definitions and arguments, and who is quite able to express his definite ideas in good old English undefiled. They obscure the thought and embarrass the attention. To read this work intelligibly, we have to learn a new Arminianese dialect, which in a condensed form runneth somewhat after this fashion: "Freedom is the power of alternative choice, otherwise called

*We referred to a few of these in the July number of our Review, which the *Methodist Quarterly* for October comments on with slight courtesy, and some inaccuracy; saying, e.g. "The phrase 'equilibril will' does not occur;" but it is found in the table of contents, p. 7, "Indifference is equilibril will."

pluripotentia causality ; while necessity is unipotent and automatically resultant from inalterative particular causation ; the will, as an uncaused cause, is necessarily free to alterities ; its volitivity may be from pure intuition whatever be the motivity ; in a true equilibrial or equipollent cause there cannot be any mustness, for no one can really volitionate where there is non-existence of power but to a fixation."

One assumption underlies our author's reasonings, which demands a moment's consideration ; and that is, that Calvinism as a system stands or falls with the doctrine of "philosophical necessity," as expounded by Edwards ; as if that metaphysical dogma had a quasi symbolical authority. This is far from being the case. The essential Calvinistic tenet is that of the divine purposes ; "philosophical necessity" is but an adjunct of the system, employed to elucidate some aspects and relations of the divine decree. It has, in fact, been denied by many, who have still held to the general Reformed theology against both Lutherans and Arminians. The late Principal Cunningham, of Edinburgh, maintained in an elaborate essay, that the Westminster Confession neither requires nor forbids the holding of that philosopheme. And many divines of our own country, both old school and new school, have, on different grounds, dissented from some of the phraseology and arguments of the sage of Northampton. Since he wrote there have been great changes in the state of the question. Edwards himself would have written in a different tone against the evangelical Arminianism of the Methodist church as represented by Dr. Whedon, from that which he assumed towards the cold and rationalising Arminianism of his own times, which denied original sin, and special grace. Had he been opposing pantheism he would unquestionably have modified some of his positions and illustrations. Few persons now-a-days would accept all his definitions as final. He does not carefully distinguish between the different usages of the word 'cause' ; he seems to limit freedom too exclusively to executive volition ; at times he implies that the whole causal power, producing volition, resides in the motives ; his conception of causation (in conformity with the philosophy of his day) is derived from the sphere of mechanics rather than from that of living or spontaneous forces ; and he is so in earnest in arguing against the self-determining power of the will as to neglect that element of self-determination which is undeniably found in every personal act. But still a critic, who can see no essential difference between "D'Holbachian atheism and Edwardean Calvinism," who says that the system of Edwards is "accordant with the

worst forms of Universalism and Parkerism in our own country;" and who cannot even master his distinctions between natural ability and moral inability; is but ill prepared to do justice to a work, which has received the homage of high eulogy and sharp assault from many of the best minds of the last hundred years. With all its minor drawbacks, the system which Edwards espoused is still, in its essential features and necessary connexions and relations, what the great Bradwardine of old called it, in the title of his famous book, the *Causa Dei contra Pelagium*. For Arminianism logically demands Pelagianism. It is only, as we shall see, by a fortunate inconsistency, or rather by a complete disregard of his theory of freedom, that Dr. Whedon is able to maintain his orthodoxy when he comes to the main problems of the theodicy. Vaunting his notion of freedom, even in the title of his work, as the only "basis of human responsibility and a divine government," he is forced to ignore it, when he encounters the knotty questions about the divine prescience, the guilt of original sin, and the vindication of the divine justice in view of sin; and to put the whole stress of his solutions on an entirely different basis. Freedom is supplemented by a "gracious ability," and justice itself, it is argued, demands the system of redemption. And so this book, just because it is so sharp and strenuous, illustrates more fully, perhaps, than any single product of this school, the inevitable tendencies and inconsistencies inherent in the Arminian system, which stands, logically and theologically, between Calvinism and Pelagianism, having some of the main difficulties of both, without the consistency of either.

Dr. Whedon's work is divided into three Parts. Part First is entitled The Issue Stated: Part Second considers the Necessitarian Argument: Part Third is devoted to the Positive Argument for the writer's own theory. This arrangement involves the necessity of frequent repetitions, and the inconvenience of refuting the "necessarian" on the ground of the writer's theory before that has been fully established. But the argument after all hinges on the definitions of terms and the correct statement of the issue. And if an author in his definitions assumes the point in debate, or misstates the ground of those whom he opposes, the apparent victory may be both easy and unprofitable.

What is the Will? Edwards says it "is the power to choose." Dr. Whedon replies "choice is a word as obscure as will." But choice certainly indicates the chief mode of the will's action, and is less "obscure" than Will, since it is

directly known as an act in consciousness. His own definition is that "Will is the power of the soul by which it is the conscious author of an intentional act." But are not "conscious author" and "an intentional act" quite as "obscure" as choice? Can there not be an unconscious act of the Will? What room is left on the basis of this definition for making a distinction between the immanent preferences and the executive acts of the Will? Is the will all act? Has it no permanent states? This definition also neglects the essential element of "choice," which is, however, brought in afterwards when our author says (p. 18) that he always "uses volition and choice interchangeably." Choice, he adds, is "a volition in view of some perceived preferability" in the object. His peculiar usage of terms now begins to appear. "Volitions are neither voluntary nor involuntary, but volitional;" "a voluntary volition is impossible." That is, he calls the direct act of the will "*volitional*," and "the consequent act of the body or mind *voluntary*." But this is arbitrary, and contrary to the best usage and the common sense of the English tongue. To say that volitions are not voluntary, and that voluntary acts are not acts of the will, is to confuse the established meaning of words, and multiply vain distinctions.

In what does the Freedom of the Will consist? In all definitions of freedom there is a certain inadequacy in language to reproduce the precise fact of consciousness. The terms ought to be perpetually interpreted, not by looking at them logically, but by reading them psychologically. Freedom is born and lives in consciousness. It is known only in and with choice or preference. External freedom is the power or opportunity of doing as one pleases. Internal freedom is found both in the capacity and in the exercise of choice; it is in and of the will, because the will can and does choose. The will, in the act of choice, is free, not only from external coercion and inward necessity, but also *in* the choice actually made. It is free in what it chooses, as well as in respect to what it does not choose.* There may be a free choice when only one object is before the mind; but, as different objects or motives are usually presented, the choice of one involves the refusal of the others, as also the possi-

* "Every free act is done in a state of freedom, not *after* such a state. . . . It will not suffice that the act immediately follows a state of Liberty; but Liberty must yet continue and co-exist with the act, the soul remaining in possession of Liberty." Edwards, p. 42. Dr. Whedon, p. 187-8, comments on this, but fails to invalidate it. Our references to Edwards are to the second volume of the New York edition of his works.

bility, so far as the natural capacity is concerned, of taking another instead, the other conditions of volition being complied with. But the cardinal point in the will's freedom, that on which responsibility chiefly hangs, is the fact that the person is consciously free *in* the choice actually made.

And this is the point which Dr. Whedon and other Arminians strangely overlook, in their anxiety to vindicate a freedom, which is abstract and illusory, a freedom which is not, and can not be, realized in any act of the mind, but which remains a perpetual negation. He says that freedom is "exemption." But this is a narrow and partial view of it. There must, he insists, be freedom "*to* the act," that is, no impediment; and freedom "*from* the act," that is, another act may be put forth "*instead*;" but freedom *in* the act he does not recognize. In his usage, as we have already seen, a "voluntary act" is not free (not "volitional"). The freedom all went before the "voluntary act," and expired in giving birth to it, so that the voluntary act is in fact necessary and not free; it is the effect of the will as a cause, and "nothing that is caused can be free." Thus his whole definition of freedom reads: "an unrestricted power to put forth in the same unchanged circumstances a different volition *instead*" of the one "in the agent's contemplation." This definition of freedom has chief respect to a volition not put forth. And this, we say, is a negative idea of freedom. It allows no place for the vital distinction between *formal* and *real* freedom."

Freedom, as thus defined, consists in, is identified with, the "unrestricted power" of "putting forth a different volition." And this power is not merely the "natural ability" conceded by the school of Edwards, but something radically different. It is, in Dr. Whedon's view, a creative energy. Arminianism, driven by force of logic from its old phrases of "a self-determining power of the will," "liberty of indifference," and the like, is coming to represent the will's action as that of pure causality, in the form of a creative act. "Every free agent," says our author* (p. 42) "is thus an original creator, even out of nothing." The will is an "uncaused cause," and it "creates, brings into existence, shapes and limits, and in all these senses necessitates and governs its volitions." It is a kind of cause "different from all others," in this respect—that all others are "unipotent," while the will is said to be "pluripotent." A natural cause, under given circumstances, can act only in one direction; it is "unipotent." This is neces-

* The same view is indicated in the title of Mr. Hazard's recent work: "Every Being that Wills, a Creative First Cause."

sity, viz., "the impossibility of the opposite." But the will is "a pluripotent or alternative cause," and is as capable of acting in opposite directions, as a "unipotent cause" is of acting in one direction. Whatever may be the feelings, motives, or state of the mind, the will is equally adequate to the opposite. It can act against all possible counter motives, and by its action even transform the weaker into the stronger motive. And such a causal capacity is said to be essential to freedom and responsibility.

That man in willing is a proper, efficient cause of his own acts, we do not contest; nor yet, that motives are the occasional and final, and not the efficient causes of volition. The direct efficiency is in the man and not in the motives. And when man chooses in one way there is no natural impossibility, but rather a natural possibility, of a different choice. He weighs, deliberates, decides; and he can decide for one or the other as seems to him best. He has all the natural and moral capacities and powers, which qualify him to choose between different objects or ends. And he chooses as he does, not because he must, not because he can not do otherwise, but because he sees no sufficient reason for, or has no hearty pleasure in, doing otherwise. And all this is entirely different from any conceivable natural necessity, or "impossibility of the opposite." But Dr. Whedon is not content with this; he will not stop at the end. He hypostatizes in the will a causal energy, a creative capacity, a "pluripotential power," which distinguishes it from all other kinds of causation. But this seems to be an unreal abstraction.

Not to anticipate criticisms, that must be reserved for other points, we do not see that this elaborate discrimination between "pluripotent" and "unipotent" cause, solves any real difficulty, or gives any distinct idea. It is an artificial way of stating an illusory distinction. In one sense all forces are "pluripotent," as they may act, or be made to act, in a variety of directions. The forces of the organic would have a greater variety than those of the inorganic; animals are more "pluripotential" than vegetables, and men than animals. And man has the capacity of choosing among and between a fertile variety of objects or ends, to which he is correlated by the complexity of his endowments; especially of deciding between the behests of reason and conscience, and the cravings of natural desire. But this capacity of choice is in no sense a double power; it is in its very nature one and simple. There is, and can be, only one undivided energy of choice, in how-

ever many directions it may turn. Even supposing that another end were chosen instead of the one that seems most desirable, it is the same capacity that makes the election. The alleged distinction indicates no real difference. And as to its being in any proper sense a "creative" energy, producing an opposite volition of its own motion, the whole idea is simply preposterous. No such thing was ever done. It is a vain imagination. To suppose it realized by man is to annul the distinction between divine and human power.

So that, upon the whole, this invention of a new kind of cause to suit the exigencies of the Arminian theory of freedom is needless and unprofitable. It is an attempt to state what eludes statement. This eccentric and pretentious "pluripotential cause," though rather formidable at first sight, turns out in fact to be only our old Arminian acquaintance, "the self-determining power of the will," brought out for a fresh airing, with a new *alias*, having been so thoroughly exposed under his former names, that he finds it inexpedient to appear in them any longer. But his new and high-sounding appellative (reminding one of the pompous titles given to petty German potentates), has not changed his nature. He is still as supple, Protean, and disputatious as ever, representing the ghost of an idea, and ever striving to elude the infinite series, into which Edwards banished him, by hiding in that intermediate state between thought and fancy in which he was begotten of old.

The general conditions "of volitional action" are reduced by Dr. Whedon to these three: "an Object or direction of action, Mental Comprehension, and Motive." "Motive is a usual antecedent of action," but its "strict universality" is doubted (pp. 71, 139). Then (p. 87) it is formally asserted that the maxim, "like causes ever and always produce like effects," is "inapplicable in the volitional sphere." And so we are prepared for "*the crucial question*," viz: the Cause of Particular Volitions. The whole theory of the book hinges here; it stands or falls with the author's view of the will as a causal power.

"What causes (determines) the will to put forth the particular volition and no other?" The question is not, how it comes to act at all, but, "Why it exerts such an act and not another?" Edwards concedes that the activity of the nature of the soul enables it to be the cause of effects, but says "*that alone* is not the cause why its action is *thus* and *thus* limited, directed and determined," as is the case in every par-

ticular volition ; and that, therefore, besides * the general capacity of election, there must be particular reasons or motives to account for particular volitions. But Dr. Whedon says, in italics, "*an alternative power or cause is an alternative thing, and accounts for the coming into existence of either one of several effects*" (p. 90). And he adds, that "*so and at once and for all, the crucial question is answered.*" When pressed with the inquiry, What causes the will to produce any particular effect ? he replies, in capitals and italics, "*NOTHING whatever.*" And this for the reason, that "*every complete cause produces its effect uncausedly*" (p. 92). Such is the theory, and upon it we join issue.

(1) The will, in and of itself, is not a complete or adequate cause of any particular volition or effect. This seems to be sometimes conceded by Dr. Whedon, when he speaks of the will "*in its proper conditions,*" as "an adequate cause," and says that "a general power is not adequate to the effect," and "that another part of the power" is to be supplied. But if these conditions furnish a part of the power, the will is not in itself a complete cause. The will may be called the efficient cause, but this gives only the general possibility of action, until the occasional and final causes are added, and these are not of the will, but constitute the motives or reasons of the act. An efficient cause and an adequate cause are by no means identical. A volition is no more accounted for by its efficient cause than would be the building of a house by the general activity of the workmen, without brick or mortar. To account for any particular volition, there must be that in the cause corresponding with the particularity in the effect. The principle of life in a seed must contain a formative element as well as a vital force, in order to be able to produce any particular kind of plant. No definite act can be constructed in thought without relation to some end or object. No event or phenomenon can be produced by a bare, general efficiency. Else, from matter, force, and motion, according to Herbert Spencer's revival of the old, godless speculations, might be evolved the universe of particular existences.

It seems to be supposed, that, because the idea of cause is simple, all effects can be accounted for by simple power alone. Cause is indeed simple in idea, but when we come to its actings, it is, as Plato says of the beautiful, "very difficult."

* Dr. Whedon, commenting on these statements, says that Edwards here teaches that motive is "the absolute cause" of the volition; but when Edwards says that active nature "alone" is not the cause of the particular volitions, he rather implies that it, as well as the motive, has a hand in the matter.

The relation of cause and effect is as complex as the frame of the universe. The most elaborate of the Aristotelian distinctions is that between power in possibility and power in act. Man (*in potentia*) may be viewed as a possible cause of either of several effects; but to pass from power to action requires other conditions or causes, which help to constitute the effect.

(2) And if the will, in itself, is not a complete and adequate cause of any one particular effect, then an "alternative power or cause," granting its existence, can no more account "for the coming into existence of either one of several effects." The same reasons in part apply here as above. If no one effect can thus be accounted for, then no other can be. Which ever alternative is taken, there is still a particular determination which cannot be explained by any mere general efficiency. Dr. Whedon seems to imagine that there is a special virtue in an "alternative cause," somehow making it adequate of itself to particular, and even "alternative" particular volitions. The difficulty however is not lessened, but repeated. Neither can be accounted for, and so either can not be. The impossibility is just reduplicated. And such "alternativity," under the circumstances must be cruelly embarrassing. It is bad enough to be obliged to put forth any one volition without any particular reason; but to decide between two opposite volitions, without any particular reason for either, is worse than the case of the traditional jackass between the two bundles of hay; for the jackass had at least the satisfaction of having each of its eyes filled with the vision of an equal good; and though it doubtless died between the two, yet, if it had chosen either, for the particular election there would have been a special inducement.

There is a still subtler difficulty about this complete power-to-either. The will is equipoised, in that it is an equally complete or adequate cause of either. It takes one: then there was a complete and adequate cause for the other, which cause, though complete and adequate, resulted in no effect. Dr. Whedon notices the matter (p. 94), and says in reply, "particularity coming into existence is itself exclusive of all counter." Very true, if it does come into existence. But why does this "particularity" come into existence, rather than the other, since there was a complete and adequate cause for either? We do not see but that the best way of settling the difficulty would be to let both come into existence. That would give us the logical absurdity full blown in act and fact.

(3) The question is: "What causes the will to produce any

particular effect?" Dr. Whedon replies: "NOTHING *whatever*. For a complete cause needs nothing to cause it to produce its normal effects." But the reason here assigned gives the slip to the question. It is true, if we have an adequate cause (or causes) we do not need anything more; but the question happens to be, Whether the will, as an alternative cause, is thus adequate even to opposite volitions; and Dr. Whedon's answer assumes this point as settled. By saying that "nothing whatever" causes it to produce any particular act, he leaves us only the will's blind energy as the cause. And as these "particular effects" cover all the sphere of the will's action, we are landed in "nothing whatever," as the root and ground of moral agency. What causes a man to be honest, rather than to steal? "Nothing whatever." What caused Adam to fall rather than to remain holy? "Nothing whatever." What causes a sinner to repent rather than to abide in sin? "Nothing whatever." And so of all other possible alternatives. Such a will is, to borrow one of the phrases of the book, "a blind, insensate, projectile will."

(4) Our author asserts (p. 87) that "in the volitional sphere" the maxim that "like causes ever and always produce like effects," is "inapplicable." This law, more carefully stated, viz: that *the same causes in the same circumstances produce the same effects*, is at the basis of the whole inductive process. Without it, all uniformity is impossible. It is not a result of induction, but its ground; it is a universal rational principle, one mode of stating the law of causality. It is so universal, that it is not violated even in a miracle. Dr. Whedon says, it applies only to nature. But how does he know that? By assuming that it does not apply to the will, he makes the will's action a point blank contradiction to all law and all certainty. It is not even a miracle; it is a caprice.

(5) And yet he claims that this theory is in harmony with the "law of causality." The law of causality is, that *for every event or change of existence there must be a cause*. His theory, he urges, does not violate this law, because for every specific volition he assigns an adequate cause, that is, an act of the will. This is good as far as it goes. But how about the act of the will itself? What is the cause of that act? Why, *nothing whatever*; it is uncaused. Of course, then, it is an act without a cause; and of course, it *does* violate the law of causality, which avers, that *every* event or act must have a cause. We must give up the law of causality, or give up this theory of the will. It is absurd to say, that anything in the universe can be uncaused excepting the Great First Cause. All that

exists in time and space must be under the law of cause and effect ; or else we cannot prove that there is a Creator. No act can be uncaused without being absolute ; and no act can be absolute and remain human. Or rather, such an act is neither human nor divine ; for God in all his particular determinations must act in accordance with the highest and best of reasons ; his being is uncaused, but his purposes are grounded in truth and holiness. Such a power, begetting an opposite volition of its own spontaneity, is incogitable ; a wanton, wilful imagination ; a sheer anomaly.

Profound thinkers, like Kant, Schelling and Julius Müller, who suppose that man's original sin can be accounted for only on the assumption of preëxistence, also hold that the sin was engendered in a "timeless" condition ; and this, in part, so as not to interfere with the law of cause and effect which rules in all that exists under the limitation of time and space. But the theory of our author leaves the human will, even in its temporal limitations and conditions, in its every act, face to face with the abyss of nothingness. It breaks up the continuity of that law, on which the whole created universe depends.

Nor does it avail, in refuting objections, to say with our author (p. 105) that "the difficulties on both sides are identical," since the nature of cause is "a mystery." For in the one case the adequate cause is assignable ; in the other, it is not. In the latter case, "nothing whatever" is said to be the cause of the act ; in the former, a sufficient reason for the act is recognized. One is a mysterious something, the other is a mysterious nothing.*

(6) There is a wide difference between a logical possibility and a real possibility. Granting even the logical possibility of stating and conceiving such an "alternative power," such

* Edwards discusses at several points this question of an uncaused cause. Thus, Part 2, Sec. 4, is on the question, whether Volition can arise without a cause, through the Activity of the nature of the Soul. He says "the activity of the soul may enable it to be the cause of effects, but it does not at all enable or help it to be the *subject* of effects which have no cause." In the previous section he examines the point, whether "the free acts of the will are existences of an exceeding different nature from other things, by reason of which they may come into existence without any previous ground or reason of it, though other things cannot ;" and he argues that this involves the contradiction, that such a "particular nature of existence is a thing prior to existence, and so a thing which makes way for existence, with such a circumstance, namely, without a cause or reason for existence." And he further shows against Mr. Chubb (p. 123) that this Arminian notion, that the acts of the will spring "from nothing, implies necessity, for what the mind is the subject of without the determination of its own previous choice, it is the subject of necessarily, as to any hand that free choice has in the affair," etc.

an "uncaused cause," it would still be a mere abstraction ; and the confirmation of consciousness and experience would be necessary to establish its real possibility, to say nothing of its reality. Because an absolute causative energy is conceivable, it does not follow that it exists in us. Power to the contrary may be stated and conceived ; but is it ever realized ? If it is exercised it is annulled ; and so its exercise is really inconceivable.

And is there not, after all, an essential illusion involved in ascribing such attributes and qualities to the Will, as if it were isolated, and distinct from the man ? An absolute and uncaused efficiency of the Will, means an absolute and uncaused efficiency of the man. But the will is only the person choosing, acting. Into its choices there must perforce enter, not merely the form of personal agency, but also its vital substance. No choice is or can be abstract--hovering, as it were, in equilibrium above our souls. All in us that prompts to action, desire, feeling, conscience, the soul's bent, are concentrated and expressed in the will's energy. It cannot be otherwise, unless we can separate the person from his feelings and affections. These can no more be kept out of the will than they can be kept out of the man. And any scheme of the will's agency which does not recognize this must be unreal and abstract.

And so we may conclude that the crucial question, "*What causes the Will to produce any particular effect,*" has not been "at once and for all answered" by saying, "*NOTHING whatever.*"

On the theory that "nothing determines the Will," it is, of course, verbally easy to evade the Infinite Series, to which Edwards reduced the Arminian self-determining power. There is no series, because in every act of choice we start with nothing. Dr. Whedon says "the tail of the series is cut off ;" and he might have added, that he cut it off right behind the ears ; for the head is gone as well as the tail. His supposed act of the will is an absolute beginning, an uncaused cause, projected of its own accord out of nothing. The will is determined by nothing ; that answers all difficulties, except those contained in itself.

What is the Relation of the Will to Motives ? Motive, comprehensively considered, is whatever leads or induces the mind to act. In the last analysis all motives are internal. The strongest motive is identical with the bent of the mind at the indivisible instant before choice, in relation to the choice. The will as a capacity for choice, is a form without contents ; it is a blind force, which receives vision and direction only from the reason, the feelings or the conscience. Motives

are not the efficient cause of volitions. They furnish the material, the occasion, and the end or object of the action; and are absolutely necessary for this. The will furnishes the efficiency, and the form of choice. But the form is to be filled with contents ere volition can be consummated. As soon, now, as it is agreed that volitions are not the efficient cause of volition, the doctrine that the will chooses according to the strongest motive (or in whatever similar phrase it may be expressed), is one of the most harmless and reasonable positions that can be taken as to the law of moral agency. No phraseology about it may be free from all ambiguity; but the object is to state a general law, in contrast with the position, that the will is arbitrary, merely self-determined, cut loose from reasons. Choice for reasons lies between caprice and fatalism; it is in contrast with chance, rather than cognate with necessity.

The question here is not as to an "impossibility of the opposite;" but simply as to a matter of fact, to be determined by an appeal to conscious experience. The position that the will is as the greatest apparent good, decides nothing as to the intrinsic value of the motives; it does not assert that any particular class or classes of motives always control volition; nor does it even affirm that the mind, at the moment of choice, is conscious of the fact, that the motive yielded to is the stronger. It only says, that in reviewing our past decisions, we find, as a matter of fact, that they have uniformly been in accordance with what at the instant solicited the will most strongly. There may have been at the same moment the consciousness of the possibility of a different choice; but that does not alter the fact that the actual choice was, on the whole, in view of what, for want of a better phrase, is called the greatest apparent good. And this never interferes, but rather harmonizes with the sense of freedom and responsibility.

But the object of the Arminian, in consistency with his assumption of the autonomy of the will, is to avoid any such general statement. Even when he grants that the will always acts, and must act, in view of motives, he tries to make out that it sometimes decides for the weaker against the stronger; or that the will gives its strength to the motive; or that the power to the contrary has actually been exercised in some cases. He insists upon it, that if the will always chooses according to the stronger inducement, that this is but a refined form of necessity. Yet he must needs concede, that all the instances covered by his seeming cases, are, at the utmost, but exceptions to the general law or fact. Or even if he does

not grant this, he will, we suppose, be willing to say, that he has sometimes, if only by way of variety, chosen according to the greatest apparent good. When he did so, was it either disagreeable or fatalistic; did it upset for the time all his notions of morality and responsibility? If it works well in some instances, why not in many? why not in all?

Even if the will can, or does choose the weaker instead of the stronger motive, we can not see what is gained, whether on the score of freedom, or of responsibility, or of the morality of the act, or in the way of defending the divine government. Certainly nothing on the score of freedom; for a man is no more free in yielding to a weak motive than to a strong one—but rather subject to the charge of caprice. Nor on the score of responsibility is there gain; for the responsibility attaches to the freedom. Nor is the morality of an act heightened when it is done without sufficient desire or love for it. And as to the divine government, even supposing that God foreknows that a man, under the circumstances in which he is placed, will choose from the weaker instead of the stronger motive, God is just as responsible, and neither more or less so, if he sees he will choose from the weaker, as if he foresees he will choose from the stronger motive.

It is said that motions cannot be compared—that certain classes of motives are incommensurable. But if they cannot be compared, how can we decide among or between them? However different they may be, they certainly agree in the characteristic of appealing to the will as reasons or inducements. The difficulty here, is simply that of finding some common and unambiguous term which will express just this fact and no other. Cheap criticisms may be made on the phrases "sufficient reason," "greatest apparent good," "what seems most desirable," and the like; but the fact still remains, that the action of the mind, unless it be contingent or capricious, can be reduced to some such general scheme or law. When we come to the last point which separates the idea of will from that of caprice, it is that the former acts with reasons, and the latter without. To call such a choice "fatalism," is to allow no middle term between fate and chance.

Dr. Whedon endeavors to reverse the relation of will and motives; and he does this on inconsistent grounds. He maintains that we must not only have, but exercise the power of contrary choice; that the will does sometimes choose from the weaker motive; that it may at times choose without a motive (pp. 139, 190); that the will "projects volition;" and, in fine, that it is the will itself which gives to the motive its

comparative strength. But if the will can, of its bare spontaneity, just "project a volition," why not give up the whole doctrine of motives altogether; it would vastly simplify, if it did not annul, psychology and ethics.

His main point, however, is, that "the so-called strength of a motive is the comparative prevalence which the will assigns to it in its action." Again (p. 79), "the last dictate of the understanding does not decide the will;" but "the dictate of the understanding becomes the last by the act of the will." And (p. 363), "the will, in and by choosing, brings the particular motive on account of which it acts, into the last antecedency to its choice." All this strikes us as more ingenious than thoughtful. Why does the will decide to make a given reason or motive the last? Not, we suppose, because it happens just then to be in view of the mind, for that would be childish. It either has a sufficient reason for stopping the series of motives, or it is wanton wilfulness. Again, "the strength of a motive" is said to be "the prevalence the will assigns to it;" but this is pre-posterous; for when the will acts, the motive, as a motive, expires; it is no longer a motive, it is incorporated in a volition; and we can no longer talk about either its strength or weakness as a motive. The discussion, by the very force and sense of the terms, is limited to the state antecedent to choice; and to slip the motive out of that state into a new mode of being, where it loses its identity as motive, is to evade the question by logical legerdemain. Yet again, the act of choice cannot change the character or force of the inducement: all that choice does is to appropriate it. If the motive was the weaker at the instant of appropriation, the appropriation does not make it stronger. If a man choose five dollars instead of ten, his choice does not make the five more than ten. Once more, if the will can be supposed to give, by its election, a greater comparative value to the motive than it had before, this must be on account of some peculiar quality or state of the will, additional to its mere power of choosing, which quality is imparted to the motive. That is, the will is not a naked power of choice, but has a moral bias or character. But this would be inconsistent with Dr. Whedon's whole theory of the nature of the will. A will that can give strength and character to a motive, is a will that contains perception and feeling, as well as power—that is, it is the man himself, and not merely one of his faculties.

Our author further illustrates his position by the doctrine of probabilities, to show that the will may and does act from the weaker motive (p. 130). "The chance may be improbable,

and yet prove successful. So the volition calculably improbable, may become the actual." But, in point of fact, in the so called contingencies (as in dice), about external facts or events, the actual result is mathematically certain to an omniscient eye. The contingency is found only in our ignorance. How, then, can this answer the purpose of showing, that strict law does not rule in the sphere of the will? If the analogy is meant, however, to apply only so far as the result is uncertain to us, then the will is a synonym for chance, and the point of comparison must be, that volition is hap-hazard, and may from mere chance fall on the lesser probability—which undermines all rational ideas of freedom and responsibility.

If freedom wanes as motives increase in intensity and permanency; if "a law of invariability in choice be pure necessity" (pp. 38, 220); then God is less free than man; and Christ had less freedom than any other man; and the sinner's guilt decreases as his sin increases; and the virtue of saints is diminished as they grow in grace and holiness.* There remains no possibility of reconciling freedom with law. The great fact of consciousness, that the highest moral freedom and the highest moral necessity concur, remains forever inexplicable.

It is commonly said that all men have the same mental and moral constitution; but we have sometimes doubted this when reading these anomalous Arminian speculations about the will and freedom and responsibility. Look at the attributes of that contradictory capacity, which they call a Will, and judge if it be essential to moral agency and responsibility. It brings forth all its acts out of nothing by its own uncaused and motiveless efficiency; it can at times act without motive, and even without emotion or feeling (p. 44); it is able to make, by its bare power, the weaker motive strong, and the stronger motive weak; it is not and cannot be free, unless it sometimes exercises a power to the contrary, without any sufficient inducement; it is under the law of natural necessity if it always chooses what on the whole seems most desirable; while it determines everything, it is itself determined by nothing, and cannot be determined by anything without annulling its very nature; it cannot be governed, and in proportion as it is governed ceases to be responsible; by its bare willfulness, it can make any reason or motive to be "the last;" and, in fine, in view of any chance impulse afloat in consciousness, it can "project itself," in the twinkling of an eye, right

* Comp. Edwards on Will, pp. 113-4, 132-3.

athwart our habitual mental and moral states, and so change us, by its arbitrary "alternativity," that we become the opposite of what we are or wish to be, with no power to let or hinder. Such a lawless capability is nearer akin to omnipotent chance than moral necessity is to fatalism. It is safe only while shut up in the technical language of abstract metaphysical treatises. An arbitrary "pluripotential cause," though it may claim to be the very essence of morality and responsibility, when it really appears in flesh and blood is furnished by society, in self-defence, with a safe retreat.

The idea of Necessity, as defined in this work, is equally abstract and one-sided with its definitions of freedom and cause. Freedom means only "exemption;" Cause is only "efficiency;" and Necessity signifies only the utter "impossibility of the opposite." This definition of Necessity is so fixed in Dr. Whedon's mind, that he seems incapable of appreciating the careful distinctions made by Edwards, and on this score does him manifest injustice. Necessity, in fact, is one of the most difficult of the categories, and requires the most careful handling. "Philosophical Necessity" is perhaps an unfortunate phrase to use in discussions on freedom; but Edwards expressly repudiates the sense in which his critic quite uniformly ascribes it to him. He says the vulgar usage makes Necessity to mean that "it is impossible it should not be;" but that, as he uses it, "metaphysical and philosophical necessity is *nothing different from certainty*." And he adds: "It is really nothing else than the full and fixed connection between the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms something to be true." That is, a proposition which affirms something to be true, presupposes that there is a full and fixed connection between the things signified by its subject and predicate; the proposition could not be true unless there were such a connection; and this connection is certainty or philosophical necessity. Wherever there is certainty, there is philosophical necessity. The things signified by the subject and predicate may be connected in very different ways; the connection may be metaphysical, logical, physical, or moral—but provided it be certain, it is philosophical necessity. Dr. Whedon cannot understand this. He says: "Edwards here does *not* certainly say what he means;" but he *does* say just what he means. Whedon continues: "He surely cannot mean that necessity is the connection itself, but a quality of the connection." And yet Edwards *does* mean that the "full and fixed connection" is the necessity; the two ideas of "full and fixed connection,"

and "philosophical necessity or certainty," are identical. This appears from the instances Edwards gives (pp. 11, 12), which relate to very different things, yet all agree in having the common element of certainty, though the ground of the certainty in each case is different. To adduce some instances: we say, *e. g.*: God is infinite. This is one case of such necessity or certainty: there is a full and fixed connection, in the nature of things, between the subject 'God,' and the predicate 'infinite.' Again: Dr. Whedon misunderstands Edwards; this is another instance of philosophical necessity or certainty; the connection of the subject and predicate is certain—because it relates to a fact already past, and not because there was a natural impossibility of the opposite. Again, the proposition: God will judge the world—is another instance; it is certain, because connected with what is in itself certain, the divine justice and purpose. Edwards labors this point so as to make a plain distinction between natural necessity, and that kind of necessity (certainty) which alone holds good of moral subjects and acts. In the former—the opposite cannot be; in the latter, though the opposite might be, yet it will not be, because the given fact or event is certain to occur. In natural necessity, the event takes place, even though the will be opposed; in moral necessity, the will itself chooses, prefers, and so its opposition is ruled out by its own act. Dr. Whedon says, this is "only a deeper necessitation"* (p. 42); but there must be some stopping place, and when we have come to a free preference, this is about the end of the matter, unless a voyage up the infinite series, or a "projected volition," seems more desirable. And Edwards himself makes a formal statement of the point in its relation to Moral Inability, entirely at variance with Dr. Whedon's constant misrepresentation of his views: "Therefore in these things to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability is not just; because the thing wanting is not a being able but a being willing." (See Part I., Sec. 4.)

But this leads us to consider the author's cognate misrepresentations of Edwards's distinctions between Natural and Moral Ability and Inability. To apprehend these distinctions is vital to the understanding of the New England theology. Dr. Whedon flatters himself that he has "rid-

* Our author (p. 210) writes: "Securing my volition in order that he may secure my voluntary sin and consequent damnation, is about the poorest piece of sneaking despotism that one could attribute to an omnipotent evil." This comes out in connection with criticisms on Dr. Pond and Dr. Nehemiah Adams; but nothing they have said warrants any one in ascribing such views to them.

dled Edwards's entire theory of Moral Inability," but he has only riddled his own target. He says that by Moral Inability Edwards means "volitional powerlessness," "non-causality-in-will;" by "Moral Ability," "the power to will;" by "Natural Ability," "the power to obey the volition;" and that this natural ability is "a power outside the will," a "post-volitional power of fulfilling the volition." Thus "a man wills to strike by *moral ability*, and the arm executes the blow by *natural ability*." This, now, is a complete tissue of mistakes; these definitions are all framed for and not by Edwards, and seem to indicate either a natural or moral inability on the part of the critic to understand the most common-place points of the New England divinity. Thus, under Natural Ability are uniformly embraced all the capacities and powers of a moral agent, including the will itself—it is the possible reach of our natural powers of mind and body, under the circumstances and conditions of our being. It never means any such nonsense as "a power outside of the will to fulfil its volitions." It includes what Whedon, confounding the two, says "moral ability" means, that is, "the power to will." But moral ability, besides the power of willing, also involves the idea of an immanent preference of the will for the object chosen. Every man has natural ability, that is, all the capacities and powers necessary to moral agency; but no sinner has "a moral ability" (in the sense of Edwards) to love God, because his heart is averse to him. Thus an Edwardean would just reverse the proposition of Dr. Whedon (p. 243): "Where there is no *moral ability* there can be no *natural ability*," and would and must say, in consistency with his standard definitions, "Where there is no *natural ability* there can be no *moral ability*," for the natural is the logical and psychological *prius* of the moral. So, too, in the usage of this school, "Moral Inability" cannot mean "volitional powerlessness;" but it always and only signifies "the opposition of *inclination*, or the want of inclination;" it is an inability arising from the moral bent or state of the individual. The sinner, though endowed with all the capacities and powers of moral agency (his natural ability), is morally unable to repent and believe without divine grace, and this inability has its root, not in any natural impotence, but in the perverse and depraved state of his will. One object of the distinction between natural ability and moral inability is to show that the sinner is responsible and guilty, while also needing the aid of divine grace; so that both the obligation to immediate repentance and the sense of dependence upon God may be equally enforced. These plain and

familiar distinctions become so senseless and confused under Dr. Whedon's manipulation, that his criticisms on Edwards are well nigh unmeaning. One might as well attack Euclid after defining a circle as a figure bounded by three lines and containing three angles. It is much easier to refute Edwards on the basis of these interpolated definitions than to attack him on his own ground. His careful and refined discriminations being set aside, there is no end to the logical absurdities that may be worked up and out; only, nothing is demolished excepting some crudities, for which nobody but the critic is to be held responsible.

We are obliged to omit several points, on which we wished to comment, that we may come to the test question, in a theological point of the view, of the theory of freedom here advocated; that is, the certainty of the divine foreknowledge of such future events as are dependent on free agency. Dr. Whedon begins by saying, that foreknowledge must precede foreordination, because the former belongs to "the intellect," and the latter to "the will;" and we all know that God's intellect, like man's, must act before his will. But—not stopping to inquire what would then be left for foreordination to do—it is a serious misunderstanding to say, that foreordination is restricted to the divine will or the divine agency. God foreordains whatever comes to pass, as it comes to pass; and so, not only his own acts, but the acts of his creatures, are included in his eternal plan, with all the circumstances and qualities of these acts, just as they eventuate in time. In one sense, foreknowledge may be said to precede foreordination; that is, God knew what he was to ordain (in the order of thought and logic) ere he ordained it. But this is not the question in dispute, though Arminians sometimes like to think that it is. The foreknowledge of future events as certain being conceded, the question is, what is the ground or reason of that certainty. To foreknow them as certain, implies that they are certain. What makes them thus certain? The Calvinist replies—that they are certain because contained in the divine plan or purpose (i. e. foreordained). Dr. Whedon replies, in substance, that they are certain because they are certain, while he advocates a view of freedom, which logically excludes such certainty.

He says (p. 271) that "our view of free agency does not so much require in God a foreknowledge of a peculiar kind of event, as a knowledge in him of a *peculiar quality existent in the free agent*." This "peculiar quality" is that of "alternative causation." The agent is "an uncaused cause," of "equi-

pollent ability" to decide either way, at every instant of action. It is "determined by nothing" in "all its particular volitions." How, then, can even omniscience foresee what its particular action will be? The more God sees into the very "peculiar" nature of such a cause, the more will he know that its acts must be uncertain. It is a pure *either-or*; and the deeper it is inspected the more *either-or* must it seem to be. How can any being foreknow the particular acts of (p. 217) "a self-centre, capable of projecting action, which, without the intrinsic nature of chance, would be *as incalculable as the most absolute chance itself*?" Who can read that riddle? Dr. Whedon says that "foreknowledge must take care of itself," and, that "he shall not enter into that inquiry." Foreknowledge will, doubtless, take care of itself; but then, on our part, we also ought to take care not to cherish a theory of the will, which excludes the logical possibility of such foreknowledge, even while we may grant that we cannot know just how God foreknows. One form of the *scientia media*, advocated by the Spanish Jesuits in controversy with the Jansenists, was much more consistent than such Arminianism; denying that God foreknows the actual event, but asserting that he knows and provides for all possible contingencies.

Yet Dr. Whedon advocates a kind of certainty; though his statements about it are so various and conflicting, that it is almost impossible to derive from them any consistent sense. This will appear from a comparison of his different utterances. Thus he says: "Whether there be any foreknowledge or not, it is *certain* that there will be *a one particular course of events and no other*." He adds that "*freedom* in every individual case *implies* that of several possible volitions, *one and no other* will take place" (p. 274). He says of certainty, that (p. 57) "its primary meaning is subjective. It exists in the mind rather than in the object." He also concedes, that there is a "pure certainty," which is "the futuration of the event," and which implies that "it will be," though "power exists for it not to be." At the same time, he maintains, that "certainty" cannot be "previously made" (p. 282); and that God's foreknowledge does not even "*prove* events to be certain" (p. 298). To complete his view we must also adduce the positions, that certainty "is simply futuration, and *takes its existence from the shaping of the free act and from nothing else*" (p. 778); and that "*all its reality receives its existence from the doing reflected backwards*" (p. 229).

These diverse statements seem to be not only irreconcilable among themselves, but also in part with his theory of the will.

He has defined the will as a free alternative cause, all whose particular volitions are determined "by nothing." It is an "uncaused cause." How, now, does such freedom "imply" that "one and no other volition" will take place in all possible circumstances? How can the "freedomist," as the logical result of this theory, in our author's words, see and say, that there is one vast "free, certain totality," which he can survey "with perfect ease and consistency?" Is it not a bold venture, to claim that such freedom implies such certainty? It does imply that one or another event will take place, but how can it signify that "one *and* no other will take place?" Does uncertainty imply certainty? Will calling shifting sand a rock, make it a rock? These different statements confuse a very simple matter. If an event *will be*, it is certain; if God knows that it will be, he knows that it is certain; and so his knowing it as certain implies or "proves" that it is certain. Such knowledge does not indicate, or make, the ground of the certainty; but it presupposes the certainty. But if, as Dr. Whedon says, certainty "*takes its existence* from the shaping of the free act, and from nothing else," then, the certainty cannot be until the free act has been; that is, there is no previous certainty; that is, God cannot foresee the act as certain, because it is not certain until it is done. Such a certainty, *post eventum*, is no certainty at all in the sense of the question. It is a mere evasion of the point in dispute. Who ever doubted that an event was certain after it took place?

Our author's position, in fact, amounts to this—that there is and can be no anterior ground of certainty, either in the laws of moral agency, or in the nature of things, or in the divine plan; but, a future event is certain because it is certain! We do not wonder that he felt compelled to say "foreknowledge must take care of itself." The point of mystery in the Calvinistic system is, how an act can be free and yet be embraced in the divine purpose; but this does not involve any such contradiction as is contained in the two positions, that God foreknows all future events as certain, and, that certainty "takes its existence from the shaping of the free act, and from nothing else." We may believe in a mystery, but who can accept both parts of a logical contradiction?

In his discussion of the divine decrees, Dr. Whedon habitually misrepresents the doctrine of predestination as held by the chief Calvinistic authorities. He represents it as "an act of the divine will;" as "producing the event;" as "embracing only the divine actions." Accordingly he claims that a "permissive decree" is Arminianism, and not Calvinism.

He asserts that Edwards quits his ground, when he ascribes sin to a "privative cause," and not to the direct divine agency (p. 427). But every student in theology knows that Calvinism makes a broad distinction between what God decrees and what he does; the confounding of the two is found chiefly among a few hyper-Calvinistic supralapsarian divines. The best theologians, from Augustine down, and the leading Confessions of Faith, have quite uniformly repudiated the positions, that God is the author of sin; that he is as directly the efficient cause of sin and damnation, as he is of holiness and salvation—producing each equally for his own glory; while they have, with equal unanimity, maintained that the decree in respect to sin is permissive, and that the agency of God in respect to sin is privative rather than positive. Such cheap and stale controversial imputations are refuted by the facts and documents of historical theology.

In applying his theory of the Will to the divine mind, our author does not flinch from the logical consequences which are wrapped up in it. Thus he says (p. 316); "God is holy in that he freely chooses to make his own happiness in eternal Right. *Whether he could not make himself equally happy in Wrong is more than we can say.*" Again (p. 317); "and how knows a finite insect like us that in the course of ages the motives in the universe *may not prove strongest for divine apostasy to evil.*" Again (p. 318); "our reliance in this case depends more upon the firmness of *our faith* than upon the firmness of the *object of our faith.*" This reduces our reliance upon the divine character to mere subjective belief, without any adequate objective ground. The essential holiness of God gives no sufficient basis of certainty. The "alternative power" of the will must be maintained at all hazards; for if it fails in relation to God, it fails in its highest application. Moral necessity and perfect freedom cannot co-exist even in the divine mind. Rather than give up freedomism," the possibility of "the divine apostasy" must be admitted. And so the theory judges itself.

Dr. Whedon is graciously pleased to say (p. 315), that "these same Edwardses every now and then have a lucid interval." The compliment may be reciprocated. Arminianism is reputed to be an inconsistent system. An eminent New England divine is said to have kept it out of his parish by frequent citations of sound Pauline views from noted Arminian authors. The latest defender of the system continues the illogical succession, being a frequent witness against his own speculations. Thus he asserts the certainty of events,

and recognizes no ground of certainty. Sometimes the will is represented as the sole adequate cause of volition ; and yet he concedes (p. 158), "that without motives there is no adequate power for the volition to be." He contends strongly against the "non-usance" of the power of contrary choice ; and yet says (p. 175) that "while there is a power that *each should not be*, yet each and all *will be*, in its own *one* way, and not another instead" (p. 275). Freedom is declared (p. 38) "to be contradicted by the law of Invariability," while it is also conceded that God is free though invariably holy ; and that men are free in sinning, though they invariably sin. At one time it is asserted (p. 216) that to be "able to predict which way a person will choose from knowing him *perfectly* is more than any one is able to affirm ;" and contrariwise (p. 272) it is argued, that "God is certainly to be conceived as able to know just what acts the creature will put forth," because he "perfectly knows" the capacities of free agents. The fact of the divine government of free agents is granted ; and yet it is broadly laid down (p. 184) that, "government, just so far as it goes, implies limitation . . . non-existence of power but to afixation." "To ensure the certainty of a free act is absurd, because contradictory" (p. 227) ; and, per contra, "powerful temptation often insures that, sooner or later, the sin will be freely accepted."

These inconsistencies, however, become more noteworthy, in relation to the doctrines of the primeval rectitude of Adam, original sin, the impossibility of self-regeneration, and the absolute need of the atonement. For Dr. Whedon is an evangelical Arminian, and cannot resort to the shifts and explanations in vogue in unsanctified ethical systems. He defends Whitby on freedom, and denies Whitby on sin. And so he is in a place where two seas meet ; where opposite dangers threaten.

Dextrum Scylla latus, laevum implacata Charybdis
Obsidet.

In his chapter on Uniformities of Volition, he seems to grant as much as the strictest advocate of law need demand, the existence of a "total spiritual depravity," requiring even "the injecting the possibility of a spiritual motive." "Men may be so absorbed in their plans as to cease to be free alternative agents, yet their responsibility remains." His most explicit statements, however, are on the Responsibility of Obduracy.* Here he concedes that "the superinduction by the

* In a note (p. 327) the following slip occurs : Edwards selects as cases "of necessitated guilt, the Will of Christ, the Divine Will, Obduracy," etc. In another

sinner's own free act, or course of action, of necessity upon himself to sin, destroys the excuse for that necessity." This of course implies that he is responsible for continuing in sin, as well as for bringing himself into such a state. How, then, is it congruous with what is elsewhere and often asserted, that guilt attaches only as long as the will is in a state of "volitional alternativity." Necessitation and responsibility are over and over again declared to be incompatible (p. 203); but yet in the case of every descendent of Adam, there is "a necessity lying back of the freedom," and ensuring the "free appropriation" of original sin; and he adds (p. 339) that "it is in this fact that the *freedom* and universality of this fall are found to be reconciled." He allows that in Adam "there was a created and necessitated righteousness before choice" (p. 394), which, however was wholly unmeritorious; and that the "holiness of saints in heaven is none the less rewardable because it has become necessary" (p. 387); as also that "sinners finally damned are none the less responsible." However much such inconsistencies impair the logical coherence of the treatise, they give welcome evidence that our Methodist brethren will not abandon these cardinal doctrines, however enamored they may be of their impracticable theory of free will.

These contrasted positions, however, are not held without an attempt at adjustment. And the ingenuity of the latest and most strenuous defender of the Arminian system is here put to its severest test. To meet some of the exigencies of the case, he distinguishes (p. 388) between a holiness which is meritorious and one which is not; and, in like manner, between a sin which deserves punishment and a sin which does not. But his chief point is that the atonement is the means of "reëlevating man to the level of *responsibility* lost by the fall." Redemption "antedates probationary existence;" "grace underlies all our moral probationary freedom." And this grace God was in justice bound to bestow. Ability being lost by the fall, "a gracious ability" must needs be imparted. And thus the difficulty is supposed to be met.

The system of redemption has, doubtless, important and even essential bearings upon the theodicy, or the vindication of the divine government in respect to the existence of sin. And in a certain sense, what may be called a gracious ability is

note (p. 206) he refers to. "a tribute paid by fatalism to freedom, just as hypocrisy is said to be the compliment which *virtue pays to vice*," which not only reverses the saying, but implies that freedom is vice and fatalism virtue. An author who undertakes to write down the Calvinistic theology should be more careful in his style.

imparted to man, through the divine favor. But if it is of debt, it can not be of grace. It can not be said to be necessary to make man responsible, without undermining both the system of law and the system of grace. Especially is it inconsistent with the whole previous argument of this book as to man's freedom and responsibility. The object of the author has been to show that responsibility attaches only to acts of free-will, done with full power to the contrary. He claims that such free-will is inalienable from human nature; that with this capacity every man is born, and so, and so only, made a moral agent. How, now, does this native power of alternative choice stand related to this new and "gracious" ability? Here comes up several interesting possibilities and difficulties. We are now conscious, it is said, of having the perfect power of alternative choice. Is this our "gracious" ability? or is it our natural free-will? If it is the natural capacity of choice, how can it be said that responsibility was lost by the fall? If it is not natural, but "gracious" ability, wherein does it differ from the natural? And if the natural capacity is really clean gone, what becomes of the whole argument of this elaborate treatise? Still further, our author assures us that every human being is under a "necessity" of "freely appropriating" his native depravity; and that when he does so, he becomes "responsible" for it. This "free appropriation," is it made by our natural ability, or by this "gracious" ability? If by the natural, then the gracious was not needed to make men responsible; if by the gracious, then the immediate effect of the grace is simply to enable man to commit a sin, which otherwise he could not have committed, to make him responsible for what otherwise would have been simply an irresponsible state. Besides, if the native will is a "pluripotential cause," what can be added to that by a gracious ability? It cannot, we suppose, be more than "pluripotential," and so it is needless; while if it is less than "an uncaused cause," man rather loses than gains by the exchange. And yet he cannot have lost this "uncaused cause;" for it is his very will. Is it then possible that these two abilities coexist in all of us? Are we ever conscious of them as distinct from each other? How can we distinguish the one from the other? We cannot see our way through the matter.

Perhaps we may be helped by some further statements of our author, about the relation of these respective abilities to the Old Law and the New Law (p. 336). God, it appears, gave to man the old law, which Adam transgressed. Adam's descendants being involved in the common ruin, God gave

them, through the atonement, a new law, less strict in its terms, and furnished them also with this gracious ability, adequate to the demand of the "intermediate" dispensation, though not to the demands of the old law. How will the case then stand? Granting that man's native free will was not adequate to the demands of the old law, why might it not still have been equal to the requisitions of the new and lighter dispensation? But waiving that point, we do not quite understand whether, when man now sins, he sins only against the Gospel, or also against the laws? If only against the Gospel, how can the law condemn him? And if against the law, how is he responsible, since his new and gracious ability is yet commensurate with the demands of that law? And this gracious ability is also, in fact, inadequate to meet even the demands of the new law. It is given to man at the dawn of his moral existence, and yet all men sin against it. All mankind fall from this grace. A gracious ability enables them to fall from grace. We need not wonder that Arminians talk about *believing* in falling from grace, as if it were an article of their creed. Our author says, in conclusion, "man is never responsible for a law he cannot meet; Christ's death and the new law are *demanded* by his case; and (*sic*!) all sin infringes against the new law and the old." And this sentence forcibly exhibits the height of the inconsistencies of the whole theory. The new law is demanded by equity, because man could not keep the old; but when he sins against the new, his sin also infringes upon the old, though he has been removed from its jurisdiction. And so we have two kinds of ability, and two kinds of law, and two kinds of punishment, and two kinds of moral government; and the whole makes a labyrinth, strikingly illustrative of the clearness and consistency of Arminian theology. Calvinism may be a sharp and hard system; but it takes no position, from which it can fairly be inferred that we are "damned by grace."

Nor have we yet reached the height of the theology propounded in this volume. For it is also maintained, that, not only is man's plenipotentiary will under a necessity of appropriating native depravity, and responsible because it freely accepts it; not only that the atonement imparts to every man at the start a gracious ability (and, some say, justification and regeneration also), which enables him freely to keep or freely to sin against the new law; but also that there are "millions," in Christian as well as in heathen lands, whom the Creator is still bound to save, because they never came up to the lead of "moral responsibility." These are not infants,

whose salvation we all concede, but "irresponsible adults" in Christian lands, incrusts in "irresponsible sins." Such persons cannot, "by the law of moral equation," be "excluded from the kingdom of heaven any more than infants (pp. 346, 347). If it were only meant that such persons having little light may be saved, on condition of repentance and faith, according to the light they have, this would be common ground. But it is argued that they must be saved, because they are "irresponsible." This is hazardous teaching, on the basis of any moral or theological system. But it becomes anomalous, as well as perilous, on the ground of the general theory of the book, that all these persons have a perfectly "alternative will," supplemented by a gracious ability; that they were all, if not justified and renewed in their infancy, yet brought into existence under a probationary system of grace, against which they have sinned; and yet, in spite of all this, that they are still in an irresponsible state, and must be saved as a matter of equity. Such teaching undermines all rational basis for responsibility and runs far in the line of advocating universal salvation on the ground of equity.

In fine, the whole argument of this volume, so far as it rests the "theodicy" upon the peculiar theory of Will herein advocated, is a conspicuous failure. It is claimed that "freedomism" is the only basis upon which the mysterious problems of man's condition can be solved, in harmony with the rectitude and goodness of the divine administration. But when the author comes to the knotty questions, he does not, and he cannot, untie a single one of them by means of his theory of the will. He is obliged to find a wholly different clue to guide him through the labyrinth. He lays a foundation, and erects the superstructure on a different foundation. He makes certain premises, and his conclusions are drawn from entirely different premises. He launches a craft on these troubled metaphysical and theological waters, and the fore part beats about without any sort of connection with the after part, and the after part floats about without any sort of connection with the fore part; and no rudder can steer both parts through these vexed waves into the same haven.

This is manifest as soon as the matter is distinctly put. He abandons the possibility of reconciling the certainty of the divine knowledge with the fact of freedom; he cannot conceive or state any ligature between them. Both certainty and freedom are asserted and unreconciled. So, too, in accounting for the sin of this race, he grants that it is freely appropriated by a necessity, before which the will is really

powerless. And so impotent is the native capacity of the will, that God is obliged to give to all men "a gracious ability" in addition. So that here, again, "freedomism" quails before the difficulty. It is further asserted that God's goodness can be vindicated in the matter of sin only as he provides an atonement for all, which of course implies that it is not of him that willeth, but of God that sheweth mercy. An "alternative cause" gives no aid here. Thousands of irresponsible, adult sinners, are also to be saved all over the world, as a matter of equity, because their inalienable freedom was not able to bring them up to the condition of responsible guilt. Of what avail, then, is their free-will? The author's theodicy declares that God must provide redemption for all mankind, not merely on the score of grace but also of equity; and for the reason, that men have not power to avoid the common ruin into which they are plunged. What connection is there between such a theodicy and the doctrine of the freedom of the will, as a power to the contrary? And thus the vaunted freedom of the will, which was to form the only basis of a divine government, breaks down and is discarded at every step; and the whole weight of the solution of the problems of the theodicy is made to rest on entirely different grounds. By this process, the theory is doubtless here and there benefitted, some cardinal points of doctrine are crudely held and stated; but the logic of the book, as a defense of Arminian freedom against the Calvinistic theology, is sadly out of joint.

On several of these vital questions, Dr. Whedon does in fact come so near to the positions even of extreme Calvinists, that we have been tempted to think that he has an ironic as well as polemic intent. His inconsistencies on many points—*e. g.*, original sin, regeneration, the inability of fallen man to renew himself without grace, the absolute need of redemption, and the primitive rectitude of Adam,—indicate very clearly that his theory of the will sits lightly upon him, when brought into conflict with these fundamental doctrines. His book contains snatches of opinion from the most opposite schools. Sometimes he is almost Augustinian in his views. Again he reminds us of the subtle speculations of the old Hopkinsian divines. He bases his theodicy, in fact, not on the human will, but on the divine goodness and justice. A more thorough study of Calvinistic theology, and especially of the New England discussions, may possibly lead him to see that this whole ground has been traversed before, and by disputants more keen and logical than have as yet arisen in the ranks of Arminian divines.

The Methodist Episcopal Church of this country, rapidly increasing in numbers, wealth and general intelligence, has a great future before it, and is, we trust, to do good service in the common cause of evangelical religion. Its theology is a commingling of Arminianism and sound evangelical truth. Its preaching is full of the cross of Christ. It insists constantly on the necessity of divine grace. But it has a traditional horror of Calvinism in all its forms. When it learns to understand our doctrines more clearly, and to state its own more consistently, we shall doubtless come nearer together. But its present theology contains irreconcilable elements. If it is consistently shaped by such a theory of the Will as is advocated in this volume, the logical result must be the denial of original sin as well as of the doctrine of the decrees of God; and its strong assertions about depravity and the absolute need of divine grace must be modified in its sense of the Pelagian system. But if it is steadfast to its doctrines upon man's native sinfulness and dependence upon divine grace, it may, on the other hand, modify its speculations about freedom, and come into closer harmony with the unquestionable historical sense of the eighth of its Articles of Religion, entitled *Of Free-Will*, adopted from the Church of England, which declares, that "the condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and works, to faith, and calling upon God; wherefore we have no power to do good works, pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will."

ART. IX.—CRITICISMS ON BOOKS.

THEOLOGY AND BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures, Critical, Doctrinal and Homiletical. By JOHN PETER LANGE, D. D. Vol. I of the New Testament. Matthew, by Lange. Translated with additions. By PHILLIP SCHAFF, D. D. New York: Scribner. 1865. Royal 8 vo., double columns. pp. xxii, 568. We have often spoken of the value of this new and admirable commentary, and of its general plan. The American edition is not only much superior to the Edinburgh, but it also surpasses the German in several particulars. On the Gospel of Matthew, Dr. Schaff has added about one-fourth to the original, chiefly criticism of the text, and exegetical materials. We know that he has worked hard at it, and all his work bears solid fruit. The Edinburgh version has been revised; its omissions supplied; its mistranslations cor-

rected. A good deal of material has been added from English and American works, not noticed in the original. The textual criticism, wholly left out in the Edinburgh edition, has been restored and largely supplemented. Thus, e. g. the Codex Sinaiticus has been compared throughout. On many difficult passages Dr. Schaaf has also supplied a full commentary of his own; especially in cases of peculiar interest to the English student and controversialist. He has likewise enlarged the scope of the "Literature," and introduced references to the chief English and American books and treatises.

We welcome this commentary as, upon the whole, the best single exposition that can be found, comprising all that is essential to a thorough, popular and useful work. Its spirit is evangelical. It treats the Bible as an inspired book; yet it is also critical, meeting and not giving the slip to difficult questions. For textual criticism it affords ample means. Its exegesis is concise and pertinent. The doctrinal and homiletical parts are handled effectively. It is not sectarian, but adapted for use in all denominations. Those who may, here and there, differ from it, will not complain that it is wanting in either candor or learning.

Mr. Scribner deserves the thanks of all our students and ministers for embarking in such times in so costly an enterprise. But we have no doubt he will find it a profitable as well as costly venture. Other portions of the work are in the course of preparation by such scholars as Shedd, Yeomans, Schaffer, Kendrick, Poor, Starbuck, Lillie and Mombert. The volume on Genesis will also be soon translated.

We have alluded to the defects of the Edinburgh edition. It sometimes omits sentences and paragraphs. The critical notes, various readings, and the whole "literature," are left out. It does not note the differences between the English version and Lange's revised text. It also abounds in curious blunders, thus: e. g. 9, p. 316, *Das hierarchische Gemeinwesen*, (the hierarchical communion) is rendered *ecclesiastical nature*; p. 323, it makes *Scripture* instead of *ignorance of Scripture*, to be the source of the errors of Sadducees and Rationalists; p. 318, *Abfall vom Christenthum* (apostasy from Christianity) is rendered *apostasy of Christendom*—not noting the difference between *Christenthum* and *Christenheit*; p. 367, *Beschleunigung des Weltendes* (hastening of the end of the world) is rendered *delay of the end*; *Nachhulen* (to make up for) is rendered *repeat*, as if it were *wiederholen*. P. 357, the translation speaks of the Psalter as a harp with *ten leaves*, instead of ten strings, mistaking *Saiten* for *Seiten*. P. 366, *Das Eine erkaufen um das Viele* (to gain the one thing needful instead of many things) is rendered, *to sell one thing to gain much* (as if it were *verkaufen*). P. 451, the *Wundenmaale* (the stigmata, or scars of the Saviour) is translated, *the meals of wonder*, as if it were *Wundenmahlzeiten*. P. 367, *Ehrsucht* (ambition) is rendered *reverence*, as if it were *Ehrfurcht*: *Allgemeinheit seiner Kirche*, is translated, *the equality*, instead of the *universality* of his church.

Notes on the Book of Genesis, from the Creation to the Covenant. By MELANCTHON W. JACOBUS, D. D., Professor in Allegheny, Pa. New York: Carters, 1865, pp. 304. With a Map. The Notes of Dr. Jacobus on the Gospels and Acts have been widely and profitably used. He now appears in the field of Old Testament criticism, where popular critical helps are more rare and needed. His work indicates a wide range of study, clear method, and reverence for the Scriptures as the inspired word of God. The most important critical questions are taken up in the introduction. The question of the authorship of the book is candidly and satisfactorily

treated. The mythic theory is shown to be inapplicable. The unity of the race is ably and concisely defended against various modern hypotheses. The author seems to think (p. 87) that changes in complexion and constitution may have been "miraculously wrought" at the time of the dispersion from Babel. This is, indeed, possible; but such an hypothesis hardly seems to be necessary. Dr. Jacobus is an earnest advocate of the literal interpretation of the Six Days. In the present state of the question, he seems to us to speak too positively on this point. The able work of Dr. Tayler Lewis on this subject, to which he does not refer, certainly deserves consideration, and has not yet had a formal refutation. Critically speaking, revelation is entitled to whatever aid it may receive from considering this as still an open question. Dr. Jacobus also maintains the strict universality of the deluge. He even seems to imply (p. 174) that a partial deluge could not have answered the object, on "the ground that the population of the globe was *greater then than since*;" while on the next page and elsewhere he gives the population as "probably *less than four millions*." In contending for the impossibility of a partial deluge, he does not notice Hugh Miller's ingenious suggestion of a sudden depression of the earth's surface. Nor is he correct in intimating that the advocates of a partial deluge assert that "God could not" have made it universal (p. 162). The power is not contested; but that such a universal deluge was necessary, is doubted or denied. There are other points on which there will be found differences of interpretation among those who equally hold to the inspiration and authority of the sacred Scriptures. In so concise a work all difficulties cannot be met, nor all the arguments on both sides adduced. But Dr. Jacobus has made a useful and needed book, and discusses these difficult questions in a candid and reverential spirit. It is a work in the right direction, as vindicating the sacred record against plausible objections. Prof. Bush's commentary, and Dr. Turner's Companion to Genesis (to which last our author does not refer) are the only American exegetical works on Genesis for the last forty years. By his clear interpretations, his ardent regard for truth, his wide range of study, and his able defence of many points against objections, Dr. Jacobus will give needed aid to teachers and students of this oldest record of authentic human history.

Christ and His Salvation: in Sermons variously related thereto. By HORACE BUSHNELL. New York: Charles Scribner. 1864.* pp. 456. All of Dr. Bushnell's writings bear the marks of genius and originality. He clothes common themes in new and rich attire; and knows how to extract hidden analogies and open rare veins of thought. Several of the discourses in this collection are quite equal, in point of literary excellence and finish, to any of the previous products of his pen. The one on Christ Asleep is full of the finest shades of reflection, with touches of the tenderest feeling. That on Christian Ability handles a difficult theme with true wisdom. The whole series has respect to Christ and his work; and few writers are so filled with a sense of the reality of the incarnation and the closeness of Christ's personal relation to his followers. This, rather than his special theories, is what attracts so many to his expositions of Christian truth. Theologically speaking, however, we fear that in his general theory of Christ's salvation, he merges the atonement too much in the incarnation; he is so earnest in setting forth the change which Christ works in us, that he neglects to emphasize what Christ has done for us. This appears more particularly in the sermon on Christ Bearing the Sins of Transgressors, though it also comes out in other con-

nctions, and is to be found in his previous works as well. Christ bears the sins of the world, it is said (1) "By that assumption which his love must needs make of it;" (2) "By being incarnated into the state of sin, including all corporate woes of penalty," etc., and (3) "By bearing the direct attack of wrong, or sin, upon his person." And this includes the chief particulars. The idea of any proper expiation for sin, of any satisfaction to the divine justice, seems to us, we regret to say, to be left out of the account, if not formally discarded.

Briefs on Prophetic Themes. By a Member of the Boston Bar. Boston: Dutton & Co. 1864. pp. 112. This little volume will interest students of prophetic Scriptures by its excellent spirit and simple style, as well as by the novelty of some of its theories, being those adopted by several of the Plymouth Brethren. Thus the chief judgments against Babylon are held to be as yet unfulfilled; its final destruction is made coincident with the future restoration of Israel. The symbolic Babylon, again, is not Romanism alone, but all forms of false religion and infidelity. The Jews are to be restored in unbelief, and then persecuted by anti-Christ. Israel and Jerusalem are to be finally exalted, in accordance with God's covenants concerning them.

St. Paul the Apostle; a Biblical Portrait and Mirror of the Manifold Grace of God. By W. F. BESSER, D. D. Translated by F. BULTMANN. With an introduction by J. S. Howson, D. D. New York: Carters. 1864. pp. xiv, 210. Dr. Besser is well known by his valuable *Bible Hours*, which show spiritual insight, derived from a thorough study of the divine word, and confirmed by deep religious experience. His Gospel of John was translated two or three years ago by Mrs. Huxtable. He is a decided Lutheran, and has been kept in the background by his devotion to his principles. Now he is pastor of a small congregation in Silesia. This volume is an admirable exhibition of the life, character and influence of the great Apostle to the Gentiles. On a hacknied theme, the author's thorough studies and vivid imagination enable him to pour new light. The concluding chapters on the Man of Faith, the Man of Hope, the Man of Life, and the Man of the Church, are rich in evangelical instruction. The work has already reached a second edition in Germany. The occasional traces of Lutheran opinion will be but slight hindrances to its general usefulness.

PHILOSOPHY.

Philosophy as an Absolute Science, Founded in the Universal Laws of Being. By E. L. and A. L. FROTHINGHAM. Volume I. Ontology. Boston: Walker, Wise & Co. 1864. pp. xxxiv, 453. This elegant volume contains a new system of fundamental philosophy, a science of the sciences, an exposition of the universal laws of being. It labors under manifest defects as to method; it is wholly untrammelled by the processes and technics of the schools; but it also indicates great force and originality of conception, and has the most far-reaching aims. The author is evidently little versed in previous systems; what he says, for example, of the German speculations is often quite aside of the mark; but he has a theory of his own, which is to solve the problems of thought and being. The whole scheme is to comprise Ontology, Theology and Psychology; only the first is elaborated in the present volume, which in three main parts discourses of the Laws of Absolute Being, and the Form and Nature of the Tri-Personal God as Absolute Creating Cause; of the Laws of Phenomenal Being, and the

Form and Nature of Creation as a Phenomenal Receptive Medium, and of the Law of Tri-Personality and its Application in Analyzing the Structure, Nature and Manifestation of the Universe. An Appendix gives Interpretations of the Symbolism of the Bible and of Heathen Mythology from the point of view of Absolute Science.

Owing to the want of definite arrangement, and too frequent and prolix repetitions, it is somewhat difficult to seize and clearly state the exact scheme of the author. As compared with other systems, his work seems to be a kind of *theosophy*, reminding us of the struggles of Behmen to communicate his incommunicable conceptions, and of some of the speculations of Schelling in the later stage of his philosophical career. The main idea seems to be, that the universe is constituted by two opposite and warring elements—the Male and Female—the Infinite and the Finite—the Good and the Evil: that, in short, the conflict and union of opposites is the law of universal being. These elements are everywhere found. The Infinite Principle, which is perfectly good, the Spirit of Deity, the Holy Ghost—manifests itself as truth, beauty and goodness. The finite Principle is the source of all evil. The union of the two resulted in the production of a divine personality, the Soul of Deity, the second person in the Godhead, or the Father. Then we have the third person of the Godhead, the Son, produced by the external manifestation of the deity. And thus there is a kind of Trinity at the basis of the universe: the law of tri-personality is demanded by philosophy.

Another peculiarity of the scheme is found in the Laws of Correspondences; the absolute science is viewed as a science of correspondences. These are traced out at length in the general forms of the universe, and especially of the human race and the human constitution. The laws of Contrariety and Circularity are also worked out in respect to the State. Art., Transcendentalism, etc.

In some of the practical applications of his principles to the complete subjection of woman to man, and to the lawfulness of bondage, the author runs athwart the prevalent tendencies of the day, and takes rank among the most extreme "conservatives."

His fundamental position of the absolute nature of both the infinite and finite—or in other words, good and evil—strangely borders on the most obnoxious theories in the history of speculation. As soon as the finite is distinctly conceived, it cannot be held to be coeval with the infinite; whenever moral evil is distinctly seen, it cannot be imagined to be equally absolute with the eternal good. And the marriage of these two cannot produce the finite forms of being—for these finite forms are already one of the two, and so can not be the product of both.

Essays: Moral, Political and Aesthetic. By HERBERT SPENCER. New York: Appletons. 1865. pp. 386. The clear, penetrating and critical character of Mr. Spencer's mind shows itself in all that he writes. Few English writers of the present time seem to rivet their attention so fully upon the inner threads of the subject under examination. None of the writers of his school develop their thoughts with such unity and sequence. All his criticisms of special topics are of course controlled by his underlying, materialistic hypothesis; but this obtrudes itself less distinctly in this than in any of his previous volumes. The essay on the Philosophy of Style goes directly and forcibly to the central points. That on Gracefulness is a beautiful exposition of grace as the result of the least effort. That on Personal Beauty ingeniously does away with some of the objections to the theory, that inward and outward excellence so often seem to

be severed. The political topics, Over-Legislation, Representative Government, Parliamentary Reform, etc., are frank and forcible discussions, opening up at each step new veils of reflection. We are promised, by a competent person, a review of his general theory. A thorough and candid discussion of his main hypothesis is very much needed; for his works are attaining a wider authority in this country, than has been conceded to them in England, where, as yet, he hardly has a school.

The Laws of Thought, Objective and Subjective. By ALEXANDER ROBERTSON. London: Longman. 1864. pp. 110. The title of this volume is perhaps broader than its contents justify. It is rather an essay on moral philosophy than on metaphysics; it has more to do with the laws of moral government than with the laws of thought strictly so called. The Objective part of the volume has chief respect to the divine nature and attributes; the Subjective part to man's duties towards God as a moral Governor. It is written in an earnest and reverential spirit.

C. A. Brandis, *Geschichte der Entwicklungen der Griechischen Philosophie.* Band II. Berlin, 1864. This admirable compendium of the history of the Greek and Roman philosophy is now completed, with the exception of some further elucidations and extracts, which are to come out in the author's larger Hand-book of the Greek and Roman Philosophy. This volume discusses, in five divisions, the Epicureans, the Stoic Systems, the Greek Sceptical Philosophy, the Eclectics and Syncretists, and the Neo-platonic system—to the dying out of the Greek and Roman Philosophy in Boethius. The New Platonists take about a fourth of the volume, and particular attention is given to the system of Plotinus. That of Proclus is very concisely treated. A certain inequality in the handling of different schools is justified on the ground that these are adequately expounded in other works. The author shows his wonted mastery of the materials, and candor and ripeness of judgment—giving, with accuracy, the views of each philosopher, and not defining them by any assumed theory of his own. In this and in Ritter's History of Christian Philosophy, we have the best summary of the course and progress of philosophic thought. Both works ought to be translated into English.

Neander's Vorlesungen über Geschichte der christlichen Ethik. Berlin, 1864. These Lectures on the History of Christian Ethics make the 5th Volume of Neander's Theological Lectures, chiefly gathered from the manuscripts of his auditors. This volume is edited by Dr. David Erdmann, General Superintendent of the province of Silesia. The history is brought down only to the close of the 12th century. Christian ethics is defined as the science which derives the laws of human conduct from the nature of Christianity. An admirable statement is given, in the first division, of the relation of the ethics of Christianity to antecedent systems. Then follow the views brought out in the heretical systems, and an account of the special duties and virtues as modified by the Christian system. The same general plan is followed in the other divisions of the work, including the controversies and casuistries of the scholastic divines who had not yet sundered ethics from dogmatics. The work is not only instructive, but it has the peculiar charm of all that Neander wrote—bringing the facts of history and the discussions of the past, home to the conscience and heart, and judging all in the sight of the Christian consciousness. It is interesting, not to the theologian alone, but to all who wish to see the growth and working of Christian ideas, transforming the character of man and the institutions of society. It is well edited.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. By E. H. GILLETT, Author of the "Life and Times of John Huss." 2 vols. Presbyterian Publication Committee, Philadelphia, and for sale by A. D. F. Randolph. This work will everywhere be warmly welcomed by the ministers and intelligent laymen of our branch at least of the Presbyterian church. The delay in bringing it out has enabled the author to add to his materials and give finish and completeness to the history. The Committee have brought it out in a neat and substantial manner.

We congratulate the author and the church on the completion of this long-looked for history. Its need has been long and extensively felt, but every attempt to supply it hitherto has failed. The field was unoccupied: Dr. Hodge's history only brought it down to 1789, and is rather a series of essays on history than a detailed and formal history itself. From that period the author has had to pioneer his way, and this has greatly added to the labor and difficulty of his task. Dr. Gillett's previous studies and his unwearied industry and indomitable resolution, eminently fitted him to write this important history. The task assigned him has been performed with thoroughness, impartiality, and good taste, and we believe the work will very generally be received with favor and become a standard history of the American Presbyterian church.

We shall probably notice this history more fully at a future time, but we note now our general impression of it.

We think the entire history of the Presbyterian church up to 1825 or 1830, shows great and predominating liberality of sentiment, a disposition to fraternize and coöperate as far as possible with other bodies. This is made clear without any special calling of the reader's attention to it by the general course of the history. The manner of the Adopting Act, the welcome to New England men, the basis of the Reunion, the urgent invitation to Suffolk Presbytery, the Plan of Union, the Presbyterianising of the New York Associations, coöperation in the voluntary societies, the representation of New England Associations in the General Assembly, the method of dealing with Rankin, Balch, and others, the silent acceptance for a long period of committee men, the avowed opinions of leading men like Dr. S. S. Smith, Dr. McMillan, Dr. Kollock and many others, the revival spirit of the Virginian especially, and Southern leaders generally—all these things, and others that might be mentioned, seem to mark the contrast between the spirit of American Presbyterianism and that of rigid Scotch ecclesiasticism. Soon after the accession of the Associate Reformed in 1822, we mark a change. A disposition in favor of strict construction manifested itself. Perhaps it had become something of a necessity with the growing self-consciousness of a denomination which had come to occupy an unexpectedly commanding position, as well as on account of the more extended field in which divergence from the Standard or erroneous sentiments threatened unprecedented danger. The New School, perhaps in reaction against strict construction, were driven to the opposite extreme, but precedent was on their side, and the spirit of the early church is manifest most signally in them, clinging as they did to coöperation, till it betrayed their confidence and forced them to give it up.

Still the great body of the history is clear of all controversial aspect. The leading men of the denomination are portrayed. The labors of pioneer missionaries together with their hardships, are set forth. The changes wrought by their zeal and fidelity, and the methods by which

they secured the desired result are brought to view. Facts, fast passing to oblivion, have been rescued, incidents of local as well as general interest have been brought up out of obscurity, and the siftings of volumes of all kinds, missionary records, biographies, state and local histories, and periodicals almost innumerable have been gathered to fill up the naked outline of the history.

We trust the work will receive a patronage worthy of its merits. Dr. Gillett deserves the gratitude of the church for such a labor of love.

Apologia pro Vita Sua: being a Reply to a Pamphlet entitled "*What then does Dr. Newman mean?*" By JOHN HENRY NEWMANN, D. D. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1865. pp. 393. Behold how great a matter a little fire kindleth. Mr. Kingsley, in his haste, said that Father Newman held that "truth, for its own sake, need not be, and on the whole ought not to be, a virtue of the Roman Catholic clergy." When called upon to prove this, he at first tried to throw the burden of proof on the accused; and so a sharp quarrel arose, which has given us, as its result, one of the most interesting and instructive autobiographies in the English language. We have here partly the outward, but chiefly the inward history of one of the ablest Englishmen of the present day, the head and heart of the old Oxford movement. This volume gives us the key to his career, and his changes of opinion, until he arrived safely in the bosom of the Roman Catholic church, since which time, he says, all doubts have passed away. He rests securely upon the rock, St. Peter. The prominent leaders of the Tractarian movement are introduced; and also most of the leading Oxford men of Newman's time. The motives of his conduct, so far as he was conscious of them, are fairly presented. But we presume that most readers of this remarkable volume will wonder, how causes apparently so slight could produce such wide results. The reasons which Dr. Newman gives for his changes seem trivial and superficial. There is an entire want of thorough grappling with the principles. Philosophical reflection had little to do with the result. Nor are there indications of profound religious experience; there is nothing of such religious depth as we find in Augustine, Luther and Calvin. It is amazing to hear the author confess, that as soon as he submitted to the Papacy, all his doubts and difficulties fled, and he found it very easy to receive infallibility, transubstantiation and the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. It looks like magic rather than reason, conscience or religion. The story is well and plausibly told. Mr. Kingsley is refuted with great pertinacity and fatiguing prolixity. The style is perfectly clear and bright. An appendix gives the authorities in favor of the "economy," that is, lying which is not lying. The volume is a good specimen of book-making.

History of the Reformation in Europe in the Time of Calvin. By J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE, D. D. Vol. III. New York: Carters. 1864. pp. 467. This volume narrates the career of Calvin to the time of his writing the Institutes; and the growth of the Reformation in Geneva before Calvin's appearance on the stage there; and also its beginning in the Pays de Vaud. It is issued at an auspicious time, when the third centenary of Calvin's decease has attracted renewed attention to the life and works of this greatest of the Reformers. Dr. d'Aubigné has produced a most interesting and detailed history. He has the rare art of bringing in the most minute incidents, and still keeping up the interest of his readers. Many new facts in respect to Calvin's earlier career are here, for the first time, incorporated into history. The analysis of Cal-

vin's Institutes is a most favorable specimen of the author's power of throwing new light and interest upon a theme usually esteemed dry and technical. No one can read this volume without having a deeper sense of the real greatness of Calvin's character, and of the vast issues at stake in the Genevese reformation. It may not have the general popularity of D'Aubigné's account of Luther and the German Reformation, but it will appeal even more strongly to reflective and studious minds.

Memoirs of Lieut. - General Scott, LL. D. Written by himself. 2 vols. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1864. Few living men have deserved so well of their country as the author of these Memoirs. His life extends through the larger portion of our national history, and in many prominent events he has borne a conspicuous part. He has been acquainted with nearly all the leading men in civil as well as military life, and his reminiscences and graphic details about them give no inconsiderable part of its interest to these frank and welcome volumes. He is entitled to the lasting gratitude of his country for his noble part in the removal of the Indian tribes; for his measures and advice in respect to Nullification in South Carolina; for his wise and pacific policy about our North Eastern boundary; for his splendid Mexican campaign, which put him into the rank of great generals; and for his counsels, unhappily unheeded, in respect to the prevention of the present gigantic rebellion. Though his profession has been that of arms, yet his spirit has always been pacific. A sincere Christian faith hallows his character. Still living in a serene old age, covered with honors, he sends out these interesting volumes, which can not but enliven the spirit of a true Christian patriotism. The work is handsomely got up, and adorned with two likenesses of its author.

History of the Peace: being a History of England from 1816 to 1854. With an Introduction. By HARRIET MARTINEAU. Vols. I and II. Boston: Walker, Wise & Co., 1864. This important work is based upon a History of the Thirty Years' Peace, 1815-1846, commenced by Charles Knight, and completed by Miss Martineau. To the original work, Miss Martineau has prefixed an Introduction, 1800-1815, with a valuable American Preface, and added an entire new Book, bringing the work down to the termination of the Peace by the Russian War. The present work is, therefore, a Complete History of England from 1800 to 1854. It will be completed in four volumes, post 8vo, of about 500 pages each, and brought out in the best style of the celebrated Riverside press. While the work lacks unity, it is an ably written and a most impartial history of this interesting period of English politics and literature. Miss Martineau possesses many admirable qualities for a historian—a clear perception, pains-taking industry, great vigor of thought, a concise style, and remarkable candor. It is written from the stand-point of a thorough "liberal," both in politics and religion, and some allowance must be made for this fact. No part of English history demands a closer study than the period covered by this work, especially to students of democratic institutions. It deserves a place in every library, and will be found a great help in the study of English history and literature in the present century.

The Hand of God in History; or, Divine Providence Historically Illustrated in the Extension and Establishment of Christianity. By HOLLIS REED. 2 vols. New-York: A. A. Constantine. 1864. This is a new and revised edition of a well known and valuable work which has already

had a very extensive sale. The title indicates its scope and purpose, and the author has executed his task with judgment and ability. No one can study the numerous and striking facts here presented and fail to recognize "the Hand of God" as the controlling power in human affairs.

The Days that are Past. By Thomas James Shepherd. Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston, 1864. 12 mo, pp. 191. The excellent Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, in the Northern Liberties of Philadelphia, gives us in this book, got up in superb style by the Publishers, an exceedingly interesting history of the church to which he ministers. During the fifty years of its existence it has been favored with the ministry of the saintly Patterson, the eloquent Carroll, the beloved Ely, and eleven years by the present pastor. In connection with the history of the Church property, sketches of these honored men are given. The record here made, bears a noble "testimony to that exceeding grace of God which through fifty years, has been signally revealed to this church and congregation." May the next fifty years be as fruitful of good as the past! There is much that is highly suggestive and interesting beyond the sphere for which the book was specially intended.

PRACTICAL RELIGIOUS LITERATURE.

Human Sadness. By the COUNTESS DE GASPARIN. New York: Carters, 1864, pp. 273. The themes of these meditations are, Oppressions, Mistakes, Weariness, Decay, Soul-Torture, Beautiful Sadness, Death, the Reason Why. These various forms of Human Sadness are presented, with a deeply sympathising spirit, in the light of the Gospel, and in relation to its abundant consolations. The book has to do with the problems of feeling, rather than with those of thought. It is written in so earnest a spirit, and with such tenderness, that it will find its way like a balm to many a wounded spirit.

The Martyrs of Spain and the Liberators of Holland. New York. Carters, 1864, pp. 400.—*The Cripple of Antioch and other Scenes from Early Christian Times.* pp. 426. Same publishers. These two books are by the well-known author of the *Schonberg-cotta Family*, which has obtained such a celebrity. One of her earlier works was, *The Voice of Christian Life in Song*, containing translations of many admirable Greek and Latin hymns, etc. This is also published by Mr. Carter. These two new volumes show the same skill in delineating characters and events, the same power of re-animating the past, the same knowledge of all the phases of Christian experience, which are found in her other volumes. The first work is upon the Martyrs of Spain, and the liberation of Holland. The second is on scenes and characters in early Christian history. No English writer has done so much to clothe the history and struggles of Christianity in a style attractive to all classes of readers.

The Forty Days after our Lord's Resurrection. By Rev. WILLIAM HANNA, LL. D. New York: Carter & Brothers, 1864. Dr. Hanna's "Life of Chalmers" is admired by all who have read it, and his "Last Days of our Lord's Passover" is a work of fine and reverent genius; so that the present volume is sure to find many delighted and profited readers. The topics are, The Resurrection, the Appearance to Mary Magdalene, The Journey to Emmaus, The Evening Meeting, The Incredulity of Thomas, The Lake-Side of Galilee, Peter and John, The Great Commission, and The Ascension; and these themes are handled with admirable

skill, by one whose pen is ever full of the aroma of the Cross, and commands the choicest stores of language.

God's Way of Holiness. By HORATIUS BONAR, D. D., author of "God's Way of Peace," "Hymns of Faith and Hope," &c. Carter & Brothers. 1864. Few religious writers are more widely and favorably known than is the author of this little work. Its clear statement of doctrine, its warm devotional spirit, and its thoroughly evangelical character, will make it a welcome and profitable companion in the closet and the family.

The Hour which Cometh and Now is: Sermons preached in Indiana-Place Chapel, Boston. By JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE. Boston: Walker, Wise & Co., 1864. pp. 348. There is eloquence in these sermons, a genuine, soul-stirring patriotism, but very little theology of any kind, and none of the evangelical spirit or teaching. The author is so intensely "liberal" as to reject not only all religious creeds and dogmas but the obvious sense of Scripture. The plainest facts are liberalized to mean anything or nothing. The "Resurrection is a rising up of the good into love, a rising up of the evil into truth." "The hour cometh and now is, when Christian doctrine shall be redeemed from the Jewish and Pagan errors which have clung to it, and so be brought back to the simplicity of Christ, when men shall no more be afraid of God, as though he were angry, and had to be appeased by a bloody sacrifice; no more be driven from their dear Father by Pagan doctrines concerning his need of some expiatory victim, before he can forgive his children. They will no more be taught that man is all corrupt and evil—nothing but sin; they will be taught to see in every soul something good; something allied to God, some conscience, some heart, something of holy fire lingering under the ashes of vice and sin." These are fair specimens of the teachings of the book so far as they bear on man's spiritual nature. Christianity thus robbed of all that is vital and distinctive has no redeeming element in it; it is no longer "the power of God and the wisdom of God unto salvation." It is sad to see so much talent thus misapplied.

Life Lessons in the School of Christian Duty. By the author of "The Life and Times of John Huss." New York, A. D. F. Randolph. 1864. 12mo. pp. 407. Very different is the atmosphere of this book from that of the preceding one. The author, Dr. Gillett, has won golden opinions by his history of the Bohemian Reformation, and as a fertile writer in our periodical literature. He here appears in a new field, the pulpit, discoursing familiarly and earnestly on the great themes of Christian doctrine and duty. "The aim of the volume is practical throughout." The sermons are short, pithy, direct, and often solemn and forcible. Our social relations and responsibilities are shown in the clear and certain light of scripture truth. We commend the volume as eminently adapted to quicken Christians in their duty. The publisher has given the book a fine appearance. The author and the benevolent parishoner who has been the means of bringing it out, will not lose their reward.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

An American Dictionary of the English language. By NOAH WEBSTER, LL. D. Thoroughly revised and greatly enlarged and improved, by C. A. GOODRICH, D. D., LL. D., and NOAH PORTER, D. D. Springfield, Mass. G. C. Merriam. 1864. 4to. pp. lxxii, 1768. With 3000 Engravings. In the preparation of this new edition of Webster's Dictionary, no pains

have been spared to make it the most complete and useful Dictionary of the English language. It is about thirty years since Dr. Webster completed his great labors, and English lexicography has since advanced at an unprecedented rate. This edition has been in the course of preparation for more than five years; and full thirty years of literary labor, by highly competent scholars, have been devoted to it. The Vocabulary has been enlarged, so that it now contains upwards of 114,000 words, being 10,000 more than are found in any other lexicon. Rejecting self-explaining compound words, and words so obsolete or technical that they are seldom or never used, all terms are retained which can fairly claim a place. As the English is still a growing language, there must be in every new lexicon some new words or new significations of old terms. The Etymology has been thoroughly revised, under the charge of Dr. C. A. F. Mahn, of Berlin; so that, though much remains to be done in this direction, it is here presented more carefully and fully than in any previous work. Able scholars in this country and Europe are now at work in this field, and before many years we shall doubtless have a tolerably complete etymological dictionary of our language; but for the present this edition of Webster must take the lead.

The Definitions of Dr. Webster have always had the highest reputation; and the present edition improves in this respect upon the previous ones. The order of the definitions is, in many instances, changed so as to give the literal sense first and then the derived. Numerous extracts have also been added from the best writers. No one can consult the work without profit on this score; though there is here, too, an endless field, and, of course, a great variety of usage. Hamilton, we see, is largely used, and rightly too, for philosophical terms. But Mansel's definition of *Personality* ("as we can conceive it, it is essentially a limitation and a relation") represents the view of a special philosophical tendency, and is, on the face of it, inconsistent with the ascription of personality to God. A learned friend has pointed out to us the definition of *Temeration*, as *temerity*—Jeremy Taylor being cited as authority; but he uses the word in the sense of *stained, polluted* (derived from *temero*). The same friend criticizes the definition of citizen—"one who has the privilege of voting," etc.—as too narrow: it is not the American sense or usage. But these are slight points compared with the general fullness and accuracy of the definitions.

Among the other points that give pre-eminence to this work are the careful revision of the Pronunciation, with a full list of Words differently pronounced, and Dr. Goodrich's able paper on the Principles of Pronunciation; a Table of differing Orthographies, with Mr. Wright's Rules for spelling certain classes of words; and the addition of a list of Synonyms to the most important words. Some 3000 pictorial illustrations are incorporated in the work, and are much better than verbal descriptions. Mr. Wheeler's Vocabulary of Names of Fictitious Persons and Places is a novel attempt, and very successful. Besides this, we have a Pronouncing Vocabulary of Scripture Names, of Greek and Latin Names, of Modern Geographical and Biographical Names, of English Christian Names; a select list of Quotations and Phrases from various languages; Abbreviations and Contractions; Arbitrary Signs in Writing and Printing; and Ancient, Foreign, and Remarkable Alphabets. Nor must we omit to commend Professor Hadley's excellent Brief History of the English Language.

This great work is an honor to American scholarship. It is a monu-

ment of careful and protracted labor. On the whole it is now the most complete Dictionary of the English Language. Those engaged in it, and foremost among them that accomplished scholar, Professor Noah Porter, are to be congratulated for their high success in a laborious undertaking. And the publishers have shown great efficiency and a laudable ambition, in producing a work which, on the score of typographical clearness and compression, and whatever goes to make a convenient and elegant book, stands foremost among the productions of modern book-making.

The Isizulu. A Grammar of the Zulu Language: accompanied with a Historical Introduction. By Rev. Louis GROUT, Missionary of the American Board. Natal: printed by J. C. Buchanan at Umsundusi. 1859. 8vo. pp. lii, 432. Our missionary gives us better fruits of his sojourn in South Africa than those we have received from Bishop Colenso. This volume strikingly illustrates one of the subsidiary advantages of Christian missions, in promoting linguistic research. The philologist will find topics of rare interest in examining the structure of this curious language, and in comparing it with others. An appendix gives, in the original and in translations, noteworthy specimens of the Zulu literature. The Introduction is a valuable disquisition on the history of the Amazulu, and a comparison of their language with that of their neighbors. The Standard Alphabet of Dr. Lepsius is fully explained and applied. The Orthography, Etymology, and Syntax are treated at length. There is one speciality in the character of the inflections in the Zulu language; most of the modifications are found at the beginning instead of at the end of the word. Thus; *Umfana* (boy) makes its plural *abafana*; the plural of *izwi* (word) is *amazwi*. The same is the case with the adjectives; *umfana omkulu*, large boy; plural, *abafana abakulu*, large boys; *amazwi amakulu*, large words, etc. The alphabet contains 32 letters; the letters are divided into vowels, consonants, and *clicks*—sharp sounds, unknown as a part of human speech, except in South Africa; they are divided into *dental*, *palatal*, and *lateral clicks* or *clacks*. The volume is admirably printed in clear type. It makes a book of unusual philological value, and gives Mr. Grout a high place in linguistic literature. The author, we are glad to learn, is about to publish a work entitled "Zululand, or Life among the Zulu-Kafirs of Natal" etc. It will be issued by the Presbyterian Board.

The Negro Problem Solved: or, Africa as she Was, as she Is, and as she Shall Be. Her Curse and her Cure. By HOLLIS REED. New York: A. A. Constantine 12mo, pp. 418. 1864. The title of this book is a little too ambitious. No finite mind is as yet equal to the task of solving this problem—certainly one of the greatest and most difficult which at present taxes human intellect. The theme of the book is, however, of peculiar and intense interest at the present time. God himself, it would seem, is fast solving the problem in connection with the greatest war of modern times. The author does little more than present the workings and results of Providence in the past and present history and condition of Africa and her races. While the volume shows some haste in preparation, it yet contains a mass of facts, many of them new to the majority of readers, and all of them bearing more or less directly on the future of Africa. With no nation on earth has God dealt more wonderfully and mysteriously than with this; and judging from the analogies of Providence, a bright and signal destiny is in store for her. The solution of the problem, according to our author, is to be found in voluntary colonization, in

the development of an African nationality, and in the influence of commerce, and especially of Christianity; and this part of the work is of special interest and value. We warmly commend the work as a timely and valuable contribution towards solving a problem, in interest and importance second to none which now agitates the world. Mr. Constantine, the publisher, was for years a Baptist missionary to Africa, and is himself thoroughly informed in regard to her present condition and the demands of the times upon the friends of this long-abused land and race.

Queens of Song: being Memoirs of some of the most celebrated Female Vocalists who have performed on the Lyric Stage from the Earliest Days of Opera to the Present time. To which is added a Chronological List of all the Operas that have been performed in Europe. By ELLEN CREATHORNE CLAYTON. With Portraits of Mrs. Billington, Madame Pasta, Madame Sontag, Madame Garcia Malibran, Madame Giulia Grisi, Madame Clara Novello, Madame Viardot Garcia, Madame Marietta Alboni, Madame Jenny Lind Goldschmidt, and Madame Marietta Piccolomini. Harpers. 1865. 8vo pp. 543. We give the title in full of this beautiful book as the best description of its character. The lovers of song will be delighted with it. The author has executed her task well. She gives us brief but lively sketches of thirty-nine women who have obtained great celebrity in the musical world during the last 150 years. While she does full justice to their queenly qualities as singers, she does not attempt to hide or palliate their womanly weaknesses and frailties, where the truth demanded the record. The book is a fitting companion to the "Queens of Society" and similar works published by the same house. "An instructive moral may be gathered" from it, as well as entertainment.

Real and Ideal. By J. W. MONTCLAIR. Philadelphia: Frederick Leopoldt. New York: Hurd and Houghton. 1865. A small book of poetry, elegantly printed. The poems are short, some of them only tolerable, while others possess considerable poetic merit.

Crusoe's Island: A Ramble in the Footsteps of Alexander Selkirk, with Sketches of Adventure in California and Washoe. By J. ROSS BROWNE. Harpers: 1864. The author has achieved quite a reputation in this line. The present work is crowded with incidents, some of them thrilling and horrible enough to satisfy the intensest curiosity, mingled with graphic description of scenery and travel. The fame of "Robinson Crusoe" is sure to make this book popular.

Egypt's Princes. A narrative of Missionary Labor in the Valley of the Nile. By Rev. GULIAN LANSING, missionary of the United Presbyterian Church in Egypt. New York: Carter and Brothers. 1865. This volume is well illustrated and in good style. The contents of it are unusually interesting and exciting for a work of its kind. It does not profess to give a complete view of missionary operations in Egypt, but only one feature of it. In September, 1860, this mission—located at Alexandria and Cairo—purchased a Nile-boat, for the purpose of facilitating the work of the mission in Upper Egypt, where the Copts mainly reside. This volume contains the record of this novel experiment, and is accordingly full of stirring narrative and exciting personal adventure. No book of Nile-travels could be more interesting to the general reader, while the friend of missions will have his heart warmed and cheered by such a record of missionary zeal and success in that land of wonders and darkness. "In Alexandria and Cairo," says the author, "we have had committed to our care large numbers of young, impressible souls; and in training them in

our schools as well as in the regular services of the sanctuary we have spent years of toil. We have been digging deep, and laying broad and firm the foundations, while our enemies have said, 'What do these feeble ones? If a fox go up he shall even break down their stone-wall.' Under the mask of patience and hope we have labored on, and at length God in his providence has removed the mask, and our enemies see with confusion that a deep trench has been dug and a solid breastwork built in front of their very citadels; and late reports from Cairo show that a strange, mysterious light from heaven is playing about our ramparts which attracts to it all eyes. This, the work of years in these great cities, I have not undertaken to describe; I have only attempted to give a view of the beginnings of a great work in the whole land of Egypt."

Diary of Mrs. Kitty Trevelyan. A story of the times of Whitfield and the Wesleys, with a Preface by the Author. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1865. The Author of this work has achieved a reputation as sudden and great as it is deserved. It is only a year since she first became known in this country through the Schönberg Cotta-Family, published first by M. W. Dodd, and afterwards by T. Nelson and Son. No book of its kind was ever a greater success. Combining the dramatic interest and excitement of a romance with the solid worth of history, it has been read and admired by a very large number. That was followed some months since by *The Early Dawn*, and now we have the third volume from this gifted pen. The other works by the same author, republished here, are her earlier productions. We need only add, that the last work strikingly resembles the Cotta-Family in its essential features, and we doubt not will be as eagerly read in ten thousand households.

From Dan to Beersheba; or, The Land of Promise as it now Appears. By Rev. J. P. Newman, D.D. Harper & Brothers. 1864. Another popular work on Palestine, and a valuable one to the students of sacred history. The author traveled extensively in the Holy Land recently, and took special pains to gather the most accurate and the latest knowledge of whatever relates to its boundaries, topography, agriculture, antiquities, cities and present inhabitants, and to verify on the spot the accuracy of the sacred writers in their allusions to their native country. The maps and numerous illustrations add to the value of the work.

Arizona and Sonora: the Geography, History and Resources of the Silver Region of North America. By SYLVESTER MOWRY. Harpers. A valuable work on the subject by one who understands more of it probably than any other man. Two editions of this book have been printed and sold chiefly in California. It is now revised and enlarged by the author, and published by the Harpers in this city.

Arctic Researches, and Life among the Esquimaux: being the narrative of an expedition in search of Sir John Franklin in the years 1860-62. By CHARLES FRANCIS HALL. With maps and 100 illustrations. 8 vo. pp. 595. Harpers. 1865. The enterprising Publishers merit praise and a large patronage for the character and style of their issues in this department of literature. Their several works of travel and exploration in Africa and other countries, have involved an immense outlay, and an appreciative public, we believe, will reward their enterprise. The present work is full of exciting interest. Captain Hall, it will be remembered, commanded the "Grinnell Expedition," sent out from this country four years since in the fruitless attempt to ascertain the fate of Franklin's party. Hope is still alive in the breast of our indomitable

countryman, and on the very day he wrote the last pages of this volume, he started on a new expedition, sanguine that success will finally crown his labors. The illustrations are remarkably well executed.

Under the Ban. (Le Maudit.) A tale of the Nineteenth Century. Translated from the French of M. l'Abbé * * *. Harpers. 1864. We are glad to see this work in English, and the three volumes brought into one of reasonable size. In some respects it is a remarkable work, and has produced no little sensation in France. It purports to be written by a French Catholic priest, and aims to expose the despotism and wickedness of the hierarchy. It is the experience of certain priests, who, for preaching a purer doctrine and life than do the mass of the Romish priesthood, were interdicted by their superiors and persecuted in every form. It is a dark picture. It details some new aspects of French clerical life. An excellent review of *Le Maudit*, and *La Religieuse*, which is but the sequel to the first, may be found in the *Eclectic* for February, copied from the *Edinburgh Review*.

Margaret Denzil's History. Annotated by her husband. A Novel. No. 247, Harpers' Library of Select Novels. 1864. A singular story, full of mystery and tragic interest; but not altogether healthy in tone.

MISCELLANEOUS.

PROF. TAYLER LEWIS'S *State Rights: A Photograph from the Ruins of Ancient Greece*. Albany: pp. 96 is the most instructive parallel that has yet been drawn in respect to our own contest. "Autonomy" led to the results in Greece, which State Rights will do in our land. The doctrine that we are essentially one nation is ably advocated on historical and rational grounds. We are glad to hear that the author intends to pursue the subject farther. No one can better do a most needed work.

Harpers' New Monthly Magazine began its 30th volume with the December number. It is deservedly the most popular magazine in the land. Besides its usual variety, it will contain serials by Wilkie Collins, Charles Dickens, and others. We should like it still more if due credit were always given for matter borrowed from other magazines. Thus in the last number (January) at least two of the illustrations and the accompanying letter-press are literal reprints from English monthlies, without acknowledgment.

The Eclectic Magazine, (January, W. H. Bidwell, New York,) begins a New Series with the year. For more than twenty years this monthly has furnished to its readers the best part of English periodical literature, and considerable from the French and German. Familiar with it from its first number to its last issue, we unhesitatingly commend it, as furnishing more valuable literature for the price than can be had in any other form. It appears now in a new dress, as it has attained to ripe manhood, and gives evidence of renewed vigor and increased attraction for those who would possess the best thoughts of the best writers of the Old World.

The Presbyterian Publication Committee (Philadelphia, and A. D. F. Randolph, New York), send us *The Shepherd of Bethlehem*, King of Israel. By A. L. O. E.; and *Stories from Jewish History*, by the same; excellent books for juveniles, in the family and in the Sunday-school. Also, *The Communion Week: Save Souls*, by Richard Baxter; *The Work of the Christian Church*; Dr. Brainerd's sterling Tract on *Profanity*, and the

Soldier's Scrap-Book, all good. These, with other and larger recent and prospective issues, indicate that our Publication Committee is now fairly and efficiently at work.

The Grahams. By JANE GAY FULLER. M. W. Dodd. 1864. A sensible and healthy book for juveniles. Add it to your Sunday-school library.

The Reconstruction of States, in a letter of MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS to Senator Lane, is a bold and sensible pamphlet, vindicating the course of Louisiana in her free State action, and animadverting on the action of Congress and the protest of Senators Wade and Davis relating to it. It will be read with interest.

Debates of the Fiscal Convention. New York: 1865. 8vo. pp. 90. An exceedingly able discussion of the Finance Question, by one who is a master of the subject. In the form of Debates in open Convention, the various theories of currency are passed in review, and the views of the writer are clearly and forcibly presented. These views differ materially from the current views which prevail, and are opposed to the policy and interests of those who are striving to keep up the price of gold; but they are sensible and sound nevertheless, and will carry conviction to the minds of most persons who will be at the pains to read them.

ART. X.—THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE. GERMANY.

The 13th Evangelical Church Diet of Germany has been held in the ancient city of Altenburg, and was largely occupied with a discussion of the recent Lives of Jesus by Renan and Strauss, with references to Schenkel. This discussion was participated in by Profs. Beyschlag, of Halle, Köstlin, of Breslau, Dr. Liebner, of Dresden, Hofman, of Berlin, Tischendorf, and De Pressensé, of Paris, (just on his way to Paris from his journey in the East), who all concurred in saying, that while the Gospel has nothing to fear in the end from these assaults, yet that they call on the defenders of Christianity to elaborate the life of Jesus more definitely and fully from the human side so as to deepen our sense of its reality.

Dr. Kahnis, of Dresden, devotes the second volume of his Lutheran Dogmatics to a concise and able review of the history of Christian Doctrines; still maintaining those views of the inspiration of the Scriptures, the nature of the Lord's Supper (anti-Lutheran), and the subordination of Christ, which aroused such a spirited controversy upon the publication, three years since, of the first volume of his work.

Prof X. Schmid has written a work on Nicholas Taurellus, rector of the University of Altdorf, in the Reformation century, claiming for him the credit of being the first genuine German philosopher; since he was a sharp opponent of the Aristotelian scholasticism, and insisted that metaphysics should be built upon a new basis. Leibnitz and Wolf owed to him many of their definitions and distinctions. He contended warmly for the reconciliation of faith and knowledge. In him is another example of how much Bavaria has done for philosophy; Hegel taught eight years in Nuremberg; Fichte was for a time at Erlangen, and Schelling there gave his first academic lectures. Leibnitz was for a time

in Altdorf and Nuremberg. Descartes began his system while he was a soldier in Neuburg on the Danube.

Dr. H. L. Ahrens, of Hanover, in his recent work on the *Office of the Keys*, interprets the Keys (Matth. xvi: 19), not as a symbol of opening the gate of heaven, but of a householder over the blessings of the Gospel, with the power and duty of imparting these to others; the power of "binding and loosing" refers to the function of interpreting the law. The author is a philologist, and not a theologian by profession, and brings illustrations of his views from classical as well as from Christian antiquity, also exhibiting at length the opinions of the reformers, and of the Lutheran Church.

An edition of the Hebrew Masora, under the title, *Das Buch Ochlach Wochlah*, by Dr. S. Frensdorff, has been published at Hannover; price 2½ thlr., making this important work generally accessible. A manuscript of the imperial library at Paris is used for comparison.

A new edition of Melancthon's *Loci Communes* has been published by G. L. Plitt. The cheap edition of 1860, by Volheding, is very defective—whole lines being sometimes omitted, and more than 70 passages deviating from the original.

Schleiermacher's Lectures on the Life of Jesus, delivered at various times, 1819 to 1838, have been published, edited by K. A. Ruterik. They appear at a time when they will excite fresh interest, in consequence of the recent works of Renan, Schenkel, and Strauss. Dr. Jonas, the chief editor of Schleiermacher's remains, was not able to get students' manuscripts of sufficient accuracy to edit the work; for Schleiermacher left only some slight memoranda. But Herr Ruterik procured a full one of the year 1832, and has executed his task of combining the different manuscripts with commendable fidelity. He promises a supplementary volume, giving a comparison of the author's views as propounded in different years. With all his critical skill, Schleiermacher's reverence for the person of Christ kept him from going to the extremes of later writers.

Gregory of Nyssa's charming dialogue on the Soul and Resurrection, fashioned after Plato's *Phaedon*, has been well done into German by Dr. Herm. Schmidt, Halle.

John Huber, a Catholic philosopher, author of a work on *Erigena*, has published a treatise on *Immortality*.

The Dictionary of the Grimms is to be continued by two competent scholars, R. Hildebrand and K. Weigand. The first part of the fifth volume is out, edited by Hildebrand, comprising K. to Kartenbild. G. H. I. are not yet published. These will be edited by Weigand.

The romanizing tendency of some Lutheran ministers is seen in a work published by W. O. Deitlein; *The evangelical Ave Maria*, devoted to the praise of the Virgin.

Dr. Geffeken of Hamburg has recently found a copy of a treatise of Joachim Jungins, a divine of the 17th century, on the Original Language of the New Testament. It is a small pamphlet of 29 pages. Jungins was a very able writer—so able that Humboldt, Goethe, and Schelling compare him with Bacon and Leibnitz. His biography was first published in 1850. Dr. Avé Lallemand also published a work on him in 1863. The above work was called out by the noted controversy about the purity of the New Testament Greek, and was written in 1637.

Prof. Theodore Waits of Marburg died May 20, 1864, aged 43 years. He wrote a work on the Foundations of Psychology, 1846; *Text Book of Psychology*, 1849; on *Pædagogics*, 1852. His chief works on which he

labored for many years before his death, was Anthropology of the Native Races; the 4th volume was published last year.

The *Zeitschrift f. die Lutherische Theologie*. Heft IV. 1864, contains an account by Delitzsch of the services of Jacob Fabri of Deventer, in the textual criticism of the New Testament as shown in the Codex Fabri; Volbehr on the Rich Man and Lazarus; Köhler on the Descent of Christ to Hades, defending the common Lutheran doctrine; and the usual full review of theological works, which is one of the main features of this periodical.

The fourth part of the *Zeitschrift f. die historische Theologie*, 1864, is wholly taken up with the continuation and conclusion of Rippold's learned and thorough account of the life, doctrine, and sect of David Joris of Delft, the fanatical Anabaptist, who claimed to be David Christ, and was driven from Delft and for a long time lived under an assumed name, John von Bruck (or Buügge) in Basle, where he died in 1554. He claimed that God had revealed himself by three human persons, Moses, Christ, and David Joris. This sketch clears up many points about his career and is one of the most curious and instructive pieces of heretical biography. Gieseler gives a slight sketch of David's libertine and enthusiastic views, in his Church History, vol. 4, pp. 313 and 353.

Zeitschrift f. exakte Philosophie Band V. 1864. Hefte 1. 2. This periodical advocates the principles of the Herbart school, and is conducted with ability by Allihn and Ziller. G. Schilling contributes a clear account of Herbart's reforms in Psychology; Geyer on the Doctrine of Contract in relation to the theory of the State; Drobisch an able review of the different applications of the terms Idealism and Realism in philosophy; Thilo on the Philosophy of Religion in the system of Leibnitz; Allihn on Herbart's Ethics.

FRANCE.

Revue Chrétienne. Sept., Oct. 1861. L. Rognon on the Religious Crisis, in relation to Guizot's recent work. L. Ruffet, a valuable account of Peter Paul Verger, bishop of Capo d'Istria, who gave up place and power in the reformation century, and became an exile and did much for truth. The first full biography of him was published by Sixt of Nuremberg, 1855. There is an interesting account of him in Mrs. Young's Life of Paleario, published in London in 1860. Casalis de Fondouce contributes an interesting lecture on the Antiquity of Man. This subject is continued in the October number, with special relation to the antiquity of man. The author gives the calculations of an Italian professor—according to which, putting the present population of the world at 1,300,000,000 and allowing the annual increase to be 1-292, it is shown that the present population would be reached in 5,863 years. This is putting the annual increase at a low figure: in France it is 1-227 annually. Calculated on the latter basis, the present numbers would be attained in 4,207 years from Noah, allowing that he left the ark with three sons and three daughters. The other articles are De Pressensé on the late German Church Diet giving his own speech in full, and Durand's review of Guibal's Poem on the Albigenian Crusade.

Schools in France, 1863; 82,135 for primary instruction, with 4,731,946 scholars. Of these schools, 41,476 are public and free schools for boys, or mixed as to sex; 37,895 being taught by lay-teachers and 3,531 by ecclesiastics. There are also 26,592 schools for girls, 13,491 directed by laymen, and 13,101 by "sisters." There are 3,162 infant schools. Average salary of male teachers, 800 francs; of female 600.

Didot's edition of Stephani's *Thesaurus Græcæ Linguae* is now complete in 8 vols.

The Abbé Brasseur de Bourbourg has gone to Yucatan to make new explorations, aided by an architect for the drawings.

H. Wallon of the Institute has published in 2 volumes, a work on "*Richard II. of England, an Episode of the Rivalry of France and England.*" He defends Richard against the current reproaches, partly on the basis of new documents, gathered in France.

Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne. Sept. Viscount de Rougé on the New Discoveries in the History of Egypt; Abbé Dedone, History of the Monastery of Lerins; Henri de Riancey, the Oriental Origin of the European Races; Jules Mohl, of the Institute, Progress in Oriental Studies; Tamizey de Larroque on the question Whether Chrysostom was in the habit of reading the Comedies of Aristophanes, vindicating him from this aspersion; Coste on Spontaneous Generation.

The *Correspondance Littéraire* gives from the Alsatian Bibliography extracts from an article by Kopp, showing that Foucher de Careil's new edition of the works of Leibnitz contains numerous and unscholarly instances of mis-translation. He renders, e.g. *Sylva Ducia* (Bois-le Duc) by Sedan.

ENGLAND.

Did Bacon write the "Paradoxes?" Rev. A. B. Groshart, editor of Dr. R. Sibbes's Works (7 vols. in Nichol's Standard Puritan Divines) sends a communication to the *Notes and Queries*, Sept. 17, 1864, saying that he has cleared up the long disputed question as to the authorship of the *Paradoxes*, usually ascribed to Bacon. Spedding admits them into his new edition of Bacon's works; but under protest. Mr. Groshart has succeeded in finding the original in the *Memorials of Godliness and Christianity*, by Herbert Palmer, B. D., Master of Queen's College, Cambridge, first published in 1644-5. Palmer there says, that the portion of his work which contained the *Paradoxes* had been surreptitiously published in 1643. In 1648 it was inserted in the *Remains of Bacon*. Palmer died in 1647; he was born in 1601; was appointed in 1644 Master of Queen's College; was a member of the Assembly of Westminster—an eminent scholar, a fearless patriot, a devout and humble man. The thirteenth edition of his *Memorials* was published in 1708.—In Basil Montagu's edition of Bacon, vol. vii, pp. xxvi to xl, the question of the authorship of the *Paradoxes* is discussed at length.

A new and greatly enlarged edition of the writings of Charles Lamb (*Elia*) is announced by Moxon & Co. A subscription is also in progress for erecting a monument to his memory.

In the year 1831, the circulation of papers in the United Kingdom was 38,648,314. In the year 1864, the circulation had risen to 546,059,400, being an increase of no less than 13·13 per cent. In the year 1831, the circulation of the weekly and monthly magazines and periodicals was under 400,000. In the year 1864, the number has risen to 6,094,950. In the year 1818, the whole number of scholars in England and Wales was 674,883, or 1 in 17 of the population. In the year 1861, there were 2,535,462 scholars, or one in 6·4 of the population.

Professor Jowett is preparing a work on Plato in three volumes. It will contain a history of the earlier Greek systems, an analysis of all the Platonic Dialogues, and a translation of the Republic.

A work on Spiritual Philosophy, founded on the teachings of Coleridge,

by Joseph Henry Green, edited with a biographical Introduction by John Simon, is announced by Macmillan; also a new edition of McCosh's *Intuitions of the Mind*.

The London Quarterly Review No 45, Oct. contains: 1. Laws and Penalties; 2. British North American Colonies; 3. Calvin and the Reformation; 4. Madame de Sevigné; 5. Life in Java; 6. Mr. Kingsley and Dr. Newman; 7. Enoch Arden; 8. Miller's Lectures on Language; 9. The Wesleyan Conference.

The Christian Remembrancer, Oct., 1864. No. 126: 1. Influence of the Ancient Régime on Modern France; 2. Trinity College, Toronto; 3. Father Mathew; 4. Subscription to Formularies; 5. Theodore Parker; 6. Scrivener's Codex Bezae; 7. Dr. Manning; 8. The *Filioque* Controversy; 9. New Books and Pamphlets.

British and Foreign Evangelical Review, October. St. Patrick; Christian Church and Social Improvement; Smith's Dictionary of the Bible; Bishop Mackenzie and African Missions; Relics of the Glacial Period in Britain; Dr. Newman; Authorship of the Pentateuch, by Prof. Bartlett; Intelligence, &c. The article on Smith's Dictionary is chiefly a criticism of Stanley on the Septuagint.

British Quarterly Review, October, 1864. William the Conqueror; Hansel's Greek Testament; The Dolomite Mountains; Chevallier's Mexico; Our Foreign Policy; Mind and Brain; Knight's Autobiography; Tennyson's Poetry; Projected Reforms in Germany.

Those two able works by a Layman of the Church of England, against Colenso, entitled *The Historic Character of the Pentateuch, and the Mosaic Origin of the Pentateuch*, are by a Mr. Skeffington.

King Alfred's Anglo-Saxon Version of Boëthius *De Consolatione* has been published with an English Version and Notes, by Rev. Samuel Fox.

The Journal of Sacred Literature, Oct. 1864: Israel in Egypt; The Tree of Life, from the German of Dr. Piper; the Rich Man and Lazarus; Analogy between the Apocalypse of the Old Testament and that of the New; Cuneiform Inscriptions; Hebrew Chronology; Encomium of Martyrs, by Eusebius, from the Syriac; Correspondence, etc.

UNITED STATES.

In the *New-Englander* for October, Prof. George P. Fisher, of New Haven, continues his discussion of the Conflict with Skepticism and Unbelief, examining the Recent Discussions on the Origin of the First Three Gospels. These articles, with those he has published in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, and his examination of Baur in our Review last year, ought to be collected in a volume. They are candid and able, and they are on topics of permanent as well as present interest.

The Christian Examiner (Unitarian) for November has a strong protest against Miss Beecher's Pelagianism, as set forth in her recent book on the *Religious Training of Children*. It says that Pelagianism, as "a system adequate to solve the hard problems of existence, to satisfy either the heart or the intellect, and bring man into God's profound and sufficing peace, has always been found wanting, and will always continue to be;" that "it discharges the fundamental facts of the Gospel of their vital import;" that it "has no basis in the facts of life." "The party of Augustine did not prevail over the party of Pelagius, because the former happened to outvote the latter, but because human nature, searched under the blaze of Gospel light, becomes conscious of troubles and wants, which Pelagianism cannot reach with its shallow soundings."

ART. XI.—COLLEGE RECORD.

By E. F. HATFIELD D. D., New York City.

HONORARY DOCTORATES IN 1864.

June 2, Adrian Coll., Mich.,	D. D., C. Prindle,	W. M.,
16, Illinois Coll., Ill.,	do Knoch Miller,	C., Liverpool, Eng.
22, Rutgers Coll., N. J.,	do Alphonso A. Willets,	R. D., Brooklyn, N. Y.
do do do	do Eugene A. Hoffman,	P. E., Elizabeth, N. J.
do do do	do Samuel M. Hamill,	P., Lawrenceville, N. J.
do do do	do James R. Talmadge,	R. D., Chittenango, N. Y.
do do do	do L. L. D., Hon. Henry C. Murphy,	Brooklyn, N. Y.
Ingham Univ., N. Y.,	D. D., William L. Parsons,	C., Mattapoisett, Mass.
do do do	do Josiah Crofts,	Eng.
23, Univ. of City of N. Y.,	do Hiram P. Arms,	C., Norwich, Ct. 1
do do do	do Philip Phelps, Jr.,	R. D., Holland, Mich.
do do do	do William P. Breed,	P., Philadelphia, Pa.
do do do	do Robt. Russell Booth,	P., New York City, N. Y.
do do do	do John H. Manning,	Brooklyn, N. Y.
do do do	do John R. Adams,	C., U. S. Army.
do do do	do Raymond H. Seeley,	C., Springfield, Mass.
do do do	do Frederick G. Clark,	P., New York City, N. Y.
do do do	do Lachin Taylor,	C. E.
do do do	do L. L. D., Rev. Asa D. Smith, D. D.,	P., Hanover, N. H.
do do do	do Rev. John Lord,	C., Stamford, Ct.
do do do	do Edward J. Sears,	New York City, N. Y.
Hanover Coll., Ind.,	do Rev. Lemuel G. Olmsted,	Washington City, D. C.
do do do	D. D., Samuel M. Hamill,	P., Lawrenceville, N. J.
do do do	do William Hamilton,	do Sistersville, Va.
do do do	do William C. Cattell,	do Easton, Pa.
Ind. Asbury Univ., Ind.,	do W. L. Thornton,	W., London, Eng.
do do do	do H. C. Benson,	M. E., Stockton, Cal.
29, College of N. Jersey,	do William C. Cattell,	P., Easton, Pa.
do do do	do Samuel Miller,	do Mount Holly, N. J.
do do do	do Edward D. Yeomans,	P., Rochester, N. Y.
do do do	do L. L. D., Frederick T. Frelinghuysen,	Newark, N. J.
do do do	do Hon. Mercer Beasley,	N. J.
Wabash Coll., Ind.,	D. D., Thomas Wickes,	C., Marietta, Ohio.
Ohio West. Univ., Ohio,	do James Stacy,	W., Sheffield, Eng.
Columbia Coll., N. Y.,	M. D., Henry S. Cutler,	New York City, N. Y.
do do do	do L. L. D., Henry Drisler,	do do
30, Trinity Coll., Ct.,	D. D., Robert B. Fairbairn,	P. E., Avondale, N. Y.
do do do	do David H. Short,	do Broadbrook, Ct.
do do do	do Samuel M. Emery,	do Portland, Ct.
Miami Univ., Ohio,	do D. Judson Starr,	M. E., Cincinnati, Ohio.
do do do	do L. L. D., Edward D. McMaster, D. D.,	P., Poland, do
Dickinson Coll., Pa.,	do Rev. John Raby,	W., Eng.
do do do	D. D., Robert S. Macley,	M. E., China.
Westminster Coll., Pa.,	do John B. Clark,	P., Alleghany City, Pa.
do do do	do A. M. Black,	do Monmouth, Ill.
do do do	do Samuel Priestly,	P., Poyntzpass, Ireland.
do do do	do Alexander Wallace,	P., Glasgow, Scotland.
Centre Coll., Ky.,	do Livingston M. Glover,	P., Jacksonville, Ill.

June 30, Centre Coll., Ky.,	D. D.	Charles W. Forman,	P., Lahore, N. India.
" " Monmouth Coll., Ill.,	D. D.,	William Davidson,	P., Hamilton, Ohio.
" " do do	LL. D.,	Thomas D. Baird,	Baltimore, Md.
" " do do	do	George Scott,	do Holmes' Mill, Ohio.
" " West. Univ. of Pa.,	do	John Brown,	do Pittsburgh, Pa.
" " do do	do	Daniel March,	do Philadelphia, Pa.
" " do do	LL. D.,	Ben. Franklin Palmer,	do do
July 7, Chicago Univ., Ill.,	D. D.,	N. W. Miner,	R., Springfield, Ill.
" " do do	do	D. B. Cheney, do	Cal.
" " Ind. State Univ., Ind.,	do	Samuel C. Brown,	M. E., Fall River, Mass.
" " do do	do	William Davidson,	P., Hamilton, Ohio.
" " do do	do	Granville Moody,	M. E., Piqua, Ohio.
" " do do	LL. D.,	Hon. George A. Bicknell,	New Albany, Ind.
" " 13, Amherst Coll., Mass.,	D. D.,	Daniel Bliss,	C., Beirut, Syria.
" " do do	do	Gordon Hall,	do Northampton, Mass.
" " Univ. of Rochester, N. Y.,	do	E. H. Gray,	B., Washington City, D. C.
" " do do	do	Isaac Westcott,	B., New York City, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Israel Foote,	do Rochester, N. Y.
" " 14, Hobart Coll., do	do	Solon W. Manney,	P. E., Faribault, Minn.
" " do do	do	David Keene,	do Wis.
" " do do	do	Theodore Babcock,	do Watertown, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Marcellus A. Herrick,	do Sanbornton Bridge, N. H.
" " do do	do	Alvi T. Twing,	do Lansingburgh, N. Y.
" " West Reserve Coll., O.,	do	William H. Goodrich,	P., Cleveland, Ohio.
" " do do	do	Henry M. Storrs,	C., Cincinnati, Ohio.
" " do do	do	Joseph B. Bittinger,	P., Sewickly, Pa.
" " do do	LL. D.,	Rev. Henry B. Smith, D. D.,	P., New York City, N. Y.
" " 20, Harvard Coll., Mass.,	do	Reuben A. Chapman,	Springfield, Mass.
" " do do	do	Hon. William P. Fessenden,	Washington City, D. C.
" " do do	do	Hon. Charles F. Adams,	London, Eng.
" " do do	do	Edward Laboulaye,	Paris, France.
" " Taft's Coll., do	D. D.,	James P. Weston,	Galesburgh, Ill.
" " 21, Wesleyan Univ., Ct.,	do	Robert Allyn,	M. E., Lebanon, Ill.
" " do do	do	Isaac W. Wiley,	do Cincinnati, Ohio.
" " do do	LL. D.,	George Thompson,	Eng.
" " Dartmouth Coll., N. H.,	do	Rev. Nathan Lord, D. D.,	C., Hanover, N. H.
" " do do	LL. D.,	Rev. Benjamin Labaree, D. D.,	do Middlebury, Vt.
" " do do	D. D.,	Levi Spaulding,	do Ceylon, India.
" " do do	do	Joseph C. Bodwell,	do Woburn, Mass.
" " do do	do	Ezra E. Adams,	P., Philadelphia, Pa.
" " Hamilton Coll., N. Y.,	do	James Glentworth Butler,	P., do do
" " do do	do	Samuel M. Campbell,	do Utica, N. Y.,
" " do do	do	Ezra H. Gillett,	do New York City, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Edward Strong,	C., New Haven, Ct.
" " do do	LL. D.,	Hon. Henry E. Davies,	do New York City, N. Y.
" " do do	do	George Wm. Clinton,	Buffalo, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Anson S. Miller,	Rockford, Ill.
" " do do	Ph. D.,	H. P. Sartwell,	M. D., Pen Yan, N. Y.
" " 27, Lewisburgh Univ., Pa.,	D. D.,	Benjamin Griffith,	B., Philadelphia, Pa.
" " 28, Union Coll., N. Y.,	do	Levi Sternberg,	Hartwick, N. Y.
" " do do	do	John D. Wells,	P., Brooklyn, E. D., N. Y.
" " do do	do	Robert T. Lowell,	do Duanesburgh, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Wm. Chauncey Childs,	Boston, Mass.
" " do do	LL. D.,	Richard M. Blatchford,	do New York City, N. Y.
" " do do	do	William T. Allen,	do do
" " do do	do	Hon. George F. Comstock,	Syracuse, N. Y.

July, 28, Union Coll., N. Y.,	LL. D.,	Hon. David Pratt,	do do	
" " do do	do	Hon. Josiah Sutherland,	do	New York City, N. Y.
" " Yale College, Ct.,	do	Gen. John G. Barnard,	do	Washington City, D. C.
" " do do	do	Henry A. Dubois,	do	New Haven, Ct.
" " La Fayette Coll., Pa.,	do	Hon. Daniel Agnew,	do	Beaver, Pa.
" " do do	do	Rev. Charles Hodge, D. D.,	P.,	Princeton, N. J.
" " do do	D. D.,	George W. Janvier,	do	Dartmouth, N. J.
" " Westminster Coll., Mo.,	do	James H. Brooks,	do	St. Louis, Mo.
" " do do	do	Robert Watts,	do	Dublin, Ireland.
" " Alfred Univ., N. Y.,	do	Joel Wakeman,	do	Almond, N. Y.
" " Acadia Coll., N. S.,	do	Robert J. Wilson,	do	Hamilton, C. W.
" " Hamline Univ., Minn.,	LL. D.,	Rev. J. G. Blair, D. D.,	M. E.,	Athens, Ohio.
Aug. 3, Williams Coll., Mass.,	D. D.,	Simeon H. Calhoun,	C.,	Mt. Lebanon, Syria.
" " do do	do	Lowell Smith,	do	Sandwich Islands.
" " do do	do	Theron H. Hawks,	P.,	Cleveland, Ohio.
" " do do	LL. D.,	M. Gen. Benj. F. Butler,	do	Lowell, Mass.,
" " do do	do	Hon. Stephen J. Field,	do	San Francisco, Cal.
" " Univ. of Vermont, Vt.,	D. D.,	James Dougherty,	C.,	Johnson, Vt.
" " do do	do	John F. Bigelow,	B.,	Keeseville, N. Y.
" " do do	do	Israel E. Dwinell,	C.,	Sacramento, Cal.
" " do do	do	John B. Wentworth,	M. E.,	Troy, N. Y.
" " Jefferson Coll., Pa.,	do	J. Brinton Smith,	do	Jersey City, N. J.
" " do do	do	Andrew B. Happer,	P.,	Canton, China.
" " do do	do	William M. Cornell,	P.,	Philadelphia, Pa.
" " do do	LL. D.,	Hon. James Veech,	P.,	Pittsburgh, Pa.
" " 10, Middlebury Coll., Vt.,	do	Rev. Myron Winslow, D. D.,	C.,	Madras, India.
" " do do	D. D.,	Seth H. Keeler,	do	Calais, Me.
" " do do	do	George P. Tyler,	do	Brattleboro, Vt.
" " 17, Madison Univ., N. Y.,	do	S. J. Creswell,	B.,	Philadelphia, Pa.
" " do do	do	Sampson Talbot,	do	Granville, Ohio.
" " do do	do	William S. Mikels,	do	New York City, N. Y.
" " do do	LL. D.,	George Wm. Curtis,	do do	
" " do do	do	Rev. John Hebb,	P.,	Edinburgh, Scotland.
" " Lawrence Univ., Wis.,	do	Hon. James T. Lewis,		Madison, Wis.
" " do do	D. D.,	Wesson G. Miller,	M. E.,	Milwaukee, Wis.
Sept. 7, Brown University, R. I.,	do	Robinson P. Dunn,	P.,	Providence, R. I.
" " do do	do	Edward A. Stevens,	B.,	Rangoon, Burmah.
" " do do	LL. D.,	Prof. Goldwin Smith,		Oxford, England.
" " Washington Coll., Pa.,	do	Hon. Daniel Agnew,	do	Beaver, Pa.
" " do do	do	Rev. Charles Hodge, D. D.,	P.,	Princeton, N. J.
" " do do	D. D.,	Robert B. Walker,	P.,	Pislingrove, Pa.

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The January number begins the *Third* volume of the new Series of this combined Quarterly. Being in solid type, it contains more matter than any other religious Quarterly. Its aim is to discuss topics of current interest connected with theology, biblical literature, philosophy, science, and the vital questions of the day, in a learned, thorough and yet brief and comprehensive manner. Its corps of contributors embraces many of the ablest and best known writers in the land. Each number contains from 8 to 10 articles, and a vast amount of Criticisms on Books, and theological and literary Intelligence from all parts of the world: in this department it is unapproached in point of fullness and a value by any other Review in the country.

NOTICES OF THE PRESS FOR 1864.

We select a few from a multitude.

"This Quarterly is now indispensable to those who desire the best evangelical issues of current thought."—*Congregationalist*, (Boston.)

This Quarterly has been greatly improved since the consolidation of the American Presbyterian of Philadelphia, and the Theological Review.—*Presbyter Cincinnati*.

The American Presbyterian and Theological Review combines two original Reviews—the Presbyterian Quarterly running back some twelve years, and the American Theological Review commenced in 1859. Perhaps no Review in this country has more able contributors. Prof. H. B. Smith, one of its editors, is in himself a host. The management of this Review is such as to combine vigor and learning with freshness and variety. Its denationalism is of the most genial kind, not pugnacious or controversial, but yet frank and outspoken. It not always on the lookout for lurking foes, or heresy in every breeze, it is devoted alike to the cause of Scriptural doctrine and sound learning. For those who have only the means to procure a single one of our quarterlies, we know of no single Review of equal value.—*New York Ecologist*.

This is one of the most valuable and ably conducted Reviews published by any branch of the Christian Church.—*Northern Christian Advocate*.

The October number of this excellent quarterly has promptly appeared, containing eight articles, with the summaries of intelligence and classified criticisms on books. The gem of the number, as usual, is the article by Prof. Smith, one of its editors, who may at some time have written something not worth reading, but if so, we have never seen it. The review is conducted with signal ability and deserves a catholic support.—*Christian Intelligence*.

The Eight Essays and Reviews of this number are distinguished by variety and ability, by adaptation to very different wants, and by a fitness for the times. The Theological and Literary Intelligence is prepared with a care, tact and spiritiveness which will continue to make it one of the strongest features of this admirable Quarterly.—*Lutheran Observer*.

A very thoughtful, comprehensive and instructive number (April) of this able and useful Quarterly.—*The Independent*.

This Review is unquestionably, as far as our own observation extends, the most able of denationalist Reviews.—*The Lutheran*, (Phila.)

"The American Presbyterian and Theological Review, edited by H. B. Smith, D. D., and Rev. J. M. Sherwood, with several most able associates, is a publication which deserves an extensive circulation among its ministers and members of the Presbyterian Church. It is distinguished by a catholic spirit, a high and liberal scholarship, and a wise advocacy of the polity and genius of that Church which it so ably represents."

"Resolved, As the American Presbyterian and Theological Review is the only one of its class which represents the Church to which we belong, that it be earnestly recommended by this Association, to the intelligent laymen of our Denomination, to subscribe to their names as its readers and patrons, assuring them that by so doing, they will at a small cost, secure great advantage to themselves and to their families, while they contribute to a great public benefit, to honor of scholarship and religion."—*Presbyterian Clerical Association of New York City*.

As a Quarterly we have always liked it, though not agreeing with all its teachings. It is always lively, learned, and various.—*Presbyterian Banner*, (Pittsburgh.)

The Review is unusually rich in its critical department, and its readers can obtain a thorough knowledge of all that is going on in the theological and scholastic world, by a careful perusal of its pages. We know of no similar periodical in America or abroad which presents as great a variety of intelligence of this character.—*Evening Bulletin*, (Philadelphia.)

The American Presbyterian and Theological Review, April, 1864, (New York: J. M. Sherwood,) is well known under the management of its editors, Prof. H. B. Smith and J. M. Sherwood, as an influential organ of the new school Presbyterians, enlisted among its contributors many of the most eminent theological writers of the day.

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